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Abstract
Essays on Credit and the Labor Market
Zachary Austin Bethune
This dissertation consists of three essays on credit and the labor market. The
first essays studies the aggregate, business cycle relationship between consumer
credit and unemployment. Using micro-level data I show there is a consistent neg-
ative effect of unemployment on both a household’s use of and access to consumer
credit. I find that upon job loss, households increase applications for credit, get
denied more frequently, and experience significant reductions in both debt out-
standing and average monthly charges. I interpret these effects as an increase in
credit constraints for the unemployed and examine how this relationship impacts
macroeconomic variables over the business cycle. To do so, I extend the canonical
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model of unemployment to include a goods mar-
ket with search and financial frictions. Households have limited commitment in
repaying debt and face borrowing constraints that are disciplined by the ability of
lenders to enforce financial contracts. The model predicts that job loss is followed
by a contraction in borrowing constraints. In the aggregate, this channel leads to a
strategic complementarity between (un)employment and firm hiring incentives as
a higher fraction of unemployed consumers decreases the expected revenue from a
labor match. I calibrate the model to match the estimated fall in credit upon job
loss and examine how these individual unemployment-related credit shocks affect
aggregate business cycles. I examine the response of unemployment to aggregate
productivity and financial shocks. I find that productivity shocks do a poor job
ix
of generating the co-movement of credit and unemployment we observe in the
data. However, I find that aggregate financial shocks contribute significantly to
the observed dynamics of both real and financial variables.
The second essay, co-authored with Guillaume Rocheteau and Peter Rupert,
studies the long-term, aggregate relationship between consumer credit and un-
employment. The model is similar to that developed in Chapter 1, however, we
depart from the assumption that households’ borrowing constraints are driven by
an enforcement technology and instead allow enforcement to arise endogenously
based on lenders’ ability to monitor household repayment. As a result borrowing
limits are endogenous and depend on the sophistication of the financial system,
the frequency of liquidity shocks, and the rate of return on (partially) liquid as-
sets that households can accumulate for self insurance. Moreover, firms’ expected
productivity is endogenous and depends on firms’ market power in the goods
market and the availability of unsecured credit to consumers. As a result of the
complementarity between credit and labor markets, multiple steady states might
exist. Across steady states unemployment and debt limits are negatively corre-
lated. We calibrate the model to the U.S. labor and credit markets and illustrate
the effects of an expansion in unsecured debt similar to that seen in the U.S. from
1978 to 2008. Under the baseline calibration, the rise in unsecured credit can
account for approximately three quarters of the decline in the long-term average
unemployment rate.
The third essay, co-authored with Tai-Wei Hu and Guillaume Rocheteau, stud-
ies the set of equilibria in a pure credit economy with limited commitment and
endogenous debt limits, similar to that studied in Chapter 2. We show that the
x
set of equilibria derived under “not-too-tight” solvency constraints, as in Chapter
2, is of measure zero in the whole set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. There exist
a continuum of endogenous credit cycles of any periodicity and a continuum of
sunspot equilibria, irrespective of the assumed trading mechanism. Moreover, any
equilibrium allocation of the corresponding monetary economy is an equilibrium
allocation of the pure credit economy but the reverse is not true. On the nor-
mative side, we establish conditions under which constrained-efficient allocations
cannot be implemented with “not-too-tight” solvency constraints.
xi
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Chapter 1
Consumer Credit,
Unemployment, and Aggregate
Labor Market Dynamics
1.1 Introduction
Between the late 1970s and 2007, the U.S. experienced a rapid increase in
households’ use of debt to finance consumption. At its peak, borrowing on con-
sumer credit accounted for nearly twenty percent of personal consumption expen-
ditures.1 This trend was abruptly reversed during the 2007-2009 Great Recession,
which featured a large contraction in the consumer credit market, coinciding with
a dramatic decline in consumption spending and historically high unemployment.2
1Source: Federal Reserve Board’s Consumer Credit G.19 Release and NIPA Table 2.1. Con-
sumer credit is mostly comprised of credit cards, auto loans and student debt.
2The fall in consumption during the Great Recession has been extensively documented in
the literature. For instance, see de Nardi et al. (2012) and Petev and Pistaferri (2012).
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A growing body of research suggests that consumer debt is an important channel
through which shocks to households get amplified leading to large and persistent
responses in consumption. Empirically, this literature finds considerable cross-
sectional evidence that regions of the U.S. that had the largest declines in house-
hold borrowing during the Great Recession also experienced the largest declines
in consumption and employment (Mian and Sufi (2010), Midrigan and Philippon
(2011), Mian et al. (2013), Mian and Sufi (forthcoming)). Recent theoretical work
has examined the role of shocks to aggregate credit and liquidity constraints as a
mechanism that prevents households from smoothing consumption.3
In this paper, I empirically and theoretically examine the effects of credit
constraints for a salient group during downturns, job losers. Credit constraints
are likely to be relevant for this group as these households value access to credit the
most. Additionally, employment status and income are key criteria used by lenders
in evaluating the credit-worthiness of borrowers (Crossley and Low, 2012). First,
using household-level data from the 2007-2009 panel of the Survey of Consumer
Finances, I identify a consistent negative effect of entering into unemployment
on both a household’s use of and access to consumer credit. I find that upon
job loss, households increase demand for credit, get denied more frequently, and
experience significant reductions in both debt outstanding and average monthly
charges compared to households that maintained employment between 2007 and
3These include Midrigan and Philippon (2011), Hall (2011), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011),
among others. Additionally, there is considerable evidence that households are credit or liq-
uidity constrained. Early work by Zeldes (1989) finds that households in the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics with low liquid assets are indeed those households in which the test of the
permanent income hypothesis fails. Others include Jappelli et al. (1998), Japelli (1990), Gross
and Souleles (2002), and Agarwal et al. (2007). See Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) for a review
of this literature.
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2009. This effect is particularly pronounced for borrowing on credit cards. While
I cannot directly observe if the decline in credit for these households translated
into a fall in consumption, I do find that there is a significant positive effect of
unemployment on the likelihood of having zero liquid assets. This suggests that
these households are limited in replacing their lost income by dis-saving.4
I interpret the effect of the fall in consumer debt as an increase in credit con-
straints for the unemployed and examine if this effect can explain the aggregate
co-movement of debt, employment and consumption over the business cycle. To
do so, I develop a model that features search in labor and goods markets in which
credit is constrained by the ability of lenders to enforce financial contracts. The
starting point is the canonical model of equilibrium unemployment by Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994), hereafter MP, in which both firms and workers must go
through frictional hiring before production can occur. However, in this framework
firms are considered to sell their output seamlessly in a competitive, frictionless
environment and there is no inherent role for credit in the goods market. I de-
scribe a household’s need for liquidity (through credit) by incorporating search
and matching frictions in the goods market in the style of Diamond (1990), Shi
(1996), and Lagos and Wright (2005). A firm matched with a worker in the labor
market produces intermediate output that it can either sell in a decentralized,
frictional goods market or in a competitive, frictionless market as in MP. These
two markets open sequentially and I assume that households have quasi-linear
preferences over consumption in the decentralized and competitive market. This
feature, combined with the fact that all labor income (wages and unemployment
4I use a broad measure of liquid assets and consider balances in checking, savings, and CD
accounts as well as any treasury bills. See Section 1.2.2.
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benefits) is received after the decentralized market closes, generates a need for
credit on the side of households.5
The key friction of the model is that households lack commitment to repay
debt. The amount of borrowing within the period depends on the ability of lenders
to enforce debt contracts. I assume enforcement constraints are a function of
both aggregate credit market conditions, similar to those used in the literature
on firm financial constraints (i.e. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and Monacelli
et al. (2011)), as well as idiosyncratic household income. Similar to MP, a worker
that enters into unemployment experiences a fall in their income. This fall causes
the enforcement constraint to become tighter which leads to a fall in borrowing.
In the model, firm revenues depend on the extent to which households are credit
constrained. A fall in borrowing in the event of a job loss, decreases the demand
for the output of a labor match. In equilibrium, this causes a lower number of firms
to post vacancies and an increase in unemployment. Household credit constraints
generate strategic complementarities, which if strong enough will lead to multiple
equilibria as in Kaplan and Menzio (2014) or Bethune et al. (2015).
Finally, I calibrate the model to match the fall in credit for the unemployed
between 2007-2009 and examine the importance of this channel in amplifying
the response of macroeconomic variables to productivity and aggregate financial
shocks. In order to discipline the extent of household financial shocks, I use an ap-
proach outlined Jermann and Quadrini (2012) with regards to firm credit. Using
data on consumer credit and household income from the Flow of Funds, I con-
struct a time series for household financial shocks using the model’s enforcement
5This motivation for liquidity can also be found in studies of bank runs a la’ Diamond and
Dybvig (1983).
4
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constraint under the assumption that it is always binding. This methodology is
analogous to the standard approach of identifying productivity shocks using Solow
residuals from the production function. I compare the response of unemployment
and other labor market variables in the model to shocks to labor productivity and
financial conditions. As first pointed out in Shimer (2005), and more recently in
Hall (2014), productivity shocks in the context of the MP model do a poor job
of generating sufficient movement in labor market variables. Similarly, I find that
the credit effect of unemployment does not improve the performance of the model
in this dimension. However, I do find that aggregate financial shocks contribute
significantly to the observed dynamics of the labor market. Financial episodes
are particularly pronounced in the Great Recession and the recession of the early
1980s.
This paper is closely related to the literature on financial frictions and un-
employment. Wasmer and Weil (2004), Monacelli et al. (2011), Petrosky-Nadeau
and Wasmer (2013), and Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) consider how financial frictions
facing firms affects hiring and unemployment in the context of the MP framework.
I differ in that my focus is on credit to households and financial frictions arise as
a consequence of limited commitment and enforcement constraints, whereas in
these papers financial frictions are in the form of search frictions. On the house-
hold side, recent empirical and theoretical work (including Mian and Sufi (2010),
Keys (2010), Mian et al. (2013), Hsu et al. (2014), Haltenhof et al. (2014), Gropp
et al. (2014), Athreya et al. (forthcoming), Mian and Sufi (forthcoming), among
others) stresses the importance of the household debt channel in accounting for
movements in the labor market, particularly during the Great Recession. This
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paper is the first to connect how credit constraints depend on an individual’s
job status and show that these constraints have implications on the labor market
during business cycles.6
In terms of empirical evidence of credit constraints among the unemployed,
this paper is closest to work by Sullivan (2008) and Crossley and Low (2012).
Sullivan (2008) finds that low-asset households, or those in the bottom decile of
the asset distribution, do not borrow from unsecured credit markets in response
to job loss.7 Using Canadian data, Crossley and Low (2012) find that a quarter
of recent job losers could not borrow to increase consumption. I further this work
by showing similar patterns for the U.S. as well as by quantifying the aggregate
effects of the credit-unemployment channel. Finally, this paper is complementary
to recent work by Herkenhoff (2013) that considers the impact of consumer credit
access on unemployment. In his framework, greater access to unsecured credit
decreases the consumption decline upon job loss, increases reservation wages, and
leads to longer and deeper labor market recoveries. The current paper differs
in that I consider the reverse, the impact of unemployment on consumer credit
access. I show that an income shock, in the form of a job loss, is also a significant,
negative credit shock which, in the aggregate, also leads to longer and deeper
labor market recoveries.
6Additionally there is a growing literature that shows that job loss is associated with long-
term earnings losses and consumption declines (Jacobson et al. (1993), Farber (2005), Stephens
(2001), Browning and Crossley (2008), Davis and von Wachter (2011)). Krebs (2007) illustrates
that cyclical variation in long-term earnings losses can lead to large welfare costs of business
cycles. This paper differs in that, in the context of the MP model without credit frictions, a job
loss is a temporary shock to earnings. I show that in the presence of credit constraints, these
temporary losses lead to consumption declines as well as further increases in the severity of the
credit constraint.
7Sullivan (2008) finds that households in the second and third deciles do replace lost income,
however they only do so by 11.5 to 13.4 percent.
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 analyzes the relationship between
consumer credit use and unemployment both in the aggregate and at the micro-
level. Section 1.3 outlines the model. Section 1.4 gives a theoretical character-
ization of the equilibrium. Section 1.5 discuses the calibration, which includes
identifying household financial shocks and shows the results of the quantitative
experiments. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Evidence on Household Credit and Unem-
ployment in the Data
In this section, I use aggregate and household-level data to analyze the rela-
tionship between consumer credit use, unemployment, vacancies, and output over
the business cycle. First, using aggregate time series I establish a strong business
cycle correlation between consumer credit and macroeconomic variables. The co-
movement is most pronounced during the Great Recession and the recessions in
the early 1980s. Next, using household-level data I identify a consistent negative
unemployment effect on both the access to and use of consumer credit. When a
household looses their job, it is more difficult to obtain credit precisely the time
when the demand for credit should increase.
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1.2.1 Aggregate Data on Consumer Credit, Firm Entry,
and Unemployment
Figures A.1 and A.2 plot the dynamics of consumer credit outstanding (dashed
red line) in relation to key macroeconomic aggregates (solid blue lines). Each series
has been logged and de-trended using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing
parameter of 100,000.8 The time series of consumer credit comes from the Flow of
Funds Accounts. Consumer credit includes both revolving accounts, such as credit
cards, as well as non-revolving accounts, such as automotive and education loans.9
It does not include loans secured by real estate, such as home equity lines of credit.
In, Table A.1, I report the contemporaneous correlation between consumer credit
and standard macroeconomic variables. For reference, I also report the standard
deviation of the variable of interest, along with its relative standard deviation to
consumer credit.
8This parameter is commonly used in the macroeconomic labor literature, for instance see
Shimer (2005). In addition to allowing comparison to this literature, there are two other reasons
to depart from the standard smoothing parameter used in the real business cycle literature of
1,600. First, as pointed out in Bethune et al. (2012), the standard HP filter is very sensitive to
movements at the ends of data series and has a tendency to underestimate the trend component
during large contractions. Since I am interested the dynamics of aggregate time series following
the Great Recession, this is problematic. One option is to use a band-pass filter as suggested in
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). The band-pass filter allows the user to pull out a particular
frequency component of a data series, such as the business cycle, and because it is a one-sided
filter it has less error at the end points. Another option is to use a simple linear trend. The
method chosen in this paper is somewhere in the middle of these two approaches. Secondly, as
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) point out, the duration of financial crises are considerably longer
than the period considered in most business cycle studies. This suggests the need to analyze
key financial and macroeconomic variables over a longer frequency.
9 See Appendix A.0.5 for a more detailed description of the data sources.
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Consumer credit is pro-cyclical; it tends to decrease relative to trend during
recessions and increase during expansions.10 The magnitude of the fall in credit
during the Great Recession was not unique. Similar declines occurred during the
recessions of the early 1980s and the time period surrounding the 1991 recession.
We see that consumer credit is also highly correlated with movements across
labor aggregates. Unemployment and consumer credit have a negative correlation
of 61.7%. The co-movement of these two variables is the particularly pronounced
during the Great Recession and the recessions in the early 1980s. Additionally,
declines in the demand for labor, measured as changes in the amount of job
vacancies, and employment also coincide with those in credit. Consumer credit
has a 51% correlation with the rate of vacancy creation and a 64.6% correlation
with the employment to population ratio.
Additionally, consistent with the fall in labor demand and increase in un-
employment, I find evidence of a decline in the demand for firms’ output. For
instance, the declines in retail trade sales almost identically track the declines in
consumer credit. The contemporaneous correlation between sales and credit is
64.3%. Household consumption expenditures, while as a whole are not as volatile
as consumer credit, experience the same turning points. Focusing on consumer
durable purchases, the two series follow nearly identical deviations from trend,
with a correlation of 77.1% and a relative standard deviation of 0.92.
The high correlation between consumer credit, labor, and macroeconomic ag-
gregates illustrates the need for a better understanding of the relationship between
10The notable exception is the recession in 2001 following the stock market bubble when
consumer credit accelerated relative to trend. The acceleration of debt during this time period
is also evident in other forms of borrowing, namely mortgages.
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household finances, unemployment, and real activity. In the next section, I pro-
vide household level evidence that, at least during the Great Recession, consumer
credit was more difficult to obtain, limits on credit cards fell, and households
decreased borrowing. I finish this section by showing that these patterns are
considerably more pronounced if a household lost their job.
1.2.2 Micro Evidence on Consumer Credit and Unemploy-
ment
This section presents evidence on the relationship between consumer credit
and unemployment at the household level. The goal is to identify the effect of
unemployment on a household’s use of and access to consumer credit. To do
so I use data from the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF). The SCF is the preeminent data source used to study household finances
in the United States. Regarding consumer credit, it contains detailed information
about levels of debt outstanding, credit limits, whether a household applied for
credit, and whether they were denied. While the SCF is typically a triennial
cross-sectional survey, respondents from the 2007 survey were re-interviewed in
2009, creating a two-period panel data set which allows me to observe changes in
both employment and credit at a household level.
Sample Selection and Experimental Design In order to examine how un-
employment affects a household’s access to credit, I use a difference-in-difference
approach to compare changes in credit for households that entered into unemploy-
ment over the 2007 to 2009 period versus those that remained employed. This
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time period corresponds to the largest recession in the U.S. since the Great De-
pression. The aggregate unemployment rate increased from 4.6% to 9.3%. The
rate of monthly job layoffs increased from 1.3% of total employment to 1.7%.
This equates to an additional five-hundred-thousand jobs lost per month due to
involuntary reasons.11 The timing of the survey allows me to identify both the
effect of the Great Recession on all households’ credit access and use as well as
the differential effect from entering into unemployment.
The SCF contains observations at a household level. Since the goal of the
experiment is to identify the effect of a change in an individual’s labor market
state, I first restrict the sample to single households defined as those that reported
not having a spouse or partner as well as not sharing finances with any other
person.12 Additionally, I only consider households that stayed single throughout
the survey. Doing so mitigates the effects of any changes in debt or earnings due
to changes in the number of earners in a household and also makes classifying
observations into employment states easier.
I use a broad definition of employment and classify households as employed if
they reported that they were either currently working, accepted a job and waiting
to start, or were on sabbatical or extended leave and expected to go back to
work.13 My treatment group consists of households that were employed at the
11Data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). JOLTS defines layoffs
and discharges as separations initiated by the employer. These include layoffs with no intent
to rehire, formal layoffs lasting or expected to last more than 7 days, discharges resulting from
mergers, downsizing or closings, firings or other discharges for cause, terminations of permanent
or short-term employees, and terminations of seasonal employees.
12The SCF defines a household as a primary economic unit (PEU). The PEU is defined as
the core individual or core couple in a household plus any minor children or other financially
interdependent individuals with the core individual or couple. See Bricker et al. (2011) for more
details on the design of the 2007-2009 panel survey.
13The survey question asked households about their job status at the date of the interview.
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2007 survey date but reported being unemployed at the 2009 survey date. I
compare this group to those households that reported being employed in both the
2007 and 2009 surveys and also reported not having any unemployment spell in the
year previous to the 2009 survey date. This limits the potential for respondents
that were unemployed between 2007 and 2009, but found work close to the 2009
survey date.14 Finally, I restrict the analysis to households in which the head is
between 20 and 70 years of age. This results in a sample of 3,820 households.
Consumer Credit and Household Labor, 2007-2009 First, in Table A.2, I
describe the change in credit and labor market variables for the sample as a whole
during the initial two years of the Great Recession. The mean of the variables
of interest are reported for 2007 and 2009 in columns (1) and (2), respectively.
Column (3) reports the difference in means between the two time periods. In
regard to certain variables, the experiences of the sample between 2007 and 2009
coincide with the patterns we observe in the aggregate, discussed in Section 1.2.1.
For instance, I find significant reductions in several measures of credit card use.
The fraction of households with at least one credit card fell by 4.3 percentage
points, average monthly charges on credit cards fell by $53, and the average debt
limit fell by $1,240. Average credit card debt outstanding also fell by $212, though
not statistically significant. Surprisingly, opposed to the behavior in the aggregate,
automotive loans increased for the sample between 2007 and 2009.
14The SCF only asks respondents if they experienced any unemployment spell in the previous
12 months. It is possible that I classify some households as having not entered unemployment
but that experienced an unemployment spell between the two survey dates but longer than a
year before the last survey date. I drop all households that were employed in 2009, but reported
having an unemployment spell in the previous year.
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It is difficult to conclude from the evidence in Table A.2 if household credit was
systematically more difficult to obtain in 2009 compared to 2007 or if households
simply decreased their demand for debt. Perhaps the cleanest measure the SCF
provides that helps differentiate the two channels is by directly asking respondents
(i) if they applied for any credit in the two years previous to the survey and (ii)
given they applied for credit, if they were denied. On average, households both
applied for less credit and got denied more frequently during the Great Recession.
The fraction of households applying for credit fell from 63% to 43%. While we still
can not be sure how much of the fall in the rate of credit applications is driven by
demand, given that a household might withhold applying for credit if they think
they will be denied, we can conclude that those households that wanted credit
experienced a fall in their access to it. Conditional on applying for credit, the
likelihood of being denied increased from 19% to 25%.15
The final two rows of Table A.2 show that households’ total income was de-
creasing, as well as average weekly hours. During a time when income and hours
of work are falling, a consumption smoothing motive would suggest that borrow-
ing should increase. However, this is the opposite of what we see in the Great
Recession, as consumer debt declined. In the next section, I ask if the large in-
crease in the number of unemployed households can provide any clarification of
the trends we observe in Table A.2.
The Effect of Unemployment on Household Credit, Assets, and Income
This section illustrates the difference in credit, asset, and labor market outcomes
15I classify a household as having been denied credit if they reported ever being denied a
credit application and if they never received that loan upon future applications.
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for households that entered into unemployment during the initial two years of the
Great Recession versus those that did not. To do so, I estimate the following
difference-in-difference model:
yit = β0 + β1EUi + β2I{t = 2009}+ β3EUi × I{t = 2009}+ β4Xit + it (1.1)
The variable EUi indicates if the household entered into unemployment between
2007 and 2009. The variable I{t = 2009} is a dummy for the year 2009. The vector
Xit includes observable household characteristics such as age, education, race and
sex. The coefficient of interest is β3. It identifies the effect of unemployment on
changes in the variable of interest.
The identification relies on the parallel-trends assumption, or that without
entering into unemployment, the changes in outcomes for the treatment group
would coincide with that for the control group. I argue that the parallel-trends
assumption is likely to be valid for two reasons. First, I show in Table A.3 the
results of a balancing test which suggests the two groups have similar individual
characteristics and pre-treatment outcomes. The individuals in the sample who
lost their jobs between 2007 and 2009 are no more likely to be male or black, and
are weakly more educated than those who maintained employment. Addition-
ally, there is no evidence that either debt outstanding or the incidence of credit
use differed between the two groups in 2007. Labor income is also comparable,
around $28,000. The notable difference is that those in the treatment group are
younger, with an average age of 43 compared to 48 for the control group. This
age gap partially explains the differences in total household income, weekly hours
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worked, and credit card debt limits as younger workers tend to have less non-labor
income, work longer hours and have lower credit card limits.16 Secondly, the time
period under consideration consisted of a large, exogenous aggregate increase in
an individuals’ likelihood of being unemployed. The rate of monthly job layoffs in-
creased from 1.3% to 1.7%, or around five-hundred-thousand jobs lost each month
for involuntary reasons. This implies that any unobserved characteristics that are
correlated with both credit and labor risk are mitigated.
Tables A.4 through A.7 report the estimated coefficient, βˆ3, for different out-
come variables. Table A.4 shows the results for consumer credit variables. There
is a strong negative unemployment effect for changes in total consumer debt out-
standing. For households that lost their job, credit fell by $2,809. This represents
a fall of 60% of debt, on average. This decline is dominated by a fall in credit card
debt which decreased by $2,504 more for the treatment group. Table A.5 further
illustrates the effect of unemployment on credit cards. There is a consistent neg-
ative unemployment effect for both the likelihood of having a credit card and the
likelihood of using it in a given month. Further, average monthly charges on credit
cards fell by $250 more for households that entered into unemployment. These
effects are in addition to the evidence that credit use was falling for all households
during this time period. There was no significant unemployment effect on the
amount of debt outstanding on automotive loans.
Table A.6 shows that not only was there a significant negative unemployment
effect on the use of consumer credit debt, but that these decreases cannot be
16One might worry that younger borrowers have higher credit risk as they are the least ex-
perienced financially and so would have greater changes in credit constraints during the Great
Recession. However, Debbaut et al. (2013) show that young borrowers are among the least likely
to experience a serious credit card default.
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explained by a fall in demand. I find that there was a positive unemployment
effect on the demand for credit. Households who lost their jobs increased their
rate of credit applications by 14% relative to those that maintained employment.
However, we see that the rate at which households were being denied for credit
increased significantly more for the unemployed. Consumer credit became more
difficult to acquire, precisely for the group that should value it the most.
I further test for the possibility of a selection effect driving the rate of credit
denials by examining the reason given to the borrower in the event they were
denied credit. If we believe the reduction in credit was based on characteristics
other than a change in employment status, for instance negative credit history,
and if the probability of a household being in the treatment group is correlated
with these characteristics, then I could be potentially identifying the selection
of households into this group. Columns (3) and (4) of Table A.6 show the rate
of credit denials for what I term ‘credit-related’ reasons, including having a low
credit score and having a history of bankruptcy, and ‘income/employment-related’
reasons, which include lacking a job or insufficient income.17 The rate of denials
for credit related reasons showed no differential response for the treatment group.
However, there is a positive unemployment effect on the rate of denials for income
or employment related reasons. This result, combined with the fact that there
are were no differences in any pre-treatment credit denial outcomes, suggests that
households who lost their jobs in the Great Recession decreased their credit use as
a direct result of facing higher constraints and the primary reason for the increased
constraints was (un)employment related.
17See Appendix A.0.5 for further details.
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Finally, Table A.7 reports the effect of unemployment on income and assets.
First, households who lost their jobs were not able to smooth their income using
forms other than labor. Total income for these households fell by $20,000 more
than for the control group.18 This decline was only partially offset by an increase
unemployment benefits of $1,188. Secondly, there is consistent evidence that these
households were dis-saving as a result of losing their job. Total liquid assets,
measured as all balances in checking, savings, and CD accounts as well as any
treasury bills, fell by $5,292 for the unemployed, around half of the 2007 average.
Additionally, the unemployment effect explains the entire increase in the fraction
of households that were liquidity constrained. I consider a strong measure of
liquidity constraints as those households reporting having zero liquid assets at
the time of the survey.19 Consistent with the evidence in Kaplan et al. (2014),
there is a considerable amount of hand-to-mouth households in the sample. In
2007, 13% of the control group had no liquid wealth and the difference for the
treatment group was not significant. During the Great Recession the fraction of all
households that had no liquid wealth doubled to 26%, which is entirely explained
by those households in the sample that lost their jobs.
18Total income is defined similarly to the aggregate series in Section 1.2.1 and includes wages
and salaries, income from sole proprietorships, and interest and dividend income.
19Holdings of currency is not reported in the SCF. However, the 2010 Survey of Consumer
Payment Choice from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, suggests that the average amount of
cash holdings is $340 and the median is $70. See Foster et al. (2013).
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1.3 A Model of Consumer Credit and Unem-
ployment
In this section, I present a model of consumer credit and unemployment. In
the model, firms and workers meet in a decentralized labor market with search
and matching frictions in the style of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). These
firm-worker pairs, then, sell a fraction of their output in a decentralized goods
market with search frictions similar to Diamond (1990). I follow Diamond (1990)
in assuming that trades in the decentralized goods market occur with pairwise
credit. The key friction of the model is that households lack commitment to
repay debt. The amount of borrowing depends on the ability of lenders to enforce
debt contracts. I assume enforcement constraints are a function of both aggregate
credit market conditions, similar to those used in the literature on firm financial
constraints (i.e. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and Monacelli et al. (2011)), as
well as idiosyncratic income. Similar to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), a worker
that enters into unemployment experiences a fall in their income. This fall causes
the enforcement constraint to become tighter which leads to a fall in borrowing.
In the model, firm revenues depend on the extent to which households are
credit constrained. A fall in borrowing in the event of a job loss, decreases the
demand for the output of a labor match. In equilibrium, this causes a lower
number of firms to post vacancies and an increase in unemployment. Household
credit constraints generate strategic complementarities, which if strong enough
will lead to multiple equilibria as in Kaplan and Menzio (2014) or Bethune et al.
(2015).
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1.3.1 Environment
The model is in discrete time that continues forever. There exists a measure
one of households and a large measure of firms. Each period is divided into three
stages. In the first stage, households and firms trade indivisible labor services in a
labor market (LM). In the second stage, they trade consumption goods with credit
in a decentralized market (DM) with search frictions. Finally, in the last stage,
wages are paid, debts are settled and trade occurs in a frictionless, competitive
market (CM). The consumption good in the CM is treated as the numeraire.
Each household is endowed with one indivisible unit of labor and has expected,
lifetime discounted utility of
E
∞∑
t=0
βt [`(1− et) + υ(yt) + ct] , (1.2)
where β is the period discount factor, yt ∈ R+ is consumption in the DM, ct ∈ R
is consumption in the CM, et ∈ {0, 1} is time devoted to working and ` ∈ R can
be interpreted as a utility flow from leisure or home production. The utility func-
tion in the DM, υ(y), is twice continuously differentiated, strictly increasing, and
concave. Further, υ is assumed to satisfy υ′(0) =∞ and υ(0) = 0.20 Households
earn wages, wt, if employed (et = 1) and income, bt, if unemployed (et = 0), both
in units of the numeraire.
A firm is composed of one job and posses a technology to transform one unit of
labor into z¯t ∈ R+ units of intermediate good in the LM. Production occurs at the
end of the LM, after matching takes place. Intermediate goods can be costlessly
20The first assumption is sufficient to guarantee an interior solution to the bargaining problem
in the DM. The second assumption is a normalization and helps simplify algebra.
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transformed into yt ∈ [0, z¯t] units of the DM good (determined endogenously) and
z¯t−yt units of the CM good.21 In order to hire in the LM in period t, a firm must
post a vacancy at cost k > 0, in units of the numeraire in period t− 1.
The LM follows Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) in which households and firms
match bilaterally to trade labor services. Let the measure of matches between
st searching workers and ot job openings be given by m(st, ot). I assume that
the measure of job seekers in period t is equal to the measure of unemployed
households at the end of period t− 1, st = ut−1. The matching function, m(s, o),
has constant returns to scale and is strictly increasing and strictly concave in both
of its arguments. Moreover, m(0, o) = m(s, 0) = 0 and m(s, o) < min{s, o}. Given
these assumptions, a worker’s job finding probability is defined as m(st, ot)/st =
m(1, θt) ≡ p(θt), where θt = st/ot is labor market tightness. Similarly, the job
filling probability for firms is given by m(st, ot)/ot = m(1/θt, 1) ≡ f(θt). Matches
formed in the LM are exogenously destroyed at rate δ at the end of the CM.
The DM has a similar structure to the LM. A measure nt = 1− ut of retailers
(productive firms) and a measure one of households form random bilateral meet-
ings according to the matching technology α(nt). Therefore, the probability a
household meets a retailer in the DM is α(nt) and the probability a retailer meets
a household is α(nt)/nt. The matching technology is assumed to satisfy α
′(n) > 0,
α′′(n) < 0, α(n) ≤ min{n, 1}, α(0) = 0, and α(1) = 1. DM matches are destroyed
with probability one at the end of the period.
21For now, I maintain the assumption of no aggregate uncertainty and perfect foresight. In
the numerical section, labor productivity will be assumed to follow an AR(1) process ln(z¯t) =
ρz¯ln(z¯t−1) + z¯,t, where 0 < ρz¯ < 1 and z¯,t ∼ N(0, σ2z¯).
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Households trade in the DM through borrowing, but lack commitment to repay
their debt. In order to sustain credit relationships, the borrower must face a
potential cost of default. I assume that lenders have access to an enforcement
technology, which in the event of default allows them to recover up to a fraction ν
of a household’s current income.22 In the model, ν represents aggregate financial
conditions that affect all households regardless of employment status.23 Therefore,
in the model households are constrained by two dimensions: the ability of lenders
to enforce debt contracts, ν, and the household’s current income. Figure 1.1 shows
the timing of the model.
Labor Market (LM)
firms 
enter
matching
wage 
barganing
production
Decentralized 
Market (DM)
wage payment
terms of trade
(y, d)
Competitive 
Settlement (CM)
matching
job separation
debt payment / 
default
Figure 1.1: Timing
22It is equivalent to assume that ν is the probability that the lender can recover the entire
amount of the loan. With probability 1− ν, the recovery value is zero. For now I assume that
ν is constant. In Section 1.5 I let ν be time-varying and follow an AR(1) process and consider
aggregate financial shocks as innovations to that process.
23These could arise from many sources, for instance Herkenhoff and Ohanian (2012) stress the
increase in congestion in the foreclosure process during the Great Recession.
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1.3.2 Equilibrium
Centralized Market (CM) Consider a household entering the CM in period
t. Let Wt(dt, et) be this household’s value function. Upon entering the CM,
a household’s state is comprised of debt obligations dt owed from trade in the
previous DM and employment status et. Let Ut(et) be their value function at the
beginning of the LM in period t given by
Wt(dt, et) = max
ct
ct + `(1− et) + βUt+1(et) (1.3)
s.t. ct + dt = wtet + b(1− et) + ∆. (1.4)
Households maximize discounted lifetime utility choosing CM consumption, ct,
subject to their budget constraint which states that consumption and debt repay-
ment must equal labor income plus any firm profits, ∆. Substituting the budget
constraint (1.4) into (1.3), the household’s value function becomes
Wt(dt, et) =− dt + wˆt(et) + `(1− et) + ∆ + βUt+1(et) (1.5)
where wˆt(et) represents labor income, wtet + b(1− et). The use of linearity helps
simplify the model in two important dimensions. First, notice from (1.5) that a
household’s lifetime utility is linear in debt, dt. This will help simplify the credit
contract in the DM since the surplus from trade will also be linear function of dt.
Secondly, linearity implies a household has no desire to smooth the repayment of
debt over time and so with-in period debt contracts are weakly optimal in this
environment.
22
Chapter 1. Consumer Credit, Unemployment, and Aggregate Labor Market
Dynamics
The value function of a firm with a filled position at the beginning of the CM
with xt unsold inventories from the previous DM, dt debt promises, and wt wage
obligations is given by
Π(xt, dt, wt) = xt + dt − wt + βJt+1 (1.6)
where Jt+1 is the value function of the firm at the beginning of the LM in period
t+ 1.
Decentralized Market (DM) Trade Next, consider a match between a house-
hold and a firm in the DM. The terms of trade are given by the pair (yt, dt) which
states the amount of DM good the firm transfers to the household, yt, in exchange
for dt units of numeraire to be paid in the subsequent CM.
There are many ways to determine the terms of trade (i.e. proportional or Nash
bargaining, Walrasian price setting, etc.). For the benchmark model, I assume
that the solution is given by proportional bargaining which guarantees that trade
is (pairwise) Pareto efficient and leads to an endogenous firm markup that is
convenient in calibrating the degree of firm’s market power.24 The proportional
24Further, the proportional solution is monotonic in that each individual’s surplus is increasing
with the size of the total trade surplus. From Gu et al. (2013b), it is known that other, non-
monotonic trading mechanisms (i.e. Nash or competitive pricing) can lead to endogenous credit
cycles in limited commitment economies. With proportional bargaining, it is guaranteed that
any endogenous cycles that arise are not due to the trading protocol. See Dutta (2012) for the
strategic foundations of the proportional bargaining solution.
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bargaining solution is given as the solution to the following problem
max
yt,dt
υ(yt) +Wt(dt, et)−Wt(0, et) (1.7)
s.t. υ(y) +Wt(dt, et)−Wt(0, et) = µ
1− µ [Πt(z¯ − yt, dt, wt)− Πt(z¯, 0, wt)] (1.8)
dt ≤ νtwˆt(et). (1.9)
The maximization problem (1.7)-(1.8) above is given by Kalai (1977). The solution
maximizes the household’s surplus from trade while keeping fixed a proportional
split of the total surplus between households and firms. The parameter µ ∈ (0, 1)
can be interpreted as the household’s bargaining power. Equation (1.9) is the
enforcement constraint. Higher labor income or a better aggregate enforcement
technology relaxes the constraint. Notice while wˆ is endogenous, the household
and the firm take it as given in the credit contract since wages are determined
before the DM.
The bargaining problem (1.7) -(1.9) can be simplified by substituting in for
Wt and Πt from (1.5) and (1.6) and combining (1.7) and (1.8).
max
yt
µ[υ(yt)− yt] (1.10)
s.t. dt = (1− µ)υ(yt) + µyt ≤ νtwˆt(et) (1.11)
The maximand in (1.10) represents the household’s share, µ, of the total surplus,
υ(yt)− yt from DM trade. Equation (1.11) gives the pricing rule for the transfer
from the household to the firm. It says that the wealth the household transfers to
the firm is a non-linear function, (1−µ)υ(yt) +µyt, of the firm’s DM output. Let
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y∗ be the first-best level of output defined as υ(y∗) = 1. The solution to (1.10) -
(1.11) is given by
yt = y(et, wt) =

y∗ if (1− µ)υ(y∗) + µy∗ ≤ νtwˆt(et)
yt s.t. (1− µ)υ(yt) + µyt = νtwˆt(et)
(1.12)
From (1.11) - (1.12), we can completely determine the terms of trade from knowl-
edge of the household’s payment capacity wˆt(et), which depends on their current
employment status, et, and equilibrium wage, wt. If the payment capacity is above
a certain threshold, (1− µ)υ(y∗) + µy∗, then the solution to the bargaining prob-
lem is to trade the first best level, y∗. Otherwise, households borrow up to their
constrained limit and the terms of trade are given by {y(et, wt), wˆt(et)}.25 In order
to simplify notation, I denote the DM consumption of employed and unemployed
agents as y1 = y(1, w) and y0 = y(0, w), respectively.
Let Vt(et) be the household’s lifetime utility upon entering the DM at date t
with employment status et. Vt satisfies
Vt(et) = α(nt)[υ(yt) +Wt(dt, et)] + (1− α(nt))Wt(0, et) (1.15)
= α(nt)µ[υ(yt)− yt] +Wt(0, et) (1.16)
25The bargaining contract must also satisfy the household and firm participation constraints
given by
υ(yt) +Wt(dt, et) ≥Wt(0, et) (1.13)
Πt(z¯t − yt, dt, wt) ≥ Πt(z¯t, 0, wt) (1.14)
which never bind given the bargaining solution above.
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where I use (1.5) and (1.12) to substitute in for Wt(dt, et) and dt respectively.
A household entering the DM gets matched with a firm with probability α(nt),
upon which they consume a fraction, µ of the total surplus from the bilateral
relationship. With probability, 1 − α(nt), the household does not get matched
and enters the CM without any debt. In (1.16), the household takes the terms of
trade (1.11) - (1.12) as given. The value function of a firm at the beginning of the
DM along the equilibrium path, Ft, is given by
Ft =
α(nt)
nt
[
ntΠt(z¯t − y1t , dt, wt) + (1− nt)Πt(z¯t − y0t , 0, wt)
]
+
[
1− α(nt)
nt
]
Πt(z¯, 0, wt)
(1.17)
=
α(nt)
nt
(1− µ){nt[υ(y1t )− y1t ] + (1− nt)[υ(y0t )− y0t )]}+ z¯ − wt + βJt+1
(1.18)
The firm matches with a household in the DM with probability α(nt)/nt and
trades yet , e = {0, 1}. With probability nt, they meet an employed household
and with probability 1 − nt they meet an unemployed household. Further, with
probability 1− α(nt)/nt, the firm doesn’t meet a trading partner and carries the
full amount of intermediate good, z¯t, into the CM.
Substituting Πt from (1.6) and using the terms of trade (1.11) - (1.12), equation
(1.18) gives Ft as the sum of the firm’s total expected revenue from trade in the
CM and DM in terms of the numeraire minus wages, wt, plus the discounted
continuation value of the firm in the following LM, Jt+1. Define the expected
26
Chapter 1. Consumer Credit, Unemployment, and Aggregate Labor Market
Dynamics
revenue as zt, given by
zt ≡ α(nt)
nt
(1− µ){nt[υ(y1t )− y1t ] + (1− nt)[υ(y0t )− y0t )]}+ z¯ (1.19)
Notice that zt depends positively on the level of DM trade described by y
e, which
is itself a function of wages, wt.
26
Labor Market (LM) Moving to the LM, the value function for a household
with access to credit, given employment status, et, is given by
Ut(1) = (1− δ)Vt(1) + δVt(0) (1.20)
Ut(0) = (1− p(θt))Vt(0) + p(θt)Vt(1). (1.21)
If employed, with probability δ the household transitions to unemployment. Like-
wise, if unemployed, with probability p(θt), the household finds a job and tran-
sitions into employment. Substituting in for Vt(et) in (1.20)-(1.21) from (1.16),
yields
Ut(1) = α(nt)µ[υ(y
1
t )− y1t ] + (1− δ)Wt(0, 1) + δWt(0, 0) (1.22)
Ut(0) = α(nt)µ[υ(y
0
t )− y0t ] + (1− p(θt))Wt(0, 0) + p(θt)Wt(0, 1) (1.23)
Households have an expected surplus from DM trade equal to the first term in
(1.22)-(1.23). Otherwise, the progression of a household through the labor market
is similar to that in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). If employed, with probability
26Sometimes I will make explicit the dependence of zt on wages and refer to z(wt).
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(1−δ) the household maintains their job or with probability δ they get separated.
If unemployed, a household finds employment with probability p(θt) and with
probability 1− p(θt) they have to continue searching in the following period. The
firm’s value function follows similarly. Let Jt be the expected lifetime value of a
firm with a filled vacancy at the beginning of the LM, given by
Jt = (1− δ)Ft + δVt (1.24)
where Vt is the value function of a vacant firm. From (1.24), a firm gets exoge-
nously destroyed with probability δ and must wait a period before searching for
a worker. Otherwise, the firm enters the DM with expected value Ft. Free entry
of firms to the matching process guarantees that the value of a vacancy must be
zero for all t, Vt = 0. Substituting in for Ft from (1.18), we can write
Jt = zt − wt + β(1− δ)Jt+1 (1.25)
Notice, zt is a function of DM trades, (y
0
t , y
1
t ), and the current measure of employed
workers, nt. A higher level of DM trade leads to higher expected firm revenue;
∂zt/∂y
e
t ≥ 0. On the other hand, firm entry has an ambiguous effect on zt. With
constant returns to scale matching, the probability an individual firm is matched
with a worker is decreasing in the measure of firms, nt. Higher unemployment
is good for vacant firms because it becomes more likely to find a match in the
LM. However, higher unemployment is bad for firms that stay filled because a
higher fraction of unemployed workers implies that firms are more likely to meet
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a consumer in the DM that is more credit constrained. Hence, the sign of ∂zt/∂nt
is ambiguous.
Wage Determination I assume wages are chosen such that the surplus gener-
ated in an employment match is proportionally split between the household and
firm according to exogenous shares λ and 1 − λ, respectively. That is, I assume
wages in period t are given by
Vt(1)− Vt(0) = λ
1− λJt (1.26)
The wage outcome in (1.26) is given as the solution to the proportional bargaining
problem in Kalai (1977) where Vt(1)−Vt(0) is the household’s surplus from being
employed and Jt is the firm’s surplus from having a filled position. Using (1.16)
and (1.18), Appendix A.0.2 derives the equilibrium wage equation
wt = λ[zt(wt) + θtk] + (1− λ)(b+ `− α(nt)µ[S1(wt)− S0]) = Γt(wt) (1.27)
where S0 = υ(y0t ) − y0t and S1 = υ(y1t ) − y1t represent the joint surplus from
a DM match with unemployed and employed households, receptively. Notice in
(1.27), I make explicit the dependence of y1t on wages through the loan contract
(1.12). The wage is a weighted average of the firm’s revenue augmented by average
recruiting costs per vacancy, θk, and a household’s flow utility from being unem-
ployed augmented by the net utility cost of potentially losing access to credit. The
equilibrium wage is a fixed point of wt = Γt(wt).
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A higher wage relaxes credit constraints for employed workers, which has two
effects on Γt(wt). First, higher credit implies more trade in the DM between firms
and employed workers, ∂y1/∂w > 0, which increases a firms’ expected revenue, zt.
This effect leads to a larger surplus in a labor match which puts upward pressure
on wages. Secondly, as credit expands for employed workers, the household’s
outside option in labor bargaining is negatively effected. Unemployment not only
coincides with a fall in income, but also a shock to credit constraints. Which
effect dominates depends on the relative bargaining power of households in labor
and goods markets. To see this, we can substitute in for z(wt) using (1.19) and
express Γt(wt) as
Γt(wt) = λ
[α(nt)
nt
(1− µ)[ntS1(wt) + (1− nt)S0] + z¯t + θtk
]
+ (1− λ)[(`+ b)− α(nt)µ[S1(wt)− S0]] (1.28)
= wDMPt + (λ− µ)α(nt)[S1(wt)− S0] + λ
α(nt)
nt
(1− µ)S0 (1.29)
where wDMPt = λ(z¯+θtk)+(1−λ)(`+b), which is identical to the equilibrium wage
in the Pissarides (2000) textbook model. It coincides with the equilibrium wage
in this model if there were no credit (i.e. ν = 0). The first and last term in (1.29)
are constant with respect to the wage in the match. The second term depends on
the surplus in the goods market between a firm and an employed worker. The sign
depends on the bargaining power of the household as a worker in the LM relative
to their bargaining power as a consumer in the DM. If λ is higher, then the first
effect discussed above dominates and wages are inflated due to the positive effect
on firm revenue. However, in the opposite case when a household’s bargaining
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power is higher in the goods market, the second effect dominates which creates
downward pressure on wages. If this negative effect is large enough, the wage
could fall below wDMPt . Under this scenario, the introduction of household credit
creates a ‘liquidity discount’ on wages equal to the additional value households
place on employment by increasing their access to credit. Figure 1.2 illustrates
the determination of wages under the two cases discussed above.
wt
⇣t
 t(wt)
45 
wDMPt
Case (a):   > µ
Case (b):   < µ
watwbt w
DMP
t
Figure 1.2: Wage Determination
If wt = 0, then Γt(0) = w
DMP
t +
[
λ (1−nt)
nt
(1 − µ) + (1 − λ)µ
]
α(nt)S
0, denoted as
ζt in the figure. In Case (a), λ > µ and the equilibrium wage is higher than in an
environment without credit, wat > w
DMP
t . Case (b) illustrates the opposite when
λ < µ and the equilibrium wage is lower than in an environment without credit,
wbt < w
DMP
t .
27 Lemma 1 makes this precise.
27Notice it is also possible under case (b) that the third term in (1.29) is large enough such
that wages are higher than wDMPt .
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Lemma 1. There exists a unique, positive solution to (1.27). Additionally,
(a) If λ > µ, then wt ∈ [ζt, w¯t] where w¯t = wDMP + α(nt)nt (1−µ)[υ(y∗)−y∗]. Hence,
wt ≥ wDMP for any (u, θ) combination since ζt ≥ wDMP .
(b) If λ < µ, then wt ∈ [wt, ζt] where wt = wDMP − (µ − λ)α(nt)[u(y∗) − y∗].
If ζt − wDMP < (µ − λ)α(nt)S1(wDMP ), then wt < wDMP . Otherwise, wt ≥
wDMP as in (a).
If household’s have more bargaining power as workers than as consumers, then
there is a positive credit externality on wages. In the other case, if households
have more bargaining power as consumers than as workers, and the net surplus of
credit to unemployed households in the labor match isn’t too big, ζt − wDMP <
(µ− λ)α(nt)S1(wDMP ), then there is a negative credit externality on wages.
Firm Entry and Unemployment Plugging in the wage from (1.27) into (1.25)
we can derive the difference equation for the value of a filled job as
Jt = S
f (nt, θt) + β(1− δ)Jt+1 (1.30)
Equation (1.30) gives a familiar law of motion for the value of a filled job. The
function Sf represents the firms share the total surplus from a labor match equal
to
Sf (nt, θt) = (1− λ)[z¯t − (b+ `)]− λθtk + (1− λ)α(nt)
nt
(1− µ)[ntS1 + (1− nt)S0]
+ (1− λ)α(nt)µ[S1 − S0]
(1.31)
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where S1 is a function of n and θ through its dependence on the wage given by
(1.27).28 The first two terms in (1.31) are standard and equal to the firms share
of exogenous output minus a worker’s outside option in an environment with no
credit, b + `, adjusted for the costs of vacancy creation. The last two terms are
novel. The first is equal to the firm’s share of the additional expected revenue of
a labor match from operating in the DM. The second term represents rents the
firm collects through wage bargaining, equal to their share of the the household’s
cost of loosing access to credit upon unemployment. Lemma 2 characterizes the
comparative statics when λ > µ.29
Lemma 2 (Comparative Statics of Sf (n, θ)). Let Sf (n, θ) be given by (1.31).
(i) ∂Sf/∂θ ≤ 0 for all n.
(ii) Suppose S0 = 0 (i.e. b = 0). Then ∂Sf/∂n ≥ 0 for all n.
(iii) Suppose S0 6= 0. Then the sign of ∂Sf/∂n is in general ambiguous, but must
change sign from positive to negative.
The value of the firm’s labor surplus is weakly decreasing in labor market tightness.
In the extreme case, if unemployed households are completely denied credit, S0 =
0, the effect of higher employment on the labor match is always positive. This is
because higher employment unambiguously leads to a larger surplus in the DM.
If S0 > 0, there are two forces at play when employment increases. First the
28S0 is a function of non-employment income b and other exogenous parameters, such as
aggregate financial conditions, ν. See equation (1.12).
29This case is informative for the quantitative section because under all of the calibrations
considered, λ > µ.
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rate of finding a trading partner in the DM for the firm declines. The sign of
∂(α(n)/n)/∂n is negative given a constant returns to scale matching function.
However in general, and increase in n, increases wages which has a positive effect
on Sf .
The law of motion for unemployment also follows the standard difference equa-
tion
ut+1 = (1− p(θt))ut + δ(1− ut). (1.32)
From (1.32), the measure of unemployed households in period t + 1 is equal to
the fraction of unemployed households in period t that did not get matched in the
previous LM, (1− p(θt))ut, plus the fraction of employed households that became
separated from their job δ(1 − ut) between periods. We are now ready to define
the equilibrium for the perfect-foresight economy.
Definition 1. A discrete-time perfect-foresight equilibrium is given by the se-
quence {ut, Jt}∞t=0 satisfying (1.30) and (1.32) such that u0 is given and limt→∞ Jt
is finite.
Given a series for Jt+1, we can determine labor market tightness, θt, as the
solution to the free entry condition, Vt = 0 ∀ t. This implies that k = βf(θt)Jt+1
in every period, where ∂θt/∂Jt > 0. Wages are determined by (1.27) which, given
b, pin down the level of trade in DM, (y1, y0).
Letting wt = w(ut, Jt) represent the solution to (1.27) and the free entry condition
θ(Jt) = f
−1(k/βJt), we can characterize the
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1.4 Equilibrium Characterization
1.4.1 Steady States in a Simplified Model
In this section I characterize all steady-state equilibria in the perfect foresight
economy under the extreme case that unemployed households receive no credit
(i.e. when b = 0). For convenience, I also assume that λ > µ as in case (a) in
Lemma 1. A steady-state is a point in (u, J) space such that the unemployment
rate and value of a firm are constant through time. Steady state unemployment
is given as a function of J by (1.32) setting ut = ut+1:
u =
δ
δ + p(θ(J))
(1.33)
This is the standard Beveridge curve derived in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
It equates the flow of households into and out of unemployment. Steady state
unemployment is the ratio of total separations to total labor market ‘churn’, given
by the total rate of separations and job finding. Let u denote the lower bound
for unemployment given as u = δ/(1 + δ). Since for all values of J above βk,
θ′(J) > 0, in the limit as J →∞ we have that θ →∞. Given the assumptions on
p(·), θ →∞ implies p→ 1. If J < βk, the labor market shuts down and u¯ = 1. In
Figure 1.3, (1.33) is represented as the downward-sloping blue line. Using (1.30),
we can characterize J as a function of u = 1− n:
J =
Sf (1− u, θ(J))
1− β(1− δ) (1.34)
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Given u, the value of a filled job is the solution to the fixed point problem in
(1.34). Lemma 3 this problem is well defined.
Lemma 3. There exists a unique, positive solution to (1.34), J∗. Additionally,
for any u ∈ [u, u¯], J∗ > JDMP , where JDMP = [(1−λ)(z¯−`)−λθk]/(1−β(1−δ))
and ∂J∗/∂u takes on the sign of ∂Sf/∂u.
The right panel of Figure 1.3 illustrates (1.33) and (1.34) for three possible cases.
In the first case, the top red dotted line, there exists a unique steady state. In
this case, the credit effects of unemployment are not strong enough to generate
multiplicity. In the second case, the solid green line, the complementarities be-
tween credit and hiring lead to two steady-state equilibria. Across these equilibria
unemployment and credit (and vacancies) are negatively correlated. In the third
case, the bottom dashed purple line, there also exists two steady-state equilibria,
however as unemployment increases credit eventually shuts down and J∗ = JDMP .
In the figure, this leads to labor market autarky and u∗ = 1. The left panel of
Figure 1.3 illustrates a case when the credit channel is strong enough to generate
multiple equilibria, but in the event credit shuts down, the labor market is still
active. Under this case, there are three steady-state equilibria.
Consider an exogenous increase in the output of a labor match, z¯. The J˙ = 0
locus shifts up, for instance moving from the solid-green line to the dotted-red
line in Figure 1.3. Unemployment decreases in the ‘good’ steady-state, or the one
with the lowest unemployment rate, and the value of a filled job increases. If the
increase in z¯ is large enough, the multiplicity of steady-states vanishes. A similar
effect occurs with an increase in aggregate financial conditions, ν. The J˙ = 0
nuclei shifts up for every value of u.
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J˙ = 0JDMP
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u˙ = 0
u u¯
Jt
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C
Figure 1.3: Steady States
1.4.2 Dynamics in a Simplified Model
In this section, I characterize the perfect-foresight dynamics in the simplified
environment considered in Section 1.4.1. I first focus on properties of equilibria
in a neighborhood of the set of stationary equilibria and then characterize the
environment’s global dynamics, or those dynamics beginning anywhere in the
(u, J) domain. It is helpful to first transform the equilibrium conditions (1.30)
and (1.32) from discrete time into continuous time.30 The following defines all
perfect-foresight equilibria in continuous time.
Definition 2. A continuous-time, perfect-foresight equilibrium is given by the path
{ut, Jt}t such that
30See Appendix A.0.4 for a detailed discussion on transforming the model from discrete into
continuous time.
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(i) For all t ≥ 0, ut satisfies the law of motion
u˙t = δ − [p(θ(Jt)) + δ]ut (1.35)
(ii) For all t ≥ 0, Jt satisfies the no arbitrage condition
J˙t = (r + δ)Jt − Sf (1− ut, θ(Jt)) (1.36)
(iii) limt→∞ Jt are finite and u0 is given.
The functions Sf is defined in (1.31) and is independent of time, t. First,
consider the dynamics in a neighborhood of the steady state. Approximating the
system (1.35) -(1.36) by linearizing around a given steady state (u∗i , J
∗
i ) yieldsu˙t
J˙t
 ≈M
ut − u∗
Jt − J∗
 , (1.37)
where the M represents the Jacobian of the system (1.35) -(1.36) given by
M =

−[p(θ(J∗)) + δ] −p′(θ(J∗))θ′(J∗)u∗
−Sf1 (1− u∗, θ(J∗)) (r + δ)− Sf2 (1− u∗, θ(J∗))θ′(J∗)
 (1.38)
The system is characterized by one forward looking ‘jump’ variable, Jt, that is
dynamically unstable and one backward looking ‘predetermined’ variable in ut
that is dynamically stable. The local dynamics can be characterized by solving
for the sign of the two eigenvalues of M. The top two elements in (1.38) are both
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negative. Part (i) of Lemma 2 guarantees that Sf2 ≤ 0 for all u and hence the
bottom-right element is positive in sign. Additionally, from part (ii) of Lemma 2
and the fact that b = 0 in the environment considered, the sign of Sf1 (1−u∗i , θ(J∗i )
is weakly positive and hence the bottom-left element of (1.38) is weakly negative.
Therefore, it is straightforward to show that the eigenvalues must be opposite in
sign since det(M) ≤ 0.
Figure 1.4 illustrates two examples of dynamic equilibria. The left panel shows
the case in which the complementarities between household credit and firm revenue
are not strong enough to generate multiple equilibria. In this case there is a unique
saddle path that is downward-sloping in the (u, J) domain. This case is illustrative
in comparison to the dynamics of the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model in
which the saddle path is a horizontal line (i.e. Pissarides (2000), Section 1.7).
Suppose unemployment starts above its steady state value. When the saddle path
is flat, the value of a filled job (as well as labor-market tightness) remains constant
as the economy converges to the steady state. As unemployment decreases, firms
post less vacancies since lower unemployment implies a lower job-filling rate. In
equilibrium, the decline in vacancy posting exactly corresponds to the decline in
unemployment. However if the saddle path is downward-sloping as in the top-
left panel of Figure 1.4, labor market tightness increases along the transition. In
this case, vacancies must fall slower than unemployment. The reason is due to
the credit effect of unemployment: higher unemployment is good for firms filling
vacancies but lowers the value of a filled job.
The right panel provides an example with multiple steady-state equilibria. The
dynamics are characterized by two saddle paths that cross through the steady
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states with the lowest unemployment rate (point A) and the highest unemploy-
ment rate (point C). The intermediate steady state is a sink. For any initial values,
(u0, J0), within the grey-shaded region in Figure 1.4, the economy makes counter-
clockwise cycles converging to point B. For any initial value of u0, there exist an
infinite, bounded measure of equilibria converging to the intermediate steady state
and two unique equilibria converging to either the high or low steady state. This
example illustrates that if the negative credit effect of unemployment is strong
enough, expectations about future unemployment can have real macroeconomic
consequences, as in endogenous credit-unemployment cycles.31
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Figure 1.4: Perfect Foresight Dynamics
1.5 Quantitative Analysis
The primary experiment considered in this section examines if the negative ef-
fect of unemployment on consumer credit identified in Section 1.2.2 has an impact
31In Section 1.5 below, all the calibrations considered deliver a unique steady state, as in the
left panel of Figure 1.4.
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on business cycles in the aggregate. To do so, I consider two sources of exogenous
fluctuations. The first are standard: shocks to aggregate labor productivity as in
Shimer (2005). The second source are aggregate financial shocks that affect all
households. These shocks have been stressed in the literature on credit frictions
on the side of firms. For instance Jermann and Quadrini (2012) find that shocks
to a firm’s ability to raise funds through debt markets contributes significantly
to the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates. I consider a similar shock, though
now on households’ ability to finance consumption, through an exogenous change
in lenders’ ability to enforce financial contracts.
1.5.1 Calibration
The period in the model is set to a quarter. I set agent’s discount factor to
β = 0.99. All empirical targets represent quarterly averages over the time period
1978 Q1 to 2007 Q4. The model is first solved by a projection algorithm in which
expectations are computed using Gauss-Hermite quadrature.32 I then simulate
the model to compute the moments for calibration.
Labor Market The calibration of the majority of the labor market parameters
follows closely to the labor search literature following Shimer (2005), and more
recently the literature on financial frictions and unemployment (i.e. Petrosky-
Nadeau and Wasmer (2013), Petrosky-Nadeau (2014), and Monacelli et al. (2011)).
First, I assume aggregate labor productivity fluctuates over time according to an
32As stressed in Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang (2013), it is imperative to use global solution
algorithm in quantifying the dynamics of the DMP model as log-linearization understates the
mean and volatility of unemployment.
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AR(1) process
ln(z¯t+1) = ρz¯tln(z¯t) + (1− ρz¯)ln(µz¯) + z¯,t s.t. z¯,t ∼ N(0, σ2z¯) (1.39)
I normalize µz¯ = 1.0. Using the Bureau of Labor Statistics series on output per
worker, I estimate ρz¯ = 0.889 and σz¯ = 0.0075. For the matching technology, I
use a constant returns to scale function as suggested in den Haan et al. (2000),
m(s, o) = so/(sηL + oηL)1/ηL , which has the nice property of binding matching
probabilities between zero and one. I set the curvature parameter, ηL, to match
the average job finding probability. Following Shimer (2012), I first estimate
the monthly job finding probability according to pt = 1 − (ULt+1/Ut), where UL
represents the number of workers with an unemployment duration above 5 weeks
and U is the total number of unemployed workers.33 I find that p=0.601. This
implies that ηL = 1.200, consistent with the estimate in den Haan et al. (2000).
The household’s bargaining power corresponds to an egalitarian solution, λ = 0.5.
Vacancy posting costs, k, are set to match 13% of quarterly wages as suggested
by Silva and Toledo (2009). I set the exogenous job destruction rate, δ, to target
an unemployment rate of 6.1%, the average over the sample considered.
The remaining two parameters associated with the labor market are the value
of leisure, `, and non-employment income, b. In an equilibrium with binding
debt constraints, the fall in credit upon job loss exactly coincides with the fall in
labor income. To see this, suppose (1.9) holds with equality for both employed
and unemployed households. We can measure the proportional fall in credit as
33Data are from the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS).
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1 − (d0/d1) = 1 − (b/w). Non-employment income is crucial in disciplining the
strength of the complementarities between credit and unemployment in the model.
To set b, I use the evidence discussed in Section 1.2.2 and target a 60.4% decline
in a households access to credit in the event of a job loss.I then set the value of
leisure such that the total labor surplus is 71% of the average wage as in Hall and
Milgrom (2008).
Credit and Goods Market In general, the frictions in the goods and credit
market are designed to capture the inefficiencies of the process of getting produced
products into the hands of consumers. Fluctuations in these inefficiencies are
what induce fluctuations in unemployment. In the model, matching frictions,
α, determine the frequency of a household’s liquidity needs. Alternatively, credit
frictions capture the difficultly households face in financing the purchases of goods
once the liquidity shock is realized. To calibrate the parameters of the credit and
goods market, I use data on household consumer credit use and firms market
power in the retail sector.
The matching technology in the DM is also chosen to follow den Haan et al.
(2000), α(n) = n/(nηG + 1)1/ηG .34 I set the curvature parameter, ηG, to target the
ratio of consumer credit outstanding to output. During the sample period, this
averaged 9.47%. In the model total debt is D = α(nt)[nd
1
t + (1 − n)d0t ]. Total
output, across the DM and CM, is Y = ntzt − θtutk. Hence I set D/Y = 0.097,
which results in ηG = 1.27. This implies an average matching rate of α = 0.56, or
that liquidity shocks occur every 1.8 quarters.
34This specification is also a general form of the matching technology used in the early New
Monetarist literature, i.e.Kiyotaki and Wright (1993).
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Utility over DM consumption is given by, υ(y) = y1−γ/(1− γ). The elasticity
parameter is set to target the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of
an increase in debt limits of 14%, as given in Gross and Souleles (2002). In
the model the MPC of an agent in employment state e is given by MPCe =
µ[υ′(ye)− ye]/[(1− µ)υ′(ye) + µ]. The aggregate MPC is then given by MPC =
nMPC1 + (1 − n)MPC0. I set MPC = 0.14, which implies γ = 0.4. The
household’s bargaining weight, µ, is set to match a gross retail markup of 39%.35
To discipline aggregate financial conditions, νt, I follow the approach outlined
in Jermann and Quadrini (2012). I first construct a series for νt using the enforce-
ment constraint (1.9) under the assumption that is it always binding. That is, I
assume
d1t = νtwt (1.40)
d0t = νtb (1.41)
In the aggregate, this implies that total debt, Dt, is equal to
D = α(nt)[ntd
1
t + (1− nt)d0t ] = νtα(nt)[ntwt + (1− nt)b] = νtα(nt)I (1.42)
Replacing d1t and d
0
t , we can express total debt as a fraction of total income as
α(nt)νt =
α(nt)[ntd
1
t + (1− nt)d0t ]
[ntwt + (1− nt)b] (1.43)
35Derived from retail gross margins. The average ratio of gross retail margins to sales from
1992-2007 was 0.28. Hence the average markup is calculated by 0.28/(1 − 0.28) = 0.39. See
https://www.census.gov/retail.
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The numerator is equal to total borrowing in meetings with employed and un-
employed agents, multiplied by the measure of agents taking loans, α(n)n and
α(n)(1− n), respectively. The denominator is total labor income, ntwt, plus un-
employment benefits, (1−nt)b. Empirically, for the numerator I use the aggregate
time series for consumer credit outstanding, minus education loans, in the house-
hold sector from the Flow of Funds Accounts.36 For the denominator, I use the
aggregate time series for disposable personal income from the BEA.37 Given an
estimate for ηL in the matching function, I am able to fully identify νt from (1.43).
Notice that disciplining the financial shock in this way, assumes that movements
in total consumer credit to disposable income in the data are generated from two
sources, α(nt) and νt. Feeding the constructed series of νt back into the model
will, by itself, only generate the series of credit to income in the data if doing so
also matches the series of ut, which I don’t calibrate to. After constructing the
series for, νt, I estimate the autoregressive process
ln(νt+1) = ρνln(νt) + (1− ρν)ln(µν) + ν,t s.t. ν,t ∼ N(0, σ2ν) (1.44)
The estimation yields µν = 0.928, ρν = 0.960, and σν = 0.0165. The top two
panels of Figure 1.5 show the constructed series for z¯t and νt, respectively. The
36Total consumer credit covers most short and intermediate-term credit arrangements. How-
ever, data on student loans suggests many of these loans are deferred for several years. Since
the objective of the quantitative exercise is to see how borrowing in the current quarter affects
sales for same quarter, I exclude this type of debt from the exercise.
37See NIPA Table 2.1 Personal Income and Its Disposition. This measure of income is broader
than that in the model. It includes income from other, non-labor, sources including receipts
on assets, dividend or interest payments, and other transfer receipts besides unemployment
insurance (i.e. social security). I could alternatively only use data on wages and salaries plus
unemployment benefits. Doing so would only increase the estimated volatility in aggregate
financial conditions.
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bottom two panels show the innovations, z¯,t and ν,t. Since 1978, labor productiv-
ity has fluctuated around 3-4% of its long-run average. Those fluctuations mostly
arise from the persistence parameter in the AR(1) process. However, similar to
what Jermann and Quadrini (2012) find with respect to business credit, I find
that household financial conditions are largely driven by innovations in the pro-
cess. Table A.8 summarizes the choice of functional forms and Table A.9 gives
the calibrated parameters.
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Year
0.94
0.96
0.98
1.00
1.02
1.04
1.06
Labor productivity, z¯t
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Year
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
Aggregate financial conditions, νt
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Year
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
Innovations to labor productivity, ²z¯
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Year
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
Innovations to financial conditions, ²ν
Figure 1.5: Stochastic processes of labor productivity and aggregate financial
conditions.
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1.5.2 Quantitative Results: Productivity versus Credit Shocks
In this section, I use the calibrated model to examine if the fall in credit upon
job loss is enough to explain the co-co-movement of credit and unemployment
in the aggregate. I consider two exogenous sources of fluctuations: aggregate
productivity, z¯t and aggregate financial conditions, νt. For each case, I feed the
estimated shock process, z¯,t or ν,t into the model while keeping constant the other
variable at its unconditional mean, µz¯ or µν . The model implied series are then
logged and de-trended using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter
of 100,00 for comparison to the data shown in Section 1.2.1.
Productivity Shocks Figure 1.6 illustrates the effects of productivity shocks
on the unemployment rate, vacancies, output, and total consumer credit. The
model series are in red and their counterpart in the data is represented in blue.
First, productivity shocks have a limited effect on the cyclical movement of un-
employment, as has been well documented since Shimer (2005). Only during the
1982 recession does the model predict that unemployment increases close to that
in the data. The recessions in 1990, 2001, and 2007 only feature a slight increase
in unemployment and a quick reversal back below trend. The predictions for va-
cancy creation are slightly more in line with the data, though still under represent
the magnitude of the deviations. For both series, the model completely misses the
expansion between 2004 and 2007. Movements in labor productivity alone imply
an increasing unemployment rate and falling vacancy creation between this time
period.
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A similar story follows with regards to output and consumer credit outstand-
ing. The model implied series and the data coincide in sign for the recessions of
the early 1980s, though again misses on the magnitude of the deviations. Each of
the recessions post-1990 are not only shallow, but also short lived. For instance,
the data suggest that after the 1990 recession, GDP stagnated relative to trend
until 1996. The movement in labor productivity in the model suggests that there
should not have been any stagnation. Debt also shows no significant deviations.
Again, the model suggests that movements in labor productivity miss the con-
traction of consumer credit in both the mid-1990s and after the Great Recession.
This leads to the conclusion that productivity shocks cannot independently ex-
plain either the movement in labor market variables or the movement of consumer
credit.
Credit Shocks Figure 1.7 plots the unemployment rate, vacancies, output, and
consumer credit for exogenous fluctuations in aggregate financial conditions, νt.
The model implied series are represented in green and their empirical counterpart
in blue. Household financial shocks in the model come much closer to explaining
movements in the data. The aggregate unemployment rate is in line with the
model predictions, particularly for the 1990 recession. Surprisingly, the model
has a difficult time explaining the movements of unemployment during the Great
Recession. In the data, unemployment started to increase in the early part of 2007.
Movements in household financial conditions lead to an increase only beginning
in 2009, after the majority of the change in the data occurred. In magnitude,
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Figure 1.6: Productivity Shocks
changes in consumer credit can explain 30 percent of the total change during the
Great Recession.
Credit shocks also do a better job explaining the demand for labor. The model
predicts the entire fall in vacancies during the early 1980s and 1990s. Regarding
the Great Recession, vacancies also fall by the same magnitude though the model
predicts that fall starting only in 2009. An additional dimension credit shocks
improve on are the persistence of labor market variables, particularly after the
1990s. For instance the slow decline of the unemployment rate in the model,
coincides with the data.
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The changes in labor market variables as a result of credit shocks also coincide
with output and consumer debt. The model predicts a similar fall in output during
the 1990s and improves on the length of the contraction. As with the labor market
variables, credit shocks miss the beginning of the Great Recession by nearly two
years. However, once the recession begins, the model does a good job in predicted
the pace of the recovery. Finally, as could be expected, credit shocks do a good
job fitting the movements in household debt over the cycle.
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Figure 1.7: Credit Shocks
50
Chapter 1. Consumer Credit, Unemployment, and Aggregate Labor Market
Dynamics
1.6 Conclusion
There is consistent evidence that households face constraints in financing con-
sumption in the face of income shocks. Understanding which groups in the pop-
ulation these constraints affect the most is important in linking the observed
movements in debt, employment and consumption during financial crises. The
starting point for this paper was illustrating the fact that an income shock, in the
form of a job loss, is also a significant credit shock. Credit constraints increase
precisely for the group that values credit access the most, the unemployed.
I proposed a model that generates an increase in credit constraints for the
unemployed that is both analytically tractable, easily quantifiable, and nests into
the workhorse model of unemployment, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). This
easily allows comparison to other studies in the literature. I calibrate the model
to match the fall in credit for the unemployed and explore to what extent this
mechanism generates the observed business cycle co-movement of consumer credit,
unemployment, and other macroeconomic variables. I show that productivity
shocks do a poor job of generating the patterns in the data. However, I show that
shocks to aggregate household financial conditions amplify the drop in credit upon
job loss and contribute significantly to the dynamics of both real and financial
variables.
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Aggregate Unemployment and
Household Unsecured Debt
2.1 Introduction
Average household balances on unsecured loans more than tripled from 1980 to
2007, from roughly 3 to 10 percent of consumption (see Figure 2.1).1 In 2007, more
than 73 percent of all U.S. households had at least one credit card and roughly
50 percent of all households carried outstanding balances on these accounts.2
Evidence suggests that unsecured debt has become easier to obtain and limits on
credit cards have become increasingly more generous. The expansion of unsecured
credit over this time period coincides with a decrease in the share of liquid assets
1Unsecured debt or non-collateralized debt refers to loans that are not tied to any asset.
Unsecured debt primarily consists of revolving accounts, such as credit card loans, see Sullivan
(2005).
2Source: 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances.
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among all assets held by households and a long-term decrease in the unemployment
rate.3
These trends were abruptly reversed following the 2007-08 financial crisis: the
unemployment rate increased from about 4.5 to 10 percent while households use
of unsecured credit and liquid assets returned to their 1995 level. These recent
changes have led many commentators to speculate about the relationship between
the recent credit crunch and the slow recovery and high levels of unemployment
following the recession.4
Credit, Liquid Assets, and Unemployment
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Figure 2.1: Unemployment, Revolving Credit, and Liquid Assets
3We define liquid assets as M2 plus treasury securities held by households as a percentage of
their total assets given by the Federal Reserve Board’s Z.1 Flow of Funds. The unemployment
rate is the civilian unemployment rate reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
4See, e.g., the article in the New-York Times of October 29, 2008, titled “As U.S. economy
slows, credit card crunch begins” or the article in the Wall Street Journal of March 10, 2009,
titled “Credit cards are the next credit crunch.”
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The objective of this paper is to provide a tractable dynamic general equilib-
rium model with trading frictions in which to analyze the relationship between
household unsecured debt, liquid assets, and unemployment and the joint behavior
of labor and credit markets, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Our starting
point is the canonical model of equilibrium unemployment by Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994)—MP hereafter. While this model is explicit about the search-
matching frictions that prevail in the labor market, trades in the goods market
are assumed to be seamless: firms’ output can be sold instantly, households have
no need for borrowing (and if they do, repayment can be enforced), and there is
no role for liquidity. In contrast, in this paper, we describe household unsecured
credit and its relation to labor market outcomes by incorporating a retail goods
market with search frictions and limited commitment—along the lines of Diamond
(1987a), Diamond (1990) , and Shi (1996).
The model assumes that frictional labor and goods markets open sequentially,
as in Berensten et al. (2011). As in MP firms that enter the labor market post
vacancies and unemployed workers look for jobs according to a time-consuming
process. The output produced by firms can then be sold in a decentralized goods
market where retailers and households are matched bilaterally, and households
use liquid assets and unsecured debt to finance their purchases. The matching
shocks in the decentralized goods market are analogous to liquidity shocks in
banking models, except that the frequency of these shocks is endogenous in our
analysis. Unsold inventories are traded in a frictionless competitive market where
households have linear utility, as in the original MP model. Households value
consumption in the decentralized retail market more than they value consumption
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in the competitive market and firms have some market power that allows them to
charge a price higher than their marginal cost.
Following Kehoe and Levine (1993), households in the decentralized goods
market face endogenous borrowing constraints because they cannot commit to
repay their debt—the repayment of the debt must be self-enforcing. In order for
unsecured credit arrangements to be incentive feasible some form of punishment
must take place if an agent defaults on its obligations. If agents are anonymous
and their trading histories are private information, agents cannot be punished
from reneging on their debt. Therefore, we will assume that an imperfect record-
keeping technology is available that keeps track of defaulting individuals and that
makes this information publicly available. If a household defaults, and if default
is publicly recorded, then the household is excluded permanently from credit ar-
rangements. The endogenous debt limit that results from this threat increases
as households become more patient, as the frequency of trade increases, but it
decreases if firms have a higher market power.
We will assume that households are heterogeneous in terms of their access to
unsecured credit. Some households’ histories of default can be publicly recorded,
and therefore these households can be trusted to repay their debt. Other house-
holds cannot be monitored or are seen as untrustworthy: those households are
not able to borrow. Irrespective of their access to credit, we give the possibility
to all households to accumulate liquid assets—assets that can be used in the de-
centralized goods market as means of payment or collateral to secure one’s debt.
However, these assets are costly to hold in the sense that their rate of return is
less than the rate at which households discount future utility.
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We show that the use of liquid assets as means of payment can coexist with the
use of unsecured credit. So our model addresses the challenge in monetary theory
of generating coexistence of money—which requires lack of record-keeping—and
credit—which requires some record-keeping. For such equilibria to exist the rate
of return of liquid assets cannot be too high—so that credit is a better option than
money and the punishment from defaulting is sufficiently severe—and it cannot
be too low—so that some households have incentives to accumulate liquid assets.
Generically, households specialize in their methods of payment. Households with
access to unsecured credit do not hold liquid assets and finance their purchases
with credit only. Households without access to credit only hold liquid assets as a
way to insure themselves against idiosyncratic spending shocks in the retail goods
market.
Our model generates the following two-way interaction between the credit and
labor markets. First, the aggregate state of the labor market affects the debt limit
through the frequency of trade in the retail goods market. Indeed the number of
firms participating in the labor market determines the number of retailers in the
decentralized goods market. If the labor market is tight—there are a lot of active
firms producing output to be sold in the retail market—then households receive
frequent opportunities to consume, which makes exclusion from unsecured credit
very costly. As a result, an increase in aggregate employment tends to raise
households’s debt limits. Second, firms’ decisions to open vacancies depend on
expected sales in the decentralized goods market, which itself depends on the
availability of unsecured credit to households. If households can borrow large
amounts, then firms can sell a larger fraction of their output in the decentralized
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goods market where they can charge a positive markup, which raises their expected
revenue. Therefore, an increase in debt limits promotes job creation and reduces
unemployment.
In the spirit of Kehoe and Levine (2001) we study analytically two limiting
economies: one where households have no access to unsecured credit but can
accumulate liquid assets to insure themselves against idiosyncratic trading oppor-
tunities in the decentralized market; a second one without liquid assets but where
agents can borrow up to some endogenous limit. The former case can be inter-
preted as the pure monetary economy of Berensten et al. (2011). In accordance
with Rocheteau and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2013), such an
economy can have multiple steady-state equilibria because of the complementar-
ity between households’ choice of liquid assets and firms’ participation decisions.
Moreover, an increase in the rate of return of liquid assets raises output and
decreases unemployment at the highest equilibrium.
The second case, which corresponds to a pure credit economy, also has multiple
steady-state equilibria. Across equilibria, unemployment and credit limits are
negatively correlated. In one equilibrium there is a higher market tightness, i.e.,
a lower unemployment rate, as well as a higher credit limit. Intuitively, if there
are a lot of producers in the market, then the punishment for not repaying one’s
debt, i.e., the exclusion from the goods market, is large since households would
have to forgive a large number of trading opportunities in the future. As default
is more costly, the household debt limit increases and, as a result, firms can
expect large sales in the decentralized goods market. By a symmetric logic the
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second equilibrium is one with a high unemployment rate and a low credit limit.
Therefore a high unemployment equilibrium with a credit crunch is self-fulfilling.
We calibrate a version of the model to match the U.S. economy pre-Great
Recession. We illustrate the equilibrium effects of a reduction in the availability
of unsecured credit that match the empirical facts in Figure 2.1. From 1980 to
2010 unsecured debt increased from 2% to 10% of total consumption spending.
Under the baseline calibration, the model predicts that steady state unemploy-
ment was 1.7 percentage points higher in 1980. This matches approximately 70%
of the movement in trend unemployment between these two time periods. We
additionally consider the effects of the credit crunch between 2007 and 2010 in
which unsecured debt fell from 10% of consumption to 8%. The model predicts
an increase in steady state unemployment of .4 percentage points, from 5.13% to
5.53%. This corresponds to approximately 10% of the total increase in unemploy-
ment from 2007 to 2010. The results suggest that the prevalence of unsecured
credit can explain long-term movements in the efficiency of the labor market, but
are not enough, by itself, to explain short term fluctuations as that seen since
2007.
2.1.1 Literature
Pairwise credit in a search-theoretic model was first introduced by Diamond
(1987a), Diamond (1987b), and Diamond (1990). The environment is similar
to Diamond (1982), where agents are matched bilaterally and trade indivisible
goods. The punishment for not repaying a loan is permanent autarky. The role of
record-keeping technologies to sustain some forms of credit arrangements has been
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emphasized by Kocherlakota (1998). Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) consider
the case of an imperfect record-keeping technology where the public record of
individual transactions is updated after a probabilistic lag. Nosal and Rocheteau
(2011), Chapter 2 describe pure credit economies in quasi-linear environments
similar to the one in this paper. Sanches and Williamson (2010) were the first
to introduce limited commitment to study the coexistence of money and pairwise
credit in the Lagos-Wright environment. Gomis-Porqueras and Sanches (2013)
study optimal monetary policy in a version of the Sanches-Williamson model
focusing on incentive-feasible schemes where all trades are voluntary, including
the ones with the government. Gu et al. (2013b) study banking and endogenous
credit cycles in this type of environment.
Our paper is also closely related to the literature on unemployment and money,
e.g., Shi (1998). Our model has a similar structure as in Berensten et al. (2011)
that extends the quasi-linear environment of Lagos and Wright (2005) to include
a frictional labor market. In Rocheteau et al. (2007) only the goods market is
subject to search frictions but unemployment emerges due to indivisible labor.
In all these models credit is not incentive feasible. In contrast we introduce an
imperfect record keeping technology to make unsecured credit incentive feasible
and to allow for the coexistence of liquid assets and credit. Liquid assets are
formalized via a storage technology as in Lagos and Rocheteau (2008).
There is a related literature studying unemployment and financial frictions
that affect the financing of firms. Wasmer and Weil (2004) add a credit market
with search-matching frictions in the Mortensen-Pissarides model. They assume
that firms search for investors in order to finance the cost of opening a vacancy.
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Versions of this model have been calibrated by Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer
(2013) and Petrosky-Nadeau (2014). Other work by Monacelli et al. (2011) study
a labor search model in which firms issue debt under limited enforcement. In
their framework, debt serves as a mechanism to decrease the bargaining position
of workers, thereby lowering the wage bill. A contraction of credit is then followed
by an increase in wages, lower entry, and higher unemployment. Our model differs
from this literature in that credit frictions are on the side of households, they take
the form of limited commitment instead of search frictions between lenders and
borrowers, and a decentralized goods market where unsecured credit is formalized
explicitly.
Finally, our paper is related to recent work by Herkenhoff (2013) that focuses
on the role of revolving credit as a self-insurance mechanism against unemploy-
ment shocks. This mechanism delivers a positive aggregate relationship between
unemployment and credit as easy credit conditions lead to a smaller consumption
decline upon job loss, higher reservation wages, and therefore higher unemploy-
ment. In contrast, we focus on household’s self insurance against shocks occurring
in the goods market.5
5While we do not assume that the frequency of shocks is linked to one’s labor market status, it
would be straightforward to allow for such an extension in our model. For instance, suppose the
frequency of shocks is larger for the unemployed. Then an increase in credit will increase wages
and unemployment. Similarly our model could easily be extended to have ex-post heterogeneity,
as in Pissarides (2000), Chapter 6 to explain how credit availability makes households more or
less choosy.
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2.2 Environment
The set of agents consists of a [0, 1] continuum of households and a large
continuum of firms. Time is discrete and goes on forever. Each period of time is
divided into three stages. In the first stage, households and firms trade indivisible
labor services in a labor market (LM) subject to search and matching frictions. In
the second stage, they trade consumption goods in a decentralized retail market
(DM) with search frictions. In the last stage, debts are settled, wages are paid,
and households and firms can trade assets and goods in a competitive market
(CM). We take the good traded in the CM as the nume´raire good. The sequence
of markets in a representative period is summarized in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Timing
The lifetime utility of a household is given by
E
∞∑
t=0
βt [`(1− et) + υ(yt) + ct] , (2.1)
where β = 1/(1 + r) ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor, yt ∈ R+ is the consumption
of the DM good, ct ∈ R is the consumption of the nume´raire good (we interpret
c < 0 as production), and et ∈ {0, 1} represents the (indivisible) time devoted
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to work in the first stage, so that ` can be interpreted as the utility of leisure or
home production.6 The utility function in the DM, υ(yt), is twice continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing, and concave. Moreover, υ(0) = 0 and υ′(0) =∞.
(We need υ to be bounded below to have a well-defined bargaining problem in the
DM.)
Each firm is composed of one job. In order to participate in the LM at t, a
firm must advertise a vacant position, which costs k > 0 units of the nume´raire
good at t − 1.7 The measure of matches between vacant jobs and unemployed
households is given by m(st, ot), where st is the measure of job seekers and ot
is the measure of vacant firms (job openings). The measure of job seekers in
t is equal to the measure of unemployed households at the end of t − 1, st =
ut−1. The matching function, m, has constant returns to scale, and it is strictly
increasing and strictly concave with respect to each of its arguments. Moreover,
m(0, o) = m(s, 0) = 0 and m(s, o) ≤ min(s, o). The job finding probability of an
unemployed worker is pt = m(st, ot)/st = m(1, θt) where θt ≡ ot/st is referred to
as labor market tightness. We assume that limθt→+∞m (1, θt) = 1, i.e., the job
finding probability approaches one when market tightness goes to infinity. The
vacancy filling probability for a firm is ft = m(ut, ot)/ot = m(1/θt, 1). We assume
that limθt→0m (1/θt, 1) = 1, i.e., the vacancy filling probability approaches one
when market tightness goes to zero.
6One can interpret a negative consumption, c < 0, as borrowing across CMs with perfect
enforcement. Alternatively, one can make assumptions to guarantee that c ≥ 0 always holds.
For instance, if households receive exogenous endowments at the beginning of each CM, then
one can choose the size of these endowments so that consumption is non-negative.
7We take the view of a recruiting technology that is not labor intensive so that k does not
need to be linked to equilibrium wages.
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An existing match is destroyed at a beginning of a period with probability
δ ∈ (0, 1). A household who is employed in the LM receives a wage in terms of the
nume´raire good, w, paid in the subsequent CM. A household who is unemployed
in the LM receives income in terms of the nume´raire good, b, interpreted as
unemployment benefits.
Each filled job produces z¯ > 0 units of goods in the first stage. These z¯ units
are divided between some (endogenous) amount yt ∈ [0, z¯] sold in the DM and the
rest, z¯ − yt, sold in the CM. This makes y the opportunity cost of selling y in the
DM. Let y∗ solve υ′(y∗) = 1. We assume that y∗ ∈ (0, z¯). The assumption υ′(y) >
1 for all y ∈ [0, y∗) captures the notion that households value the opportunities
to consume early in the DM more than CM consumption. Therefore, in line with
the banking literature, one can interpret an opportunity to consume in the DM
as a liquidity shock.
The DM goods market has a similar structure as the LM in that it involves
bilateral random matching between retailers (firms) and consumers (households).8
The matching probabilities for households and firms are α(nt) and α(nt)/nt, re-
spectively, where nt = 1− ut is the measure of participating firms. So α(nt) is a
measure of the frequency of the liquidity shocks in the DM. We assume α′(n) > 0,
i.e., a tight labor market implies a high frequency of trading opportunities in the
8The description of the goods market with search frictions follows the model in Diamond
(1990), except that we assume a constant-return-to-scale matching function. The framework has
been adopted in the monetary literature since Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). This description has
several advantages for our purpose. First, the notion of credit seems more natural in the context
of a market with bilateral relationships. Second, search frictions rationalize the presence of
unsold goods (inventories). Third, search frictions generate an endogenous frequency for random
consumption opportunities that depends on the state of the labor market. This frequency will
play an important role in the determination of credit limits.
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goods market. Moreover, α′′(n) < 0, α(n) ≤ min{1, n}, α(0) = 0, α′(0) = 1 and
α(1) ≤ 1.
Households in the DM lack commitment. Therefore, firms are willing to extend
credit to households only if the repayment of debt in the subsequent CM is self-
enforcing.9 If a household defaults on its debt, such default is recorded publicly
with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1]. The parameter ρ can be interpreted as a measure of
the sophistication of the financial system.10 We assume that only a fraction, ω, of
households can be monitored and have access to credit. The remaining households
cannot borrow.11 Moreover, as in Wallace (2005), a monitored household can
choose to become unmonitored at any point in time.
Finally, there is a technology allowing households to store goods: each unit
of the nume´raire good invested in the storage technology at t yields R < 1 + r
units of the nume´raire good at t+ 1.12 Equivalently, we can think of stored goods
as Lucas trees in fixed supply, A, that yield a dividend normalized to one before
the CM opens and are traded at the ex-dividend price φ in the CM. (See, e.g.,
Rocheteau and Wright (2013), in a related model.) The gross rate of the return
of those Lucas trees is then R = 1 + 1/φ. Stored goods (or claims on these goods)
9Even though we assume that firms lend directly to households, one can think of firms as
consolidating the roles of a producer and a financial intermediary such as a bank.
10Sanches and Williamson (2010) adopt a similar assumption whereby a fraction of sellers has
no monitoring potential. Our assumption treats firms/sellers symmetrically. Williamson (2011)
captures the imperfection of the record-keeping mechanism by assuming that sellers have access
to a buyer’s history only with a given probability. Uninformed sellers might find it optimal to
extend credit to buyers, which allows for the possibility of default in equilibrium.
11The fact that a group of households does not have access to credit can also be an equilibrium
outcome even if those households can be monitored. For instance, if firms believe that some
households will not repay their debts, then they won’t lend to those households, and it becomes
optimal for them not to repay their debts since they are already excluded from future credit
transactions.
12For a similar storage technology, see Lagos and Rocheteau (2008)
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are perfectly divisible and portable and can be carried into the DM. If a household
has a units of stored goods in the DM, it can transfer up to a fraction ν ∈ [0, 1]
as means of payment. Alternatively, the household can obtain a collateralized
loan to be repaid in the next CM for an amount equal to νRa.13 Stored goods
are consistent with different interpretations, including currency, demand deposits,
shares of mutual funds, and even home equity. The opportunity cost of holding
liquid assets is R− (1 + r).
2.3 Equilibrium
In the following we focus on steady-state equilibria in which labor market
outcomes and loan contracts in the DM are constant over time. We characterize
an equilibrium by moving backward from the description of households’s choices
in the centralized market (CM), to the determination of prices and quantities in
the retail goods market (DM), and finally the entry of firms and the determination
of wages in the labor market (LM).
2.3.1 Settlement and competitive markets (CM)
Let We(d, a) denote the lifetime expected utility of a monitored household in
the CM with debt d from the previous DM, in units of the nume´raire good, and
a units of liquid assets, where e ∈ {0, 1} indicates the labor market status (e = 0
if the household is unemployed and e = 1 otherwise). We assume that the debt
13The partial acceptability of assets due to private information frictions is formalized in Ro-
cheteau (2011), Lester et al. (2012), and Li et al. (2012). Sanches and Williamson (2010) describe
an economy with money and credit. In contrast to our model, engineering a positive return on
money requires taxation, and agents can default on their tax liabilities.
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issued in the DM is repaid in the CM and is not rolled over across periods.14
Similarly, let Ue be the household’s value function in the LM. Then we have
We(d, a) = max
c,a′≥0
{c+ (1− e)`+ βUe(a′)} (2.2)
s.t. c+ d+ a′ = ew + (1− e)b+Ra+ ∆− T. (2.3)
The first two terms between brackets in (2.2) are the utility of consumption and the
utility of leisure, the third term is the continuation value in the next period. Thus,
from (2.2)-(2.3) the household chooses its net consumption, c, and liquid assets,
a′, in order to maximize its lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint. The left
side of the budget constraint, (2.3), is composed of the household’s consumption,
the repayment of its debt, and its purchase of liquid assets, a′. The right side is
the household’s income associated with its labor status (w if employed and b if
unemployed), the gross return of its beginning-of-period liquid assets (Ra), and
the profits of the firms (∆), minus taxes (T ). We substitute c from (2.3) into (2.2)
to obtain
We(d, a) = Ra− d+ ew + (1− e)(`+ b) + ∆− T + max
a′≥0
{−a′ + βUe(a′)} . (2.4)
From (2.4) the value function of the household in the CM is linear in its wealth,
Ra − d. Moreover, from the linear preferences in CM, the choice of liquid assets
14We can extend our theory to allow for debt to be rolled over across periods as follows. A
debt contract is defined by a CM payment, ∆, and a probability, 1−%, that debt is exogenously
extinguished. So % can be interpreted as the probability that debt is revolved. Also, if the
household gets hit with a liquidity shock, with probability α, the debt contract is terminated.
The expected discounted value of this contract is (1+r)∆/ [1 + r − %(1− α)]. Setting this value
equal to d, we obtain the CM payment, ∆ = [1− %(1− α)/(1 + r)] d.
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for the next period, a′, is independent of the assets held at the beginning of the
period, a.
Consider next the value function of a household with no access to credit—
either the household defaulted on its debt in the past and this default was publicly
recorded, or it cannot be monitored. We focus on equilibria where the household
is excluded from credit permanently. Firms have no incentive to lend to this
household as they anticipate that it would default on its loan; and it is rational
for the household to default on its loan as it doesn’t expect to get any loans in
the future. The value of a household with no access to credit is
W˜e(a) = Ra+ ew + (1− e)(`+ b) + ∆− T + max
a′≥0
{
−a′ + βU˜e(a′)
}
, (2.5)
where U˜e(a
′) is the LM value function of a household with no access to credit. We
assume and verify later that the wage paid to a household is independent of its
access to credit.
Finally, the expected discounted profits of a firm in the CM with x units of
inventories, d units of household’s debt, a units of liquid assets, and a promise to
pay a wage w, are
Π(x, d, a, w) = x+ d+Ra− w + β(1− δ)J. (2.6)
A firm with x units of inventories can sell x units of nume´raire good; the d units of
household’s debt are worth d units of nume´raire good (since there will be no default
in equilibrium), and the a units of liquid assets are worth Ra units of nume´raire
good. So x+d+Ra is the real value of the sales made by the firm within a period
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across the DM and CM. If the firm remains profitable, with probability 1−δ, then
the expected profits of the firm at the beginning of the next period are J .
2.3.2 Retail goods market (DM)
Consider a match between a firm and a household who holds a units of liquid
asset in the DM goods market. A contract is a triple, (y, d, τ), that specifies the
output produced by the firm for the household, y, the unsecured debt to be repaid
by the household in the next CM, d, and the transfer of liquid assets, τ . The terms
of the contract are determined by Kalai (1977) proportional bargaining solution
with µ ∈ [0, 1] denoting the household’s share.15 This trading mechanism guaran-
tees that the trade is (pairwise) Pareto efficient and it generates an endogenous
markup (if µ < 1). The solution is given by:
(y, d, τ) = arg max
y,d,τ
[υ(y)− d−Rτ ] (2.7)
s.t. υ(y)− d−Rτ = µ
1− µ (d+Rτ − y) . (2.8)
According to (2.7)-(2.8) the terms of the contract are chosen so as to maximize the
household’s surplus subject to the constraint that this surplus is equal to µ/(1−µ)
times the surplus of the firm. The surplus of the household is defined as its utility
from consumption, υ(y), net of the payment to the firm, d + Rτ . The surplus of
15The proportional bargaining solution has several desirable features. First, it guarantees the
value functions are concave in the holdings of liquid assets. Second, the proportional solution
is monotonic (each player’s surplus increases with the total surplus), which means households
have no incentive to hide some assets. These results cannot be guaranteed with Nash bargaining
(Aruoba, Rocheteau, and Wright (54). Dutta (2012) provides strategic foundations for the
proportional bargaining solution.
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the firm is defined in a similar way. The problem (2.7)-(2.8) is subject to the debt
constraint, d ≤ d¯, i.e., the household cannot borrow more than a limit, d¯, arising
from households’s lack of commitment, and the feasibility constraint, τ ≤ νa, i.e.,
the household cannot transfer more than a fraction of its (partially-)liquid assets.
Alternatively, we can think of the household as negotiating a loan of size d+ νRτ
where only the part νRτ is secured with collateral.
The bargaining problem can be simplified further by substituting d+Rτ from
(2.8) into (2.7) to obtain
y = arg max
y
µ [υ(y)− y] (2.9)
s.t. d+Rτ = (1− µ)υ(y) + µy ≤ d¯+Rνa. (2.10)
According to (2.10) the transfer of wealth from the household to the firm is a
non-linear function, (1 − µ)υ(y) + µy, of the output produced by the firm. The
price of one unit of DM output is 1 + (1−µ) [υ(y)− y] /y, where the second term
can be interpreted as the average markup over cost. Given this non-linear pricing
rule, output is chosen to maximize the household’s surplus, which is a fraction of
the total surplus of the match. The solution to the bargaining problem is y = y∗
if (1 − µ)υ(y∗) + µy∗ ≤ d¯ + Rνa and (1 − µ)υ(y) + µy = d¯ + Rνa otherwise.
So provided that the household has enough payment capacity, agents trade the
first-best level of output, y∗. If the payment capacity of the household is not
large enough, the household borrows up to its limit. If the household does not
have access to credit, because it cannot be monitored or has a recorded history of
default, then d = d¯ = 0.
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The expected discounted utility of a household in the DM is
Ve(a) = α(n) [υ(y) +We (d, a− τ)] + [1− α(n)]We(0, a)
= α(n)µ [υ (y)− y] +We(0, a), (2.11)
where the terms of trade, (y, d, τ), depend on the household’s debt limit and hold-
ings of liquid asset as indicated by the bargaining problem, (2.9)-(2.10). According
to the first equality in (2.11), the household is matched with a firm with probabil-
ity α(n), in which case the household purchases y units of output against d units
of debt and τ units of liquid asset. With probability, 1 − α(n), the household
does not have any trading opportunity in the DM, and hence it enters the CM
without any debt. The second equality in (2.11) is obtained by using the linearity
of We. It says that if the household is matched, with probability α(n), then it
enjoys a fraction µ of the match surplus. Similarly, the expected lifetime utility
of a household with no access to credit is given by
V˜e(a) = α(n)µ [υ (y˜)− y˜] + W˜e(a). (2.12)
According to (2.12) if the household does not have access to unsecured credit, then
it can only spend its liquid assets and consume the quantity, y˜, obtained from the
bargaining problem, (2.9)-(2.10), with d¯ = 0. Here, we have assumed that a
household who defaulted on its debt in the past can choose to be nonmonitored
and therefore cannot be excluded from pure monetary trades.
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2.3.3 Labor market (LM)
Households Consider a household who is employed at the beginning of a period.
Its lifetime expected utility is
U1(a) = (1− δ)V1(a) + δV0(a). (2.13)
With probability, 1 − δ, the household remains employed (e = 1) and offers its
labor services to the firm in exchange for a wage in the next CM. With probability,
δ, the household loses its job and becomes unemployed (e = 0), in which case it
will not have a chance to find another job before the next LM in the following
period. Substituting V1 and V0 by their expressions given by (2.11),
U1(a) = α(n)µ [υ (y)− y] + (1− δ)W1(0, a) + δW0(0, a). (2.14)
The household enjoys an expected surplus in the goods market equal to the first
term on the right side of (2.14). The last two terms are the household’s continu-
ation values in the CM depending on its labor status.
The expected lifetime utility of a household who is unemployed at the begin-
ning of the period is
U0(a) = (1− p)V0(a) + pV1(a), (2.15)
where p is the job finding probability. Substituting V1 and V0 by their expressions
given by (2.11),
U0(a) = α(n)µ [υ (y)− y] + (1− p)W0(0, a) + pW1(0, a). (2.16)
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By a similar reasoning the value functions for households with no access to credit,
U˜e, solve
U˜1(a) = α(n)µ [υ (y˜)− y˜] + (1− δ)W˜1(a) + δW˜0(a) (2.17)
U˜0(a) = α(n)µ [υ (y˜)− y˜] + (1− p)W˜0(a) + pW˜1(a), (2.18)
where y˜ is the DM consumption of a household with no access to credit, d¯ = 0.
Firms Free entry of firms implies that the cost of opening a vacancy must be
equal to the probability of filling the vacancy in the next LM times the discounted
value of a filled job, k = βfJ (assuming there is entry), where J = E [Π(x, d, τ, w)]
is the expected discounted profits of a filled job. It satisfies
J = z − w + β(1− δ)J, (2.19)
where z is the firm’s expected revenue in both the DM and CM expressed in
nume´raire good,
z = z¯ +
α(n)
n
(1− µ) {ω [υ (y)− y] + (1− ω) [υ (y˜)− y˜]} . (2.20)
From (2.19) the value of a filled job is equal to the expected revenue of the firm net
of the wage plus the expected discounted profits of the job if it is not destroyed,
with probability 1−δ. When writing the revenue of the firm in (2.20) we have con-
jectured that the level of output traded in a match is identical across households
with the same debt limit irrespective of their labor status. If a firm is successful
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in selling some of its output in the retail market, with probability α(n)/n, then
it receives a payment (d, τ) but forgoes y in the CM. Therefore, its received pay-
ments increase by d + Rτ − y, which from (2.10) is equal to (1 − µ) [υ (y)− y].
Solving for J we obtain
J =
z − w
1− β(1− δ) . (2.21)
The value of a job is equal to the discounted sum of the profits where the discount
rate is adjusted by the probability of job destruction.
Wage The wage is determined by bargaining between the household and the
firm. As is standard in the literature, we adopt Nash/Kalai bargaining as our
solution. The wage is set to divide the match surplus according to the following
rule, V1(a) − V0(a) = λJ/(1 − λ), where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the household’s bargaining
power in the labor market. The firm’s surplus, J , is given by (2.21). We conjecture
that employed and unemployed workers face the same debt limit and hold the same
quantity of assets. As a result, from (2.11) the surplus of a household from being
employed, V1(a)− V0(a) = W1(0, 0)−W0(0, 0), is independent of the household’s
asset holdings or borrowing capacity. Therefore, we will assume that the household
holds its optimal level of liquid assets and we will omit this argument in the value
functions. Skipping some algebra (available on request) the expression for the
wage is given by
w = λz + (1− λ) (`+ b) + λθk. (2.22)
The expression for the wage, (2.22), is identical to the one in Pissarides (2000).
The wage is a weighted average of firm’s revenue, z, and household’s flow utility
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from being unemployed, `+b, augmented by a term proportional to firms’ average
recruiting expenses per vacancy, υk/u. By the same reasoning as above the same
wage is paid to households with no access to credit.
Market tightness
The ratio of vacant jobs per unemployed worker is determined by the free-entry
condition according to which k = βfJ where J is given by (2.21). Substituting w
by its expression from (2.22) into (2.21) and using that β = 1/(1 + r),
(r + δ) k
f
= (1− λ) (z − `− b)− λθk. (2.23)
If (r+δ)k > (1−λ)(z−`−b), (2.23) determines a unique θ > 0 for a given z. The
financial frictions affect firms’ entry decision through z, their expected revenue.
If credit is more limited, then households have a lower payment capacity, sales in
the DM goods market, y, fall, which reduces z (provided that µ < 1). As z is
reduced, fewer firms find it profitable to enter the market.
2.3.4 Liquidity
A household’s optimal holdings of liquid assets is obtained by substituting
Ue(a) given by (2.14)-(2.16) into (2.4), i.e., a solves
max
a≥0
{− (1− βR) a+ βα(n)µ [υ (y)− y]} , (2.24)
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where y is the solution to the DM bargaining problem, (2.9)-(2.10), i.e., (1 −
µ)υ(y) + µy = d¯ + Rνa if the solution is less than y∗ and y = y∗ otherwise.
According to (2.24) households choose their holdings of liquid assets in order to
maximize their expected surplus in the DM net of the cost of holding assets, which
is approximately equal to the difference between the gross rate of time preference,
β−1, and the gross rate of return of liquid assets, R. The problem in (2.24) is
independent of the labor status of the household, which establishes that both
employed and unemployed households will hold the same quantity of liquid assets
conditional on facing the same debt limit.
From the bargaining solution dy/da = νR/ [(1− µ)υ′(y) + µ] if d¯ + Rνa <
(1− µ)υ(y∗) + µy∗. Therefore, the first-order condition associated with (2.24) is
− (1 + r −R) + α(n)µνR
[
υ′ (y)− 1
(1− µ)υ′(y) + µ
]
≤ 0, (2.25)
with equality if a > 0. The first term on the left side of (2.25) is the opportunity
cost of holding liquid assets. The second term on the left side of (2.25) is the
liquidity premium of the asset, i.e., the expected marginal benefit from holding
liquid assets in the DM. This expected marginal benefit is computed as follows.
With probability, α(n), the household has an opportunity to spend its marginal
unit of asset in the DM; this marginal unit buys dy/da units of DM output, which
is valued at the marginal surplus of the household in a DM meeting, µ [υ′ (y)− 1].
A household with no access to credit solves a similar portfolio problem as in
(2.24) where y is replaced with y˜ and (1− µ)υ(y˜) + µy˜ = Rνa˜. After rearranging
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terms, it becomes:
max
y˜≥0
{[
α(n)νµ−
(
1 + r
R
− 1
)
(1− µ)
]
υ (y˜)−
[
1 + r
R
− 1 + α(n)ν
]
µy˜
}
.
(2.26)
Using that υ′(0) = ∞, a necessary and sufficient condition for y˜ > 0 is that
the first term between squared brackets in (2.26) is positive, i.e., α(n)νµ >
[(1 + r) /R− 1] (1 − µ). It is optimal for households with no access to credit
to hold liquid assets if the holding cost of those assets, 1 + r−R, is not too large.
Moreover, the higher the frequency of trades, α(n), the higher the household’s
bargaining power, µ, and the more likely it is that households will accumulate
liquid assets.
2.3.5 Borrowing constraint
Consider a household with debt level, d, and labor status, e, in the CM. The
incentive compatibility constraint for the repayment of the household’s debt is
− d+We(0, a) ≥ ρW˜e(a) + (1− ρ)We(0, a), (2.27)
where W˜e is the value of a household who is excluded permanently from credit
transactions. The left side of (2.27) is the expected lifetime utility of the household
if it does not default: the household pays back its debt and enters the CM with
a units of liquid asset and future access to credit. The right side is the expected
lifetime utility of the household if it defaults. With probability, ρ, the identity
of the defaulting household is publicly known, and as a result the household is
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banned from future credit but it can keep trading with liquid assets (because he
can choose to be non-monitored).16 Its continuation value is W˜e(a). If the default
is not recorded, with probability 1−ρ, then the household’s public trading history
shows no event of default, which allows the household to keep its line of credit.
In this case its continuation value is We(0, a).
Using the linearity of We and W˜e, from (2.4) and (2.5), the household credit
constraint, (2.27), can be reexpressed as
d ≤ d¯ ≡ ρ
[
We(0, 0)− W˜e(0)
]
. (2.28)
For repayment to be incentive compatible the household’s debt cannot be greater
than the expected cost from defaulting, which is equal to the probability of losing
access to credit, ρ, times the difference between the lifetime utility of a household
with access to credit, We, and the lifetime utility of a household with no access
to credit, W˜e. From (2.28) d¯ is independent from the quantity of assets held by
the household when entering the CM. Using (2.4) and (2.5), the debt limit can be
rewritten as
d¯ = ρ
{
max
a≥0
[−a+ βUe (a)]−max
a˜≥0
[
−a˜+ βU˜e (a˜)
]}
. (2.29)
16Our assumption is consistent with the one in Kehoe and Levine (1993) according to which
an agent who defaults on a contract cannot be excluded from spot markets trading. It is also
consistent with Wallace (2005) who assumes that monitored people who defect can join the
ranks of the nonmonitored people and suffer no further punishment Similarly, in Aiyagari and
Williamson (2000) an agent who defaults can trade with money in the future. In contrast,
Sanches and Williamson (2010) assume that if a buyer defaults, then sellers will refuse to take
his money.
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From (2.29) the possibility offered to households to self-insure against idiosyncratic
shocks in the DM by holding liquid assets will affect debt limits.
In order to characterize the debt limit it is useful to introduce the following
two thresholds for the gross rate of return of liquid assets:
R¯ ≡ ρ (1 + r)
rν + ρ
(2.30)
R ≡ (1− µ)(1 + r)
α(n)νµ+ 1− µ. (2.31)
We show in the next Lemma that R¯ is an upper bound for the gross rate of return
on liquid assets above which the repayment of credit is not incentive compatible.
From (2.26) the threshold, R, is the gross rate of return below which households
do not want to accumulate liquid assets.
Proposition 1. (Endogenous debt limit) For given n, the debt limit, d¯, is a
solution to
rd¯ = Γ(d¯), (2.32)
where
Γ(d¯) ≡ ρmax
a≥0
{− (1 + r −R) a+ α(n)µ [υ (y)− y]}
− ρmax
a˜≥0
{− (1 + r −R) a˜+ α(n)µ [υ (y˜)− y˜]} .
(2.33)
There exists a d¯ > 0 solution to (2.32) if and only if r < ρα(n)µ/(1 − µ) (i.e.,
R < R¯) and R ≤ R¯. Moreover, if R < R¯, then this solution is unique; if R = R¯,
then any d¯ ∈ [0, Rνa˜] is a solution.
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As conjectured earlier, the debt limit is independent of the household’s em-
ployment status.17 The determination of the debt limit, d¯, is represented in Figure
2.3. The line, rd¯, is the return to the household from having access to a line of
credit of size d¯. The curve, Γ(d¯), represents the flow cost from defaulting on one’s
debt if the debt limit for future DM trades is equal to d¯. This cost is equal to the
probability of being caught, ρ, times the loss from not being eligible for a loan in
the future. The first term on the right side of (2.33) is the expected DM surplus
of a household with access to credit net of the cost of holding liquid assets. The
second term gives a similar expression for households with no access to credit.
The punishment from defaulting increases with the size of the credit line, i.e., Γ
is upward sloping. Moreover, Γ(0) = 0. If a household anticipates that it will not
have access to credit in the future, then there is no cost from defaulting. As a
consequence, there always exists an equilibrium with no unsecured credit.18
For a further characterization of Γ we distinguish two cases. First, if the size
of the credit line, d¯, is less than the payment capacity of a household with no
access to credit, Rνa˜, then Γ is linear. Indeed, as shown in the bottom panels
of Figure 2.3, households with a credit limit of d¯ < Rνa˜ choose asset holdings
so as equalize their payment capacity with the one of households with no credit
line, Rνa + d¯ = Rνa˜. This result comes from the observation that both types
of households face the same trade-off at the margin, captured by (2.25), in terms
of the cost and benefit from holding liquid assets. As a result, the cost from
defaulting is equal to the probability, ρ, times the quantity of liquid assets that
the household has to accumulate to replace the credit line, a˜− a = d¯/Rν, where
17This does not rule out the existence of other equilibria where d¯ would be a function of e.
18For a similar result, see Sanches and Williamson (2010).
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the cost of holding one unit of liquid asset is equal to 1 + r−R. Hence, the slope
of Γ is ρ(1 + r −R)d¯/Rν.
Second, households with a credit limit, d¯ > Rνa˜, find it optimal to hold no
liquid assets (from (2.25)), and Γ is strictly concave (provided that d¯ is not too
large). To see this, notice from (2.10) that ∂y/∂d¯ = 1/ [(1− µ)υ′(y) + µ], and
hence
∂ [υ(y)− y]
∂d¯
=
υ′(y)− 1
(1− µ)υ′(y) + µ =
1
1− µ+ 1/ [υ′(y)− 1] , (2.34)
which is decreasing in y when y < y∗. So the surplus from a DM trade, υ (y)− y,
is strictly concave in d¯.
For unsecured debt to emerge the slope of Γ at d¯ = 0 must be greater than r.
The expression for Γ′(0) depends on whether households with no access to credit
find it optimal to hold liquid assets. If R ≤ R, then households with no access
to credit choose not to accumulate liquid assets, a˜ = 0. In that case, from (2.33)
and (2.34) Γ′(0) = ρα(n)µ/(1− µ), and hence a necessary condition for credit to
be sustainable is r < ρα(n)µ/(1 − µ), as indicated in Proposition 1. Households
must be sufficiently patient and care enough about the future punishment in case
of default for the repayment of debt to be self-enforcing. The threshold for the rate
of time preference below which unsecured credit is incentive compatible increases
with the probability of being punished in case of default, ρ, with the frequency of
liquidity shocks, α, and with the household’s market power in the DM, µ.
If R > R, households with no access to credit accumulate liquid assets, a˜ >
0. This possibility of self-insurance lowers the cost of defaulting, and hence the
condition for credit to be incentive incompatible is more stringent. In that case
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Γ′(0) = ρ(1+r−R)/Rν so that r < Γ′(0) can be expressed as R < R¯. So unsecured
credit can be sustained in equilibrium if the rate of return of liquid assets is not
too close to the rate of time preference, R/(1 + r) < ρ/(rν + ρ). Graphically, the
curve representing Γ intersects the curve representing rd¯ from above. See the left
panel of Figure 2.3. In contrast, if R is greater than R¯, then the cost of defaulting
is too small to sustain unsecured credit and Γ is located underneath the line rd¯.
See right panel of Figure 2.3. Finally, there is a knife-edge case where rd¯ and
Γ(d¯) coincide so that there are a continuum of debt limits, d¯ ∈ [0, Rνa˜]. For any
d¯ ∈ [0, Rνa˜], the flow value of credit is rd¯ and the flow cost from defaulting is rd¯,
which makes the debt limit indeterminate.
The following Corollary provides a condition on the rate of return of liquid
assets for the coexistence of credit and money.
Corollary 1. (Coexistence of money and credit) A necessary condition for
the coexistence of money and credit is R ∈ (R, R¯]. If R > R¯, then unsecured credit
is not incentive compatible. If R < R, then agents do not hold liquid assets.
As shown in Proposition 1 if R > R¯, then unsecured credit is not incentive
compatible and, as a result, all households choose the same holdings of liquid
assets, a = a˜. The economy in this case corresponds to a pure monetary economy.
Households’ payment capacity, Rνa = Rνa˜, increases with R. See the upward-
sloping dashed lines in Figure 2.4 for all R > R¯. When R is exactly equal to
1 + r, there is no cost of holding liquid assets (which is equivalent to a Friedman-
rule outcome) and households accumulate enough liquidity to finance y∗, i.e.,
Rνa ≥ (1 − µ)υ(y∗) + µy∗. In Figure 2.4 the dashed lines become vertical at
R = 1 + r.
81
Chapter 2. Aggregate Unemployment and Household Unsecured Debt
Figure 2.3: Debt Limit
If R < R¯, then unsecured credit is incentive compatible. As R increases,
the punishment from being excluded from credit is lower since defaulters can
accumulate liquid assets at a lower cost. Graphically, the curve representing Γ in
Figure 2.3 shifts downward and the debt limit decreases. In Figure 2.4, the plain
line representing d¯ is downward sloping. For all R ∈ (R, R¯) there is coexistence
of money and credit: some households pay with liquid assets only while other
households pay with credit only.19 Moreover, households with access to credit
have a larger payment capacity than households who trade with liquid assets only
19In order to have households hold money and use credit one could assume that there is a
probability that a firm in the retail market is not able to identify a consumer and therefore
cannot extend credit for him. For a related assumption, see Sanches and Williamson (2010).
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(graphically, the plain curve is located above the dashed one). Finally, from (2.26)
if R <R, then the cost of holding liquid assets is so high that even households
with no access to credit choose not to hold any liquidity. In Figure 2.4 the dashed
lines are horizontal at 0. The economy is a pure credit economy.
The following Corollary shows how the aggregate state of the labor market
affects credit limits.
d
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Figure 2.4: Debt Limit vs. Rate of Return
Corollary 2. (Credit limits and the labor market) Assume r < ρα(n)µ/(1−
µ) and R < R¯. The solution, d¯ > 0, to (2.32) is increasing with n.
The state of the labor market affects debt limits through the frequency of
consumption opportunities in the DM goods market, α. If employment is high,
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then there are a large number of firms participating in the retail market and, as
a result, households have frequent trading opportunities. Such frequent trading
opportunities imply that the cost from defaulting on one’s debt is high, and there-
fore the debt limit is high. In Figure 2.3, as n increases, the curve representing Γ
moves upward for all d¯ > Rνa˜.
2.3.6 Steady states with unsecured credit
We consider steady-state equilibria with unsecured debt, d¯ > 0. As we have
shown above, in any such equilibrium households who have access to credit will
not accumulate liquid assets, a = 0 (except in the knife-edge case where R = R¯),
because their payment capacity is greater than the one of households with no
access to credit, y > y˜, where
(1− µ)υ(y) + µy = min [(1− µ)υ(y∗) + µy∗, d¯] . (2.35)
From (2.25) the choice of liquid assets by households with no access to credit
solves
α(n)µν
[
υ′ (y˜)− 1
(1− µ)υ′(y˜) + µ
]
=
1 + r −R
R
if
1 + r −R
R
<
α(n)νµ
1− µ (2.36)
y˜ = 0 otherwise,
where
a˜ =
(1− µ)υ(y˜) + µy˜
νR
. (2.37)
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The steady-state level of unemployment in the LM, u, is such that the flow
in unemployment is equal to the flow out of unemployment, i.e., pu = δ(1 − u),
which gives
u =
δ
m(1, θ) + δ
. (2.38)
From (2.20) and (2.23), labor market tightness (assuming it is positive) solves
(r + δ) k
m
(
1
θ
, 1
) + βλθk =(1− λ){α(1− u)
1− u (1− µ) {ω [υ (y)− y]
+ (1− ω) [υ (y˜)− y˜]}+ z¯ − `− b} . (2.39)
Definition 3. A steady-state equilibrium with unsecured credit is a list (u, θ, y, y˜, a˜, d¯)
that solves (2.32)-(2.39) with d¯ > 0.
Assuming z¯ > `+ b+ (r+δ)k
1−λ , let θ0 > 0 be the unique solution to
(r + δ) k
m
(
1
θ0
, 1
) + βλθ0k = (1− λ) (z¯ − `− b) .
Denote n0 = m(1, θ0)/ [m(1, θ0) + δ] the associated level of employment. The fol-
lowing proposition provides sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium
with credit.
Proposition 2. (Existence of an equilibrium with unsecured credit) If
z¯ > `+ b + (r + δ)k/(1− λ), R < R¯, and r < ρα(n0)µ/(1− µ), then there exists
a steady-state equilibrium with unsecured credit, d¯ > 0.
A sufficient condition for the labor market to be active is that labor produc-
tivity is sufficiently high relative to workers’ utility of leisure and unemployment
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benefits. This is a standard existence condition for an active equilibrium in the
MP model. For unsecured credit to emerge, it must also be the case that the
rate of return on liquid assets is not too high since otherwise the threat of exclu-
sion from credit transactions would not be strong enough to sustain households’
incentives to repay unsecured credit.
Notice that Proposition 2 only gives sufficient conditions for existence. An
equilibrium might exist even if z¯ < ` + b + (r + δ)k/(1 − λ) because effective
productivity, z, is endogenous and depends on the availability of credit. Moreover,
in contrast to the MP model, the equilibrium might not be unique because of
the complementarity between the credit limit in the goods market and aggregate
employment. We will illustrate this last point in the following section.
Finally, if we want to interpret liquid assets as Lucas trees in fixed supply we
add the following market-clearing condition,
φA = ωa+ (1− ω)a˜. (2.40)
The asset price, φ, is endogenous and it determines the gross rate of return on
liquid assets, R = 1+1/φ. Equivalently, one can rewrite the asset-market clearing
condition as A = (R− 1)[ωa+ (1− ω)a˜].
2.4 Two limiting economies
Before we turn to a quantitative exploration of the model we will characterize
the set of equilibria and some comparative statics for two limiting economies: (i)
A pure monetary economy where households do not have access to unsecured debt
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(ω = 0 or ρ = 0); (ii) A pure credit economy where all households have access to
unsecured credit (ω = 1) but there is no liquid asset (R = 0 or ν = 0).
2.4.1 Pure monetary economies
Suppose that there is no record keeping technology that can keep track of
households’ defaults (ω = 0 or ρ = 0). Because of lack of commitment, credit is
not incentive feasible as households would always renege on their debts. Therefore,
households must hold liquid assets in order to trade in the DM. We assume that
households can transfer all their liquid assets in a match, ν = 1.20
A steady-state monetary equilibrium can be reduced to a pair, (y˜, θ), that
solves (2.36) and (2.39) with ω = 0 and n = 1− u, i.e.,
1 + r
R
= 1 + α (n)µ
[
υ′ (y˜)− 1
(1− µ)υ′(y˜) + µ
]
(2.41)
(r + δ) k
m
(
1
θ
, 1
) + βλθk = (1− λ){α(n)
n
(1− µ) [υ (y˜)− y˜] + z¯ − `− b
}
,(2.42)
where n(θ) = m(1, θ)/[m(1, θ) + δ]. We study each equilibrium condition in turn.
Let us start with the equilibrium condition for the choice of liquid assets,
(2.41). If αµ/(1−µ) ≤ (1+ r−R)/R, where α is evaluated at n = 1/(1+ δ), then
for all θ ≥ 0 there is no y˜ > 0 solution to (2.41). So a necessary condition for a
monetary equilibrium to exist is that households have enough bargaining power
20This limiting economy is analogous to the pure currency economy studied in Berensten et al.
(2011) except that the medium of exchange takes the form of capital in our model, as in Lagos
and Rocheteau (2008), instead of fiat money.
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in the DM,
µ >
1 + r −R
1 + r −R [1− α ( 1
1+δ
)] . (2.43)
Assume (2.43) holds and define θ> 0 as the solution to
µα [n(θ)]
1− µ =
1 + r −R
R
. (2.44)
According to (2.41) and (2.44), for all θ ≤ θ, y˜ = 0 and, for all θ > θ, y˜ is
an increasing function of θ. Indeed, as n(θ) increases, the frequency of trading
opportunities in the DM increases, which raises the non-pecuniary return of liquid
assets and gives households higher incentives to accumulate them. As market
tightness tends to infinity, n(θ) approaches 1/(1 + δ), and y approaches some
upper bound, y¯. Finally, as R tends to 1 + r, i.e., the cost of holding liquid assets
approaches 0, θ tends to 0 and y˜ tends to y∗ for all θ. Indeed, if liquidity is costless,
all households want to hold Ra ≥ µy∗+ (1−µ)υ(y∗) irrespective of the frequency
at which trading opportunities in the DM occur. In the left panel of Figure 2.6
we represent the equilibrium condition, (2.41), by LD (demand for liquidity).
Let us turn to the vacancy supply condition, (2.42). First, we assume that
(1− λ) {(1− µ) [υ (y∗)− y∗] + z¯ − `− b} > (r + δ)k. (2.45)
Condition (2.45) guarantees that if households have enough liquid assets to buy
the first-best level of output in the DM, y˜ = y∗, then the labor market is active,
θ > 0. If, in addition, (1 − λ) (z¯ − `− b) < (r + δ)k, then the labor market is
active only if there is a minimum amount of trade in the DM. Define y ∈ (0, y∗)
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as the solution to
(1− λ){(1− µ) [υ (y)− y]+ z¯ − `− b} = (r + δ)k. (2.46)
For all y ≤ y, θ = 0; for all y > y, θ > 0 is an increasing function of y for all
y < y∗, and it reaches a maximum at y = y∗. Under these conditions there is
an inactive equilibrium with y˜ = θ = 0, and if an active equilibrium exists, then
there is an even number of active equilibria (except for degenerate cases where the
equilibrium is unique). In the left panel of Figure 2.6 we represent the equilibrium
condition, (2.42), by V S (vacancy supply).
If (1−λ) (z¯ − `− b) > (r+ δ)k, then the firm’s productivity is high enough to
cover its entry cost even if the DM is inactive. Denote θ> 0 the solution to (2.42)
with y˜ = 0, i.e.,
(r + δ) k
m
(
1
θ
, 1
) + βλkθ = (1− λ) (z¯ − `− b) . (2.47)
This is the market tightness that would prevail if the DM shuts down. Any
solution to (2.41)-(2.42) is such that θ ≥θ. Let Rˆ < 1 + r be the solution to
θ= θ(Rˆ). If R > Rˆ, then θ> θ(R) and any equilibrium is such that y˜ > 0. We
recapitulate our characterization of the pure monetary economy in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. (Pure monetary equilibrium) Consider an economy with no
unsecured credit (ω = 0 and/or ρ = 0) and suppose (2.43) and (2.45) hold.
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1. If z¯− `− b < (r+ δ)k/(1−λ), then there is an inactive equilibrium, (θ, y˜) =
(0, 0). If R is sufficiently close to 1 + r, there are also an even number of
equilibria with both an active DM, y˜ > 0, and an active LM, θ > 0.
2. If z¯− `− b > (r+ δ)k/(1− λ), then all equilibria have an active LM, θ > 0.
Moreover, if R > Rˆ, then all equilibria have an active DM.
The left panel of Figure 2.6 provides a graphical representation of part 1 of
Proposition 3. There is an inactive equilibrium and two active equilibria. The
logic for the multiplicity of equilibria is based on strategic complementarities be-
tween firms’ entry decision and households’ choice of liquid assets.21 If households
accumulate a lot of liquid assets, then firms’ expected profits in the DM are high
and a lot of firms participate. But if aggregate employment is high, the frequency
of consumption opportunities is also high, and households have incentives to accu-
mulate a large quantity of liquid assets. By the same logic, there is an equilibrium
with a small number of firms and with few liquid assets held by households. So the
aggregate liquidity in the economy and unemployment are negatively correlated
across equilibria.
From part 2 of Proposition 3 we learn that the labor market is active in any
equilibrium provided that firms’ productivity is sufficiently high. Moreover, the
retail goods market will also be active if the rate of return of liquid assets is
sufficiently close to the rate of time preference.
Finally, we can study the effects of monetary policy on aggregate liquidity
and the labor market, where monetary policy is described by the choice of R.
21For a similar result in the context of an economy with fiat money and free entry of sellers,
see Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
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From (2.41) as the rate of return on liquid assets increases, households increase
their asset holdings for a given θ. Graphically, in Figure 2.6, the curve LD moves
to the right. At the highest equilibrium both market tightness and DM output
increase. Consequently, a higher interest rate leads to lower unemployment and
higher output.
2.4.2 Pure credit economies
We now assume that all households have access to credit, ω = 1, and there
is no liquid asset, R = 0 (goods cannot be stored) or ν = 0 (capital goods are
not portable or cannot be transferred in the DM, let say, because they can be
counterfeited at no cost). From Proposition 1 the credit limit is a solution to
rd¯ = ρα(n)µ [υ(y)− y] where (1 − µ)υ(y) + µy = min [(1− µ)υ(y∗) + µy∗, d¯]. If
the credit limit binds, then y solves
y =
{
1− r
[r + ρα(n)]µ
}
υ(y). (2.48)
Provided that r < ραµ/(1−µ), then there is a unique y > 0 solution to (2.48). If
the solution to (2.48) is greater than y∗, then d¯ > (1− µ)υ(y∗) + µy∗ and y = y∗.
Market tightness is determined by
(r + δ) k
m
(
1
θ
, 1
) + βλθk = (1− λ){α(n)
n
(1− µ) [υ (y)− y] + z¯ − `− b
}
. (2.49)
We can reduce an equilibrium to a pair, (θ, y) ∈ R+ × [0, y∗], that solves the
conditions above.
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We first describe an equilibrium where households’ borrowing constraint in the
DM is not binding, which implies y = y∗. It requires the right side of (2.48) to be
greater than the left side when both are evaluated at y = y∗, i.e.,
[
ρα(n∗)− r(1− µ)/µ
r + ρα(n∗)
]
υ(y∗)
y∗
≥ 1, (2.50)
where n∗ = n(θ∗) is the employment level given by (2.49) when y = y∗. Assuming
(2.45) holds, θ∗ > 0 and n∗ > 0. From (2.50) credit is abundant if the match sur-
plus in the DM is sufficiently large, if households have sufficient market power in
the goods market (i.e., µ is high), and if the financial system is sufficiently sophis-
ticated (i.e., ρ is high). A necessary condition for the debt constraint not to bind
is ρα (n∗) > r(1−µ)/µ. In Figure 2.5, we describe a case with multiple equilibria
where the high equilibrium is such that the debt limit is not binding. Notice that
the curve representing the credit limit as a function of market tightness, labelled
CL, becomes vertical when θ is above a threshold. Indeed, for high values of θ,
d¯ > (1−µ)υ(y∗)+µy∗ and households have enough borrowing capacity to finance
the purchase of y∗. In this case the CL curve intersects the vacancy-supply curve,
V S, at its maximum.
We now study equilibria where borrowing constraints do bind. We analyze
each equilibrium condition in turn starting with the condition for the DM output
level, (2.48). Define θ<∞ as the solution to ρα(n)µ = r(1− µ), i.e.,
m(1, θ)
m(1, θ) + δ
= α−1
[
r
ρ
(
1− µ
µ
)]
, (2.51)
92
Chapter 2. Aggregate Unemployment and Household Unsecured Debt

y

CL
VS
*yy
*
Figure 2.5: Multiple equilibria in which the debt limit at the high steady state
is not binding.
if r < ρα [1/(1 + δ)]µ/(1−µ), and θ= +∞ otherwise. For all θ ≤ θ, y = 0. Below
a threshold for market tightness, unsecured credit cannot be sustained. Above
θ, y increases with θ because α(n) is an increasing function of θ. As θ tends to
infinity, y approaches y¯, where y¯ solves (2.48) with n = 1/(1+δ). In Figure 2.6 we
represent the equilibrium condition, (2.48), by a curve labelled CL (credit limit).
Let us turn to the vacancy-supply condition, (2.49), represented by the curve
labelled V S in Figure 2.6. It gives a positive relationship between θ and y for
all y ≤ y∗. Intuitively, if households have a higher payment capacity, they buy
more output in the DM, and firms have more incentives to participate. Assume
(1 − λ) (z¯ − `− b) < (r + δ)k. For all y ≤ y, where y is defined in (2.46), θ = 0.
Under this condition, there is an inactive equilibrium with θ = y = 0 and an even
number of equilibria (possibly zero) across which θ > 0 and y > 0 are positively
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correlated. If (1− λ) (z¯ − `− b) > (r + δ)k, then θ > 0 for all y ≥ 0. In this case
any equilibrium has an active labor market, even if the DM is inactive. Define
θ> 0 as the solution to (2.47), i.e., the market tightness when the DM is inactive,
and
ρˆ(µ) =
r (1− µ)
µα
[
m(1,θ)
m(1,θ)+δ
] (2.52)
µˆ =
r
r + α
[
m(1,θ)
m(1,θ)+δ
] . (2.53)
From (2.52) the quantity, ρˆ(µ), is defined as the level of monitoring such that
θ = θ. For all ρ > ρˆ(µ), credit can be sustained if θ = θ. From (2.53) the
threshold, µˆ, is defined such that ρˆ(µˆ) = 1. Therefore, for all µ > µˆ and ρ > ρˆ(µ),
θ < θ and any equilibrium has both an active labor market and an active retails
goods market since θ > θ > θ.
Proposition 4. (Pure credit equilibrium) Suppose (2.45) holds.
1. If (2.50) holds, then there exists an equilibrium with y = y∗ and θ = θ∗.
2. If z¯ − ` − b < (r + δ)k/(1 − λ), then there is an inactive equilibrium with
(θ, y) = (0, 0). If r is sufficiently close to 0, there are also an even number
of active equilibria with both an active DM, y > 0, and an active LM, θ > 0.
3. If z¯ − ` − b > (r + δ)k/(1 − λ), then any equilibrium has an active LM,
θ > 0. Moreover, if µ > µˆ and ρ > ρˆ(µ), then all equilibria have an active
DM, y > 0.
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Figure 2.6: Limiting economies and multiple equilibria
In Figure 2.6 we represent the determination of an equilibrium under the condi-
tion in Part 2 of Proposition 4. There is an inactive equilibrium where households
do not have access to credit and firms do not participate in the labor market, and
two active equilibria. Credit limits and unemployment rates are negatively corre-
lated across equilibria. Intuitively, if there are a lot of firms in the retail market,
then the punishment for not repaying one’s debt, i.e., the exclusion from the DM
market, is large since households would have to forgive a large number of trading
opportunities. As a result, households can borrow a large amount and firms can
expect large profits in the DM. In Figure 2.5 the high equilibrium is such that
liquidity is abundant in the sense that borrowing constraints are not binding. By
a symmetric logic there is also an equilibrium with a high unemployment rate and
a low credit limit. So our model provides a theory of high unemployment due to
a self-fulfilling credit crunch.
95
Chapter 2. Aggregate Unemployment and Household Unsecured Debt
As in the case of a pure monetary economy, the labor market is active in
any equilibrium provided that productivity is sufficiently high. Moreover, the
retail goods market is active in any equilibrium if the record-keeping technology
is sufficiently effective and households are sufficiently patient. An improvement
in the sophistication of the financial system (i.e. an increase in ρ) affects the
credit limit condition (2.48) indicated as a rightward shift in the CL′ curve in
Figure 2.6. As ρ increases, the expected loss from default is higher which tightens
household’s incentive compatibility constraint for all levels of unemployment and
labor market tightness. This leads to higher levels of DM trade, increasing labor
market tightness, and a decrease in steady state unemployment.
2.5 Quantitative Analysis
We now turn to a quantitative evaluation of the theory. To start, the model
is calibrated to match features of the U.S. economy between 2000 and 2008, char-
acterized by high levels of unsecured credit and low unemployment. We then
exogenously reduce the availability of credit in accordance with the observed data
between 1978 and 1986 in order to evaluate to what extent the expansion of credit
can explain the long-term decrease in unemployment from the mid 1980s to the
early 2000s. We also analyze a similar experiment in which we reduce unsecured
credit in accordance with the observed data in 2011 and evaluate its contribution
to the high levels of unemployment during the Great Recession.
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2.5.1 Calibration
The model period is chosen to be a month. Accordingly, we set r = .003,
implying β = 0.997. All empirical targets represent monthly averages over the
time period 2000-2008.
Labor market. The calibration of the labor market follows Shimer (2005) and
Berensten et al. (2011) in the context of a monetary model. The matching function
is Cobb-Douglas, m(s, o) = Asηo1−η. We set the elasticity with respect to job
seekers to η = 0.5, in the middle of the suggested range from empirical surveys
(see, e.g., Petrolongo and Pissarides, 2001). The households’ bargaining power
corresponds to an egalitarian solution, λ = 0.5. It is also the value consistent with
constrained-efficiency (Hosios, 1990) in an economy with non-binding borrowing
constraints.
The matching efficiency parameter, A, the job destruction rate, δ, and the
vacancy posting cost, k, are jointly determined by targeting the job finding prob-
ability, the unemployment rate, and labor market tightness. The unemployment
rate comes from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and averaged 5.1% be-
tween 2000-2008, u = 0.051. We estimate the job finding probability according
to pt = 1 − (ULt+1/Ut), where UL is the number of workers unemployed over 5
weeks and U is the total number of unemployed workers from the CPS.22 We find
that p = 0.36. Labor market tightness is given by the Job Openings and Labor
Turnover Survey (JOLTS).23 From 2000-2007, there were 0.523 job openings for
22See Shimer (2012) for the structural foundation of this equation.
23It is standard to normalize either the measure of vacancies or labor market tightness to
one (see Shimer (2005) or Berensten et al. (2011)). Since our time period allows the use of
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every unemployed worker, θ = 0.51. Using the moments above, labor market
matching efficiency is given by A = pθη−1 = 0.50. From (2.38) the job destruction
rate is δ = pu/(1−u) = 0.019. Finally, k is given by the vacancy supply condition,
(2.49), which yields vacancy costs as a percentage of monthly wages to be 9.2%.
The remaining two parameters associated with the labor market are the value
of leisure, `, and unemployment income, b. We interpret b to represent unem-
ployment benefits in the US and so we set the replacement ratio to one half,
i.e., b = 0.5w. The value of leisure, `, is an important parameter to pin down
the response of equilibrium unemployment to productivity. Shimer (2005) sets
` = 0 and finds that the unemployment rate is not responsive enough to changes
in productivity. Alternatively, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) show that if this
parameter is calibrated to match hiring costs, then b+ ` should be set to 95% of
wages, which results in the response of unemployment to productivity that is more
in line with data. Since the effects of credit on unemployment in our model are
channeled through changes in productivity, z, we follow Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) and set b+ `/w = .95, or ` = 0.45w.24
Credit and Goods Market The DM matching function takes the form α(n) =

√
n, which corresponds to a Cobb-Douglas specification where households and
firms have an equal contribution to the matching process. The household’s bar-
JOLTS, we instead use some measure of vacancies to job seekers. This choice does not affect
the quantitative results.
24An important difference between our methodology and that of Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) is that we let unemployment benefits b vary with wages in the experiments we consider.
Doing so dampens the response of unemployment to productivity changes and is more in line
with the movements in the two variables over the long run.
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gaining weight, µ, is set to match the retail markup of 40% as discussed in Faig
and Jerez (2005).
We focus on revolving unsecured credit, which primarily consists of credit and
charge cards, as debt limits for such loans are observable in the data. To target
the eligibility of households to unsecured credit, we choose ω to represent the
fraction of US households that had a non-zero debt limit. The Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) reports that the average percentage of households having at least
one unsecured credit account with a non-zero limit. Over 2000-2007, this averaged
74.7%. Therefore, ω = 0.747.
The efficiency parameter of the DM matching function, , is chosen to match
the average credit utilization rate, defined as the fraction of the unsecured debt
limit outstanding. In the model, average debt outstanding is given by ωα(n)d¯
while the average debt limit is ωd¯, which implies a credit utilization rate is equal
to α(n). Mian and Sufi (2010) report a median credit card utilization rate of
23.4% in the fourth quarter of 2006. Hence, we target α = 0.23. This implies that
households receive a liquidity shock on average every 4.3 months.
The monitoring probability, ρ, is chosen to target the average amount of
monthly consumption financed through unsecured credit. In the model, aggregate
consumption is given by C = α(n)(1−µ){ω[υ(y)−y]+(1−ω)[υ(y˜)−y˜]}+nz¯−θuk
and consumption out of unsecured credit is ωα(n)d¯. We target ωα(n)d¯/C as the
ratio of new monthly charges on credit and charge cards given by the SCF and
total monthly household consumption expenditures as reported in the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX). Over 2000-2008, the average household had $845 of
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new charges on credit cards and total consumption expenditures of $3,681 during
a month. Therefore, we set ωα(n)d¯/C = 0.23, which results in ρ = 0.30.
We take M2 as our measure of liquid assets and the rate of return on liq-
uid assets, R, is chosen to target the real user cost of M2 monetary services as
published by the St. Louis Federal Reserve. The real user cost is defined as the
discounted interest rate spread between a benchmark rate and the own rate of
return on assets included in M2.25 In the model the real user cost is given by
(1 + r − R)/(1 + r). Over 2000-2008, the real user cost averaged 0.055%. This
implies R = 1.0025.
Utility over DM consumption is given by, υ(y) = υ0y
1−γ/(1 − γ). The level
and elasticity parameters in the utility function, (υ0, γ), are set such that the
relationship between the demand for liquid assets, Ra˜, and the opportunity cost
of holding them, (1 + r − R)/(1 + r), matches the data. In the model, aggregate
holdings of liquid assets normalized by consumption are given by (1 − ω)[(1 −
µ)υ(y˜) + µy˜]/νC, where aggregate consumption C is defined above. The demand
for liquid assets depends on the opportunity cost (1 + r − R)/(1 + r) through y˜
given by (2.37). We set υ0 to match average M2/C and γ to match the empirical
elasticity of M2/C to the real user cost, which we estimate to be -0.17. Together
these imply (υ0, γ) = (1.42, 0.03). Figure 2.7 shows the estimated demand for
liquid assets.26
25The benchmark rate is given as the upper envelope of a set of rates including the Baa
corporate bond yield and other short-term money market rates plus a small liquidity premium.
See Anderson and Jones (2011) for a review of the Monetary Services Index (MSI).
26The estimated money demand curve fits the empirical relationship well until 1991, when
there was an apparent shift down in the demand for liquid assets.
100
Chapter 2. Aggregate Unemployment and Household Unsecured Debt
The targets discussed above are sufficient to pin down all but one parameter,
ν, which determines the acceptability of liquid assets as a means of payment in
the DM. We first solve for a range of ν that is consistent with the coexistence of
liquid assets and credit in equilibrium. We find ν must range between .001 and .1.
In the baseline calibration, we set ν = .05 and show a sensitivity analysis around
this target.27 Table 2.1 reports the calibrated parameters.
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
0.
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1.
0
Real User Cost of M2 (%)
M
2/
PC
E
1991−2011
elasticity = −0.171
Figure 2.7: Demand for Liquid Assets
27At first, the suggested range for ν may seem to be too small; however, it is important to
consider that this parameter captures various costs that are not directly taken into account in
the model. For instance, Sanches and Williamson (2010) emphasize the possibility of theft in
anonymous transactions.
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2.5.2 Quantitative Results
In this section, we use the calibrated model to analyze the effects of an exoge-
nous change in unsecured credit on the aggregate labor market. Our experiments
will focus on two episodes: (i) the expansion of credit between the late 1970s
and early 2000s and (ii) the sharp drop in credit availability during the Great
Recession from 2008 to 2011.28
1978-2008 The 1970s and early 1980s consisted of the passage of several reg-
ulatory acts that affected the household credit market. Beginning with the Fair
Credit Reporting Act of 1970, these regulations essentially standardized the re-
porting and use of consumer credit histories.29 We interpret the result of these
acts, combined with the well documented IT revolution, as a long-term improve-
ment in monitoring technology. We will vary two parameters ω and ρ. In the
model, ω controls the measure of households that have access to the unsecured
credit market while ρ affects the endogenous debt limit for those households who
maintain access to credit.
Compared to the benchmark time period 2000-2008, unsecured credit as a
percentage of consumption was 70.6% lower during 1978-1968. We engineer this
reduction in credit by first decreasing ω to 65%, the fraction of households in the
1983 SCF that reported having at least one credit card. We then decrease ρ by
5.1% to generate the total fall in the ratio of unsecured credit to consumption of
70.6%. The results are presented in Table 2.2.
28See Figure 2.1.
29The series of acts were the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, the Community Reinvestment
Act of 1977, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974.
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The difference in the availability of unsecured credit between 1978 and 2008 is
largely attributable to changes in borrowing limits. As indicated in the first row
of Table 2.2, the fall in the fraction of households with any access to credit, ω,
generates only 13.3% of the total 70.6% difference in the credit to consumption
ratio. The remainder is generated by differences in borrowing limits.
Holdings of liquid assets increase as a result of the restriction of credit. The
model slightly over accounts for the total difference in holdings of M2 as a percent-
age of consumption between 1978 and 2008, as indicated in the last two columns
of row 2, but in general captures the trade-off between the utilization of credit and
money in the aggregate. Measured productivity decreases as the absence of credit
leads to lost consumption opportunities. The model predicts that productivity
decreases by 4.45%.
The difference in credit conditions has significant implications for unemploy-
ment in the long run. The model predicts that credit differences can account for
71% of the total difference in the average unemployment rate between 1978-1986
and the benchmark time period of 2000-2008. A counter-factual prediction of
the model is the movement in the average job finding rate. The model predicts
that lower credit limits generate a fall in worker’s job finding rate as firms entry
declines. However, the data suggest that the average job finding rate was 16.1%
higher during the time period of 1978-1986 compared to the benchmark.30
The time period under consideration also consisted of long-term movements in
inflation, or in the context of our model can be considered as movements in the
return on liquid assets, R. The cost of assets plays a crucial role in disciplining
30For a discussion and evidence of worker job finding rates, see Shimer (2012).
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credit in the model. As assets become relatively more expensive, the cost of
defaulting on credit increases so debt constraints are relaxed. Inflation, then,
improves credit in partial equilibrium. However, inflation hurts households that
do not have access to credit as they bear the full cost. In general equilibrium, the
unemployment effects are ambiguous. To capture potential changes in inflation
during this time period, we repeat the experiment above while letting R vary. In
the baseline calibration, R is disciplined by the real user cost of holding M2.31
Despite the large movements in inflation over this time period, the real user cost
of holding M2 changed little. The average real user cost form 1978 to 1986 was
0.058% compared to 0.055% in the baseline calibration. The results from the
previous experiment change little. Matching a similar decrease in unsecured credit,
productivity falls by 4.6%, while unemployment increases by 35%.32
2008-2011 Table 2.3 reports the results of a similar experiment to that in Table
2.2 to mimic the US before and after the Great Recession. The experimental
question is to what extent can the fall in unsecured credit, viewed as the result
of changes in monitoring, explain the short-term movements in unemployment.
Between 2008 and 2011, unsecured credit as a percentage of consumption fell
by 22.9%. As before, we generate this decline by first decreasing ω to 67.9% to
mimic the fraction of households in the 2010 SCF that reporting having at least
one credit card. We then decrease ρ by 0.8% to generate the 22.9% fall in credit
to consumption.
31See the discussion of the real user cost in Section 5.1 above.
32We also repeated the experiment above interpreting assets as Lucas trees in fixed supply
and allow the price, R, to vary. The results are similar and are available upon request.
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The model predicts the fall in unsecured credit between 2008 and 2011 led
to a decline in aggregate productivity of 1.4%. This generates an increase in
equilibrium unemployment from 5.13% to 5.53%, or 7.8% of the total 74% increase
in unemployment over this time period. In the steady-state, the reduction in
household’s ability to finance purchases with unsecured credit explains about 10%
of the total increase in unemployment over this time period.33
The Response of Unemployment to Exogenous Productivity Shocks:
The Role of Unsecured Credit In this section, we analyze the role of the un-
secured credit market in amplifying exogenous shocks in the model. Specifically,
we return to a question posed by Petrosky-Nadeau (2014), and others, which
asks to what extent do credit frictions amplify the response of unemployment to
exogenous productivity shocks. We analyze this question in the context of the
steady-state. Consider a decrease in the exogenous component of productivity,
z¯. In partial equilibrium, holding unsecured credit fixed, there is an increase in
equilibrium unemployment. The value of a filled job decreases, firms post less
vacancies causing unemployment to rise. This is just the standard mechanics of
MP. In general equilibrium, however, an increase in unemployment also lowers
households access to unsecured credit. This causes a further drop in measured
productivity, z and a larger increase in unemployment. Figures 2.8 and 2.9 high-
light this channel.
33The effects are robust to alternative calibration strategies presented in tables B.1 and B.2
in the Appendix. Varying ν within the range (0.035, 0.065) affects the substitution between
liquid assets and credit, but does not alter the magnitude of the effect on productivity and
unemployment. Considering a smaller target for the retail markup of 30% also delivers similar
results, though the effect on unemployment and productivity are slightly dampened.
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Figure 2.8: The credit amplification channel on measured productivity
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Figure 2.9: The role of credit in the amplification of unemployment to produc-
tivity shocks
The first graph of each figure shows the response in equilibrium steady-state
measured productivity and unemployment, respectively, for an exogenous change
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in z¯. The green line represents the partial equilibrium effect holding credit con-
stant while the blue line represents the full general equilibrium movement. The
difference between the two lines is caused by the endogenous response of credit.
The graph on the right of each figure highlights the magnitude of this amplifica-
tion. The y-axis represents the absolute distance between the green and blue lines
in percentage terms.
First, the existence of unsecured credit can have a significant amplification
effect on measured productivity and unemployment. For instance, consider a neg-
ative 4% shock to exogenous productivity, z¯. Holding unsecured credit constant,
measured productivity, z, falls by 3.7% and unemployment increases from 5.1%
to 6.4%. As debt limits adjust, productivity decreases an additional 0.8% and
unemployment increases further to 6.9%. Therefore the additional amplification
due to unsecured credit is 7.8%. Secondly, the effects are highly asymmetric.
Negative productivity shocks lead to a significantly larger amplification caused
by unsecured credit. For instance, when exogenous productivity decreases by 6
percent, unsecured credit amplifies the effect on unemployment by around 30%.
A positive 6% shock to exogenous productivity is only amplified by 1.6%.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between aggregate unemployment and
household unsecured credit. We develop a theory that incorporates a retail goods
market with search frictions and limited commitment. Households purchase goods
using both unsecured credit and liquid assets. The theory provides a channel
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through which credit can affect firm revenue and entry, thereby impacting steady-
state unemployment. We show the possibility of multiple steady-state equilibria in
which there exists a negative relationship between unemployment and unsecured
debt. The key mechanism delivering the result is the complementarity between
the endogenous borrowing limit and firms’ entry decisions.
The model is also amenable to quantitative analysis. As an example, we
illustrate the labor market effects of the long-term expansion of unsecured credit
in the US between 1978 and 2008 as a result of an improvement in monitoring. The
model is able to account for 71% of the low frequency movements in unemployment
over this time period. The results suggest that unsecured credit is an important
contributor to firm revenue and, as a result, has important implications on labor
market outcomes.
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Chapter 3
Dynamic Indeterminacy and
Welfare in Credit Economies
3.1 Introduction
The inability of individuals to commit to honor their future obligations is a
key friction of decentralized economies that jeopardizes the Arrow-Debreu appa-
ratus based on promises to deliver goods at different dates and in different states.
Economies with limited commitment have been studied predominantly in mone-
tary theory. Stark examples are pure currency economies where anonymity and
lack of commitment make credit infeasible. Arguably, pure currency economies
have become less relevant due to advances in record-keeping technologies that facil-
itate the use of credit. Yet, monitoring technologies do not purge economies from
the limited commitment problem—they do not make individuals entirely trust-
worthy. Hence, this paper investigates the full set of equilibria and constrained-
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efficient allocations of a pure credit economy taking seriously the limited commit-
ment friction.1
There are two recent contributions, one normative and one positive, that shed
some light on economies with limited commitment. On the normative side, Al-
varez and Jermann (2000), AJ thereafter, establish a Second Welfare Theorem
for a pure exchange, one-good economy where agents are subject to endowment
shocks and have limited commitment—a special case of the environment in Kehoe
and Levine (1993). They prove that constrained-efficient allocations can be im-
plemented by competitive trades subject to “not-too-tight” solvency constraints.
These constraints specify that in every period agents can issue the maximum
amount of debt that is incentive-compatible with no default, thereby allowing as
much risk sharing as possible. From a positive perspective Gu et al. (2013b),
GMMW thereafter, study a pure credit economy subject to the same “not-too-
tight” solvency constraints and show the possibility of endogenous credit cycles.2
The conditions for such cycles, however, are much more stringent than the ones
in pure currency economies.3
The objective of this paper is to revisit these two key insights—the implemen-
tation of constrained-efficient allocations and the existence of endogenous credit
cycles—in the context of a pure credit economy with limited commitment. Our
1In the words of Wicksell (1936), “a thorough analysis of this purely imaginary case seems
to me to be worth while, for it provides a precise antithesis to the equally imaginary case of a
pure cash system, in which credit plays no part whatever.”
2In a related paper Bloise et al. (2013) prove indeterminacy of competitive equilibrium in
sequential economies under “not-too-tight” solvency constraints. While they do not focus on
endogenous credit cycles they show that for any value of social welfare in between autarchy and
constrained optimality, there exists an equilibrium attaining that value.
3For instance, Lagos and Wright (2003) find that monetary economies can generate endoge-
nous cycles under monotone trading mechanisms, such as buyers-take-all bargaining. Under the
same trading mechanisms, GMMW do not find any cycle.
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main contributions are twofold. On the positive side, we give a complete charac-
terization of the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium set of a pure credit economy. On
the normative side, we characterize constrained-efficient allocations of economies
with pairwise meetings and competitive economies with large meetings.
The pure credit economy we consider features random matching—in pairwise
meetings or in large groups—and incorporates intertemporal gains from trade that
can be exploited with one-period debt contracts. In the absence of public record
keeping, the environment corresponds to the New-Monetarist framework of Lagos
and Wright (2005) so that one can easily compare equilibrium allocations in credit
and monetary economies. In the presence of a public record-keeping technology
the environment is mathematically equivalent to the one in GMMW.4
We start with a simple mechanism where the borrower in each bilateral match
sets the terms of the loan contract unilaterally, which allows us to analyze the
economy as a standard infinitely-repeated game with imperfect monitoring. If we
impose the AJ “not-too-tight” solvency constraints exogenously—which amounts
to restricting strategies and beliefs such that any form of default is punished with
permanent autarky—then there is a unique active steady-state equilibrium and
no equilibrium with endogenous cycles. When we look for all perfect Bayesian
equilibria, we find a continuum of steady-state equilibria, a continuum of periodic
equilibria of any periodicity, and much more. Each equilibrium can be reduced to a
sequence of debt limits, where the debt limit in a period specifies the amount that
agents can be trusted to repay. Moreover, there is a wide variety of outcomes: in
some credit cycle equilibria debt limits are binding in all periods, in other equilibria
4As we discuss later in details, there are differences regarding the timing of production that
are inconsequential.
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they are never binding, or they bind periodically. These results are robust to the
choice of the mechanism to determine the terms of the loan contract—Nash or
proportional bargaining, or even competitive pricing if agents meet in large groups.
Figure 3.1 plots the set of 2-period cycles in the space of debt limits for a
representative example under competitive pricing (example 3A in GMMW). The
horizontal axis gives the debt limit (expressed in terms of the good used for repay-
ment) in even periods and the vertical axis specifies the debt limit in odd periods.
The blue area represents the continuum of 2-period cycle equilibria. Under “not-
too-tight” solvency constraints there is a unique active steady state, marked by a
green star, and two strict 2-period cycles marked by red stars.
The multiplicity of credit equilibria captures the basic notion that trust is a
self-fulfilling phenomenon. To that extent, and following (Mailath and Samuelson,
2006, p. 9), “we consider multiple equilibria a virtue.” But this multiplicity does
not imply that everything goes. Fundamentals, including preferences and market
structure, do matter for an outcome to be consistent with an equilibrium. We show
that the set of credit-cycle equilibria expands (in Figure 3.1 the blue area expands
outwards) as trading frictions are reduced, agents are more patient, and borrowers
have more bargaining power (in the version of the model with bargaining).
We also show that for a given trading mechanism the set of equilibrium out-
comes of a pure monetary economy (with fiat money but no record keeping) is
a strict subset of the outcomes of a pure credit economy (with record keeping
but no fiat money). Hence all dynamic allocations of monetary economies (e.g.,
cycles, chaos) also exist in credit environments. The reverse is not true. There
are equilibrium outcomes of the pure credit economy that cannot be sustained
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Figure 3.1: A representative example: Set of 2-period cycles under competi-
tive pricing. Green star: steady state under ”not-too-tight” solvency constraints.
Red star: cycle under ”not-too-tight” constraints. The red and green curves are
society’s indifference curves.
as equilibrium outcomes of the pure currency economy. For instance, there are
equilibria where credit and output shut down periodically—which is ruled out by
backward-induction in monetary economies.
In order to understand why the equilibrium set for credit economies—the blue
area in Figure 3.1—is so vastly larger than the one found in GMMW—the green
and red stars—it is worth recalling that the AJ “not-too-tight” solvency con-
straints were meant to provide a way to decentralize constrained-efficient allo-
cations in one particular economy with limited commitment. Such constraints
are not warranted for positive analysis. We will argue later that they are also
restrictive for normative analysis in our environment. We avoid arbitrary restric-
tions on the set of equilibrium outcomes by working with simple strategies that
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punish both default and excessive lending (i.e., lending in excess of the amount
that is deemed trustworthy along the equilibrium path). We show that such sim-
ple strategies implement the full set of outcomes of perfect Bayesian equilibria
(subject to mild restrictions).
In terms of normative analysis we determine the constrained-efficient alloca-
tions under different assumptions: we consider both economies where agents meet
in pairs and economies with large-group meetings and, following the formulation
in GMMW, we vary preferences to affect an agent’s temptation to renege on his
debt. If agents are matched bilaterally then the constrained-efficient allocation is
implemented with take-it-or-leave-it offers by buyers and “not-too-tight” solvency
constraints, which generalizes the AJ welfare theorem to economies with pairwise
meetings. Under competitive pricing the “not-too-tight” solvency constraints are
suboptimal when the temptation to renege is low. In this case the constrained-
efficient allocation is non-stationary and it features slack participation constraints
(i.e., solvency constraints that are “too-tight”, according to the terminology of
AJ) for all periods except the initial one. Slack participation constraints are so-
cially optimal due to a pecuniary externality according to which a decrease in
debt limits generates lower contemporaneous output, which reduces prices and
increases gains from trade for buyers/borrowers, thereby relaxing borrowing con-
straints in earlier periods. Moreover, there exists a continuum of credit cycles that
yield a higher social welfare than those with “not-too-tight” solvency constraints.
We illustrate this point in Figure 3.1 by representing with red and green areas the
set of 2-period cycles that dominate the equilibria obtained under “not-too-tight”
solvency constraints.
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3.1.1 Related literature
We adopt an environment similar to the pure currency economy of Lagos and
Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005), but we replace currency with a
public record-keeping technology, as in Sanches and Williamson (2010, Section 4).
The first part of the paper, on the characterization of the equilibrium set (Sections
3.3 and 3.4), extends the analysis of Sanches-Williamson which focuses on steady
states and of GMMW which focuses on cycles. In both cases, the equilibrium
notion imposes the “not-too-tight” solvency constraints of AJ. Instead, we present
our model as a repeated game with imperfect monitoring with few restrictions on
strategies and beliefs (the same restrictions typically imposed on equilibria of pure
currency economies).5 In addition, we consider both stationary and non-stationary
equilibria (including endogenous cycles and sunspots), various trading mechanisms
(ultimatum games, axiomatic bargaining solutions, competitive pricing), and we
conduct a normative analysis to determine constrained-efficient allocations. Our
methods to characterize equilibrium outcomes (Sections 3.3 and 3.5) are related
but different from the ones used by Abreu (1988) and Abreu et al. (1990) as our
stage game has an extensive form and only buyers/borrowers are (imperfectly)
monitored.
Kocherlakota (1998) shows that the set of implementable outcomes of mone-
tary economies is a subset of the implementable outcomes of pure credit economies.6
5Repeated games where agents are matched bilaterally and at random and change trading
partners over time are studied in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994). A thorough review of the
literature is provided by Mailath and Samuelson (2006).
6Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) study an environment similar to Alvarez and Jermann (2000)
and show that the set of equilibrium allocations with self-enforcing private debt is equivalent to
the allocations that are sustained with money.
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We find a similar result, but in contrast to Kocherlakota (1998), we take the
trading mechanism as given and we do not restrict outcomes to stationary ones.
Moreover, we establish in Proposition 13 that the condition to implement the first
best allocation in the pure credit economy with record keeping is identical to the
one in the pure currency economy with no record keeping (Hu et al., 2009).
Our paper is part of the literature on limited commitment in macroeconomics.
Seminal contributions on risk sharing in endowment economies where agents lack
commitment include Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996), and AJ.
Kocherlakota (1996) adopts a mechanism design approach in a two-agent economy
with a single good. Our Section 3.5.1 on constrained-efficient allocations under
pairwise meetings is related with some key differences: we study a two-good pro-
duction economy where a continuum of agents search for new partners every period
and we select the allocation that maximizes a social welfare criterion under quasi-
linear preferences. Gu et al. (2013a, Section 7) has a similar environment but
solves for the contract curve. In our Section 3.5.2 we study constrained-efficient
allocations under large meetings and competitive pricing, as in Kehoe and Levine
(1993) or AJ. Kehoe and Levine (1993, Section 7) conjectured that punishments
based on partial exclusion might allow the implementation of socially desirable
allocations.7 This conjecture is verified in our economy with the caveat that the
extent of exclusion has to vary over time. Our normative results are also related
to the Second Welfare Theorem in AJ according to which constrained-efficient
7Azariadis and Kass (2013) relaxed the assumption of permanent autarky and assumed that
agents are only temporarily excluded from credit markets. Gu et al. (2013a) and GMMW
allow for partial monitoring, which is formally equivalent to partial exclusion, except that the
parameter governing the monitoring intensity, pi, is time-invariant. Kocherlakota and Wallace
(1998) consider the case of an imperfect record-keeping technology where the public record of
individual transactions is updated after a probabilistic lag.
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allocations can be implemented with “not-too-tight” solvency constraints. We
provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which this theorem applies to
our environment.
3.2 Description of the game
Time is discrete and starts with period 0. Each date has two stages. The first
stage will be referred to as DM (decentralized market) while the second stage will
be referred to as CM (centralized market). There is a single, perishable good at
each stage and the CM good will be taken as the nume´raire. There is a continuum
of agents of measure two divided evenly into a subset of buyers, B, and a subset
of sellers, S.8 The labels “buyer” and “seller” refer to agents’ roles in the DM:
only the sellers can produce the DM good (and hence will be lenders) and only
the buyers desire DM goods (and hence will be borrowers). In the DM, a fraction
α ∈ (0, 1] of buyers meet with sellers in pairs. (We consider a version of the model
with large meetings later.) The CM will be the place where agents settle debts.
Preferences are additively separable over dates and stages. The DM utility of
a seller who produces y ∈ R+ is −v(y), while that of a buyer who consumes y is
u(y), where v(0) = u(0) = 0, v and u are strictly increasing and differentiable with
v convex and u strictly concave, and u′(0) = +∞ > v′(0) = 0. Moreover, there
exists y˜ > 0 such that v(y˜) = u(y˜). We denote by y∗ = arg max [u(y)− v(y)] > 0
the quantity that maximizes the match surplus. The utility of consuming z ∈ R
8The assumption of ex-ante heterogeneity among agents is borrowed from Rocheteau and
Wright (2005). Alternatively, one could assume that an agent’s role in the DM is determined at
random in every period without affecting any of our results.
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units of the nume´raire good is z, where z < 0 is interpreted as production.9
Agents’ common discount factor across periods is β = 1/(1 + r) ∈ (0, 1).
With no loss in generality we restrict our attention to intra-period loans issued
in the DM and repaid in the subsequent CM.10 The terms of the loan contracts
are determined according to a simple protocol whereby buyers make take-it-or-
leave-it offers to sellers. We describe alternative mechanisms later in the paper.
Agents cannot commit to future actions. Therefore, the repayment of loans in the
CM has to be self-enforcing.
There is a technology allowing loan contracts in the DM and repayments in
the CM to be publicly recorded. The entry in the public record for each loan is
a triple, (`, x, i), composed of the size of the loan negotiated in the DM in terms
of the nume´raire good, ` ∈ R+, the amount repaid in the CM, x ∈ R+, and the
identity of the buyer, i ∈ B. If no credit is issued in a pairwise meeting, or if i
was unmatched, the entry in the public record is (0, 0, i). The record is updated
at the end of each period t as follows:
ρit+1 = ρ
i
t ◦ (`t, xt, i), (3.1)
9Kehoe and Levine (1993) and AJ consider pure exchange economies. One could reinterpret
our economy as an endowment economy as follows. Suppose that sellers receive an endowment y¯
in the DM and z¯ in the CM. Buyers have no endowment in the DM but an endowment z¯ in the
CM. The DM utility of the seller is w(c) where w is a concave function with w′(y¯) = 0. Hence,
the opportunity cost to the seller of giving up y units of consumption is v(y) = w(y¯)−w(y¯− y).
10Under linear payoffs in the CM one-period debt contracts are optimal, i.e., agents have
no incentives to smooth the repayment of debt across multiple periods. This assumption will
facilitate the comparison with pure monetary economies of the type studied in Lagos and Wright
(2005).
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where ρi0 = (`0, x0, i). The list of records for all buyers, ρt = 〈ρit : i ∈ B〉, is public
information to all agents.11 Agents have private information about their trading
histories that are not recorded; in particular, if ρit = (0, 0, i), then agents other
than i do not know whether i was matched but his offer got rejected (in that case,
the offer made is not observed either) or was unmatched. However, as discussed
later, this private information plays no role in our construction of equilibria.
3.3 Equilibria
For each buyer i ∈ B, a strategy, si, consists of two functions sit = (sit,1, sit,2)
at each period t conditional on being matched: sit,1 maps his private trading
history, hit, and public records of other buyers, ρ
−i
t , to an offer to the seller,
(yt, `t); s
i
t,2 maps ((h
i
t, ρ
−i
t ), (yt, `t)), together with the seller’s response, to his CM
repayment, xt. For each seller j ∈ S, a strategy, sj, consists of one function
at each period t, conditional on being matched with buyer i: sjt maps the seller’s
private trading history, hjt , the buyer’s identity and public records, (i, ρ
i
t, ρ
−i
t ), and
his current offer, (yt, `t), to a response, yes or no. We restrict our attention to
perfect Bayesian equilibria (see Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, Definition 232.1)
satisfying the following conditions:
(A1) Public strategies. In any DM meeting the strategies only depend on
histories that are common knowledge in the match, including the buyer’s public
11We could make alternative assumptions regarding what is recorded in a match. For instance,
the technology could also record the output level, y, together with the promises made by the
buyer, i.e., ρi = (y, `, x, i). Not surprisingly, this would expand the set of equilibrium outcomes.
Moreover, we could assume that the seller only observes the record of the buyer he is matched
with, ρi, without affecting our results.
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trading history, his offer and the seller’s response in the current match, but not
on private histories (nor the public records of other buyers).12
(A2) Symmetry. All buyers adopt the same strategy, sb, and all sellers adopt the
same strategy, ss. Moreover, the buyer’s offer strategy, sbt,1, is constant over all
public trading histories of the buyer that are consistent with equilibrium behavior,
in particular, equilibrium offers at date-t are independent of matching histories.
(A3) Threshold rule for repayments. For each buyer i and each date t fol-
lowing any history, there exists a number, dt, such that dt is weakly larger than
the equilibrium loan amount at date t, and sbt,2(ρ
i
t, (yt, `t), yes) = `t if `t ≤ dt and
if ρit is consistent with equilibrium behavior.
We call a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, (sb, ss), satisfying conditions (A1)-(A3)
above a credit equilibrium. A few remarks are in order about these conditions. Our
record-keeping technology does not record all actions taken by the agents. Agents
have private information about the number of matches they had, quantities they
consumed, or offers that were rejected. Because of this private information using
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as the solution concept is both standard and
necessary. Alternatively, one may assume that all actions are observable, and
PBE is reduced to subgame perfection. Although we prefer our environment,
which is closer to the existing literature on monetary economics, our multiplicity
result does not rely on the presence of private information. In fact, because of our
focus on public strategies, (A1), any PBE we construct is also a subgame-perfect
12For a formal definition of public strategies see Definition 7.1.1 in Mailath and Samuelson
(2006).
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equilibrium (SPE) if all actions were observable.13 However, agents’ belief about
how other agents will respond to deviations do matter but they are pinned down
by equilibrium strategies.
Conditions (A1) and (A2) imply that, for any credit equilibrium, its outcomes
are characterized by {(yt, `t)}+∞t=0 , the sequence of equilibrium offers made by buy-
ers. Moreover, (A3) implies that xt = `t for each t, and hence the sequence
{(yt, `t)}+∞t=0 also determines the equilibrium allocation. Without (A1), equilib-
rium offers may depend on the buyer’s past matching histories.14 Condition (A3)
is not vacuous either. It restricts sellers to believe that buyers will repay their debt
when observing a deviating offer with obligations smaller than those in equilib-
rium.15 This restriction will rule out inefficiently large trades. As we will see later,
taken together the restrictions (A1)-(A3) will allow us to obtain a simple repre-
sentation of credit equilibria with solvency constraints added to the bargaining
problem.
Let {(yt, `t)}+∞t=0 be a sequence of equilibrium offers. Along the equilibrium
path the lifetime expected discounted utility of a buyer at the beginning of period
t is
V bt =
∞∑
s=0
βsα[u(yt+s)− `t+s]. (3.2)
13In such an equilibrium sellers’ beliefs about buyers’ private information are irrelevant for
their decisions to accept or reject offers. Hence, actions that correspond to agents’ private
trading histories would not matter even if they were publicly observable.
14Obviously, when α = 1, the matching-history-independence element in (A1) is vacuous.
However, when α < 1, it would be difficult to fully characterize all equilibrium outcomes without
(A1) but it certainly adds many more equilibria.
15Without this restriction one could sustain equilibria in which yt > y
∗ for some t; to do so,
one can adopt a strategy that triggers a permanent autarky for the buyer if his offer `t is smaller
than the equilibrium one.
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In each period t+s the buyer is matched with a seller with probability α in which
case the buyer asks for yt+s units of DM output in exchange for a repayment of
`t+s units of the nume´raire in the following CM and the seller agrees. In any
equilibrium −`t + βV bt+1 ≥ 0, which simply says that a buyer must be better off
repaying his debt and going along with the equilibrium rather than defaulting on
his debt and offering no-trade in all future matches, (yt+s, `t+s) = (0, 0) for all
s > 0. By a similar reasoning the lifetime expected utility of a seller along the
equilibrium path is
V st =
∞∑
s=0
βsα[−υ(yt+s)− `t+s]. (3.3)
The seller’s participation constraint in the DM requires −v(yt) + `t ≥ 0 since a
seller can reject a trade without fear of retribution. (He is not monitored.) Given
that buyers set the terms of trade unilaterally, and the output level is not part of
the record ρi, this participation constraint holds at equality. Our first proposition
builds on these observations to characterize outcomes of credit equilibria.
Proposition 5. A sequence, {(yt, xt, `t)}∞t=0, is a credit equilibrium outcome if
and only if, for each t = 0, 1, ...,
`t ≤
∞∑
s=1
βsα[u(yt+s)− `t+s] (3.4)
`t = xt = v(yt) ≤ v(y∗). (3.5)
As mentioned earlier, a sequence of equilibrium offers, {(yt, `t)}+∞t=0 , also deter-
mines the sequence of allocations, {(yt, xt)}+∞t=0 , with xt = `t for each t, and hence,
Proposition 5 also gives a characterization of allocations that can be sustained in
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a credit equilibrium. Condition (3.4), which follows directly from (3.2) and the
incentive constraint −`t + βV bt+1 ≥ 0, is analogous to the participation constraint
(IR) in Kehoe and Levine (1993), and the participation constraint in Proposition
2.1 in Kocherlakota (1996). However, while Kehoe and Levine (1993) assume the
IR constraint from the outset as a primitive condition, (3.4) is derived as an equi-
librium condition in our framework. The condition (3.5) is the outcome of the
buyer take-it-or-leave-if offer and pairwise Pareto efficiency (which follows from
the threshold rule A3).16
Proposition 5 shows that the conditions (3.4)-(3.5) are not only necessary but
also sufficient for an equilibrium by constructing a simple equilibrium strategy
profile. This strategy profile relies on punishments—the “penal code” in the ter-
minology of Abreu (1988)—for both default and excessive lending.17 Specifically,
buyers can be in two states at the beginning of period t, χi,t ∈ {G,A}, where G
means “good standing” and A means “autarky”, and each buyer’s initial state is
χi,0 = G. The law of motion of a buyer i’s state following a loan and repayment
(˜`, x˜) are given by:
χi,t+1
(
˜`, x˜, χi,t
)
=
 A if x˜ < min(
˜`, `t) or χi,t = A
G otherwise
, (3.6)
16To derive these conditions formally one has to use the assumption that yt is not publicly
recorded—only the loan contract is—and the threshold property in (A3). See proof of Proposi-
tion 5.
17There are different approaches for finding equilibria of repeated games. Abreu et al. (1990)
introduce the idea of self-generating set of equilibrium payoffs while Abreu (1988) introduces
the notion of simple strategies. See Mailath and Samuelson (2006, Section 2.5) for a review of
these approaches. We use a related but different approach from the one of Abreu (1988) as our
stage game has an extensive form and only a subset of the agents (the buyers) are monitored.
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where (˜`, x˜) might differ from the loan and repayment along the equilibrium path,
`t = xt. In order to remain in good standing, or state G, the buyer must repay
his loan, x˜ ≥ ˜`, if the size of the loan is no greater than the equilibrium loan
size, ˜` ≤ `t, and he must repay the equilibrium loan size, x˜ ≥ `t, otherwise.18
The autarky state, A, is absorbing: once a buyer becomes untrustworthy, he
stays untrustworthy forever.19 Sellers cannot be punished in future periods for
accepting a loan larger than `t since their identity is not recorded. However, they
are punished in the current period because buyers are allowed to partially default
on loans larger than `t while keeping their good standing with future lenders.
The strategies, (sb, ss), depend on the buyer’s state as follows. The seller’s
strategy, sst , consists of accepting all offers, (y˜,
˜`), such that v(y˜) ≤ min{˜`, `t}
provided that the buyer’s state is χi,t = G. The buyer repays s
b
t,2 = min{`t, ˜`}
if he is in state G, and he does not repay anything otherwise, sbt,2 = 0. These
strategies are depicted in Figure 3.2 where (yt, `t) is the offer made by a buyer
in state G along the equilibrium path and (y˜, ˜`) is any offer. By the one-stage-
18Note that the buyer can remain in state G even if he does not pay his debt in full, and hence
default is with respect to the common belief that buyers repay up to the size of the equilibrium
loan. Also, notice that there are alternative strategy profiles that deliver the same equilibrium
outcome. For instance, an alternative automaton is such that the transition to state A only
occurs if x˜ < ˜`≤ `t. If a loan such that ˜`> `t is accepted, then the buyer can default without
fear of retribution.
19While no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally along a subgame perfect equilibrium,
at some heuristic level it seems that two players may want to ”renegotiate” the punishment
and coordinate on some preferred outcome in the Pareto sense. In the context of our credit
equilibrium, the seller might want to forgive, and trust, a buyer who defaulted in the past
instead of punishing him with no trade. This idea was formalized by Farrell and Maskin (1989),
among others, with the refinement concept of weakly renegotiation-proof (WRP) equilibrium,
defined as one where any two continuation payoffs are not Pareto-rankable. From our viewpoint,
WRP eliminates the possibility of interesting coordination failures and the possibility of belief-
driven credit cycles.
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deviation principle it is then straightforward to show that any {(yt, `t)}∞t=0 that
satisfies (3.4)-(3.5) is an outcome for the strategy profile (sb, ss).
Figure 3.2: Automaton representation of the buyer’s strategy
In the following we propose an alternative formulation of a credit equilibrium in
terms of solvency constraints imposed on the bargaining problems in the DM. As
in AJ in the context of an economy with competitive trades, a solvency constraint
specifies an upper bound—called a debt limit—on the quantity of debt an agent
can issue, ` ≤ dt. According to this formulation, the buyer in a DM match sets
the terms of the loan contract so as to maximize his surplus, u(y)− `, subject to
the seller’s participation constraint and the solvency (or borrowing) constraint,
` ≤ dt, i.e.,
max
y,`
{u(y)− `} s.t. − υ(y) + ` ≥ 0 and ` ≤ dt. (3.7)
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The solution to (3.7) is `t = υ(yt) where
yt = z(dt) ≡ min{y∗, v−1(dt)}. (3.8)
The solvency constraint is reminiscent to the feasibility constraint in monetary
models (e.g., Lagos and Wright, 2005) according to which buyers in bilateral
matches cannot spend more than their real balances.
We say that a sequence of debt limits, {dt}∞t=0, is consistent with a credit
equilibrium outcome, {(yt, xt, `t)}∞t=0, if (yt, `t) is a solution to the bargaining
problem, (3.7), given dt for all t ∈ N0, and the buyer’s CM strategy consists of
repaying his debt up to dt provided that his past public histories (up to period
t−1) are consistent with equilibrium behavior, that is, the sequence {dt} satisfies
condition (A3).
It is easy to check from the proof of Proposition 5 that any credit equilibrium
outcome, {(yt, xt, `t)}∞t=0, is consistent with the sequence of debt limits, {dt}∞t=0,
such that dt = `t for all t ∈ N0. But the same equilibrium outcome may be
implementable by multiple debt limits if (3.9) is slack and yt = y
∗. The following
corollary summarizes these results and reduces a credit equilibrium to a sequence
of debt limits, {dt}∞t=0, that satisfies a sequence of participation constraints.
Corollary 3. (Equilibrium representation with debt limits) A sequence of
debt limits, {dt}∞t=0, is consistent with a credit equilibrium outcome if and only if
dt ≤
∞∑
s=1
βsα[u(yt+s)− v(yt+s)] (3.9)
v(yt) = min{dt, v(y∗)}. (3.10)
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Corollary 3 gives a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes using debt
limits. Indeed, by (3.10), yt is determined by dt, and hence (3.9) can be viewed
as an inequality that involves {dt}∞t=0 as the only endogenous variables. Without
the danger of confusion, we also call a sequence of debt limits, {dt}∞t=0, a credit
equilibrium if it satisfies (3.9) and (3.10).
While AJ introduces the solvency constraint as a primitive condition, we derive
debt limits endogenously as part of equilibrium strategies. AJ focuses on solvency
constraints that are “not-too-tight”, meaning that dt is the largest debt limit that
solves the buyer’s CM participation constraint, (3.9), at equality, thereby pre-
venting default while allowing as much trade as possible. A “too-tight” solvency
constraint is such that (3.9) is slack. In contrast to AJ and GMMW, we do not
impose buyers’ participation constraint to bind, i.e., the solvency constraint to be
“not-too-tight”, as such restriction would reduce the equilibrium set dramatically
and might eliminate equilibria with good welfare properties. The next Corollary
provides a sufficient condition for a credit equilibrium in recursive form.
Corollary 4. (Recursive sufficient condition) Any bounded sequence, {dt}+∞t=0 ,
that satisfies
dt ≤ β {α [u(yt+1)− v(yt+1)] + dt+1} , (3.11)
where v(yt) = min{dt, v(y∗)}, is a credit equilibrium.
The left side of (3.11) is the cost of repaying the current debt limit while the
right side of (3.11) is the benefit which has two components: the expected match
surplus of a buyer who has access to credit and his continuation value given by the
debt limit next-period. In Figure 3.3 we represent the pairs, (dt, dt+1), that satisfy
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(3.11) at equality by a red curve. We plot a truncated sequence of debt limits,
(dT−2, dT−1, dT ), that solves (3.11), i.e., (dT−2, dT−1) and (dT−1, dT ) are located to
the left of the red curve. Under “not-too-tight” solvency constraints {dt} solves
(3.11) where the weak inequality is replaced with an equality and hence any pair,
(dt−1, dt), is on the red curve. The sequence of inequalities, (3.11), are sufficient
conditions for a credit equilibrium, but they are not necessary. We will provide
examples of credit equilibria that do not satisfy (3.11) in Section 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Recursive representation
3.3.1 Steady-state equilibria
We first characterize steady states where debt limits and DM allocations are
constant over time, (dt, yt, `t) = (d, y, `) for all t. Under such restriction the
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incentive-compatibility condition, (3.9), or, equivalently, (3.11), can be simplified
to read:
rd ≤ α {u [z(d)]− υ [z(d)]} , (3.12)
where z given by (3.8) indicates the DM level of output as a function of d. The
left side of (3.12) is the flow cost of repaying debt while the right side is the flow
benefit from maintaining access to credit. This benefit is equal to the probability
of a trading opportunity, α, times the match surplus, u(y)−υ(y), where y = z(d).
Let dmax denote the highest value of the debt limit that satisfies (3.12), i.e., dmax
is the unique positive root to rdmax = α{u[z(dmax)]−v[z(dmax)]}. It is determined
graphically in Figure 3.4 at the intersection of the left side of (3.12) that is linear
and the right side of (3.12) that is concave. For all d < dmax, the gain from
defaulting is less than the cost associated with permanent autarky. The next
Proposition shows that any debt limit between d = 0 and d = dmax is part of an
equilibrium.
Proposition 6. (Steady-State Equilibria) There exists a continuum of steady-
state, credit equilibria indexed by d ∈ [0, dmax] with dmax > 0.
The two extreme debt limits, {0, dmax}, correspond to the two steady-state
equilibria under the AJ “not-too-tight” solvency constraints where the gain from
defaulting is exactly equal to the cost of permanent autarky. Proposition 6 estab-
lishes that any debt limit in between these two extreme values is also part of an
equilibrium. The intuition is as follows. For any debt d between 0 and dmax the
gain from defaulting is strictly smaller than the cost associated with permanent
autarky. So the buyer has incentives to repay such a loan. What about a slightly
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larger loan? The borrower cannot convince his current lender that he could repay
more than d as his incentive to repay depends on how his future lenders (who
he has not met yet) will “punish” him would he decide to renege on his current
obligations, and these punishments are taken as given by the borrower and his
lender. As a result, if a buyer offers ` > d then he only repays d, which is the
repayment that keeps him trustworthy to the other sellers he may meet in future
periods.
Figure 3.4: Set of debt limits at steady-state, credit equilibria
3.3.2 Periodic equilibria
Here we consider deterministic credit cycles where the extent to which buyers
are trustworthy to repay their debts changes over time. We start with 2-period
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cycles, {d0, d1}, where d0 is the debt limit in even periods and d1 is the debt limit
in odd periods. The incentive-compatibility condition, (3.9), becomes:
rdt ≤
α
[
u(y(t+1)mod2)− υ(y(t+1)mod2)
]
+ βα [u(yt)− υ(yt)]
1 + β
, t ∈ {0, 1} , (3.13)
where we used that `t = v(yt) = min{dt, v(y∗)} from (3.10). The term on the
numerator on the right side of (3.13) is the buyer’s expected discounted utility
over the 2-period cycle starting in t + 1. Obviously, the steady-state equilibria
described in Proposition 6 are special cases of 2-period cycles; indeed, for any
d ∈ [0, dmax], (d, d) satisfy (3.13). We define, for each d0 ∈ [0, dmax],
γ(d0) ≡ max{d1 : (d0, d1) satisfies (3.13) with t = 1}, (3.14)
the highest debt limit in odd periods consistent with a debt limit equal to d0 in
even periods. A 2-period-cycle equilibrium, or simply a 2-period cycle, is a pair
(d0, d1) that satisfies d0 ≤ γ(d1) and d1 ≤ γ(d0).
Lemma 4. The function γ(d) is positive, non-decreasing, and concave. Moreover,
dmin ≡ γ(0) > 0, γ(d) > d for all d ∈ (0, dmax), and γ(dmax) = dmax. If υ(y∗) <
dmax, then γ(d) = dmax for all d ∈ [υ(y∗), dmax].
The function γ is represented in the two panels of Figure 3.5. It is non-
decreasing because if the debt limit in even periods increases, then the punish-
ment from defaulting gets larger and, as a consequence, higher debt limits can
be sustained in odd periods. So there are complementarities between agents’
trustworthiness in odd periods and agents’ trustworthiness in even periods. The
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function γ(d) is always positive because even if credit shuts down in even periods,
it can be sustained in odd periods by the threat of autarky in both odd and even
periods. For a given d0 we define the set of debt limits in odd periods that are
consistent with a 2-period cycle by
Ω(d0) ≡ {d1 : d0 ≤ γ(d1), d1 ≤ γ(d0)} . (3.15)
In Figure 3.5 the set of credit cycles is the area between γ and its mirror image
with respect to the 45o line.
Proposition 7. (2-Period Credit Cycles) For all d0 ∈ [0, dmax) the set of 2-
period cycles with initial debt limit, d0, denoted Ω(d0), is a nondegenerate interval.
GMMW restrict attention to equilibria with “not-too-tight” solvency con-
straints, i.e., d0 = γ(d1) and d1 = γ(d0). Given the monotonicity and concavity of
γ(d) such equilibria do not occur outside of the 45o line, i.e., there are no (strict)
credit cycles with ”not-too-tight” solvency constraints. Indeed, if d0 ∈ (0, dmax)
then the maximum debt limit in odd periods is d1 = γ(d0) > d0. But given d1
the maximum debt limit in even periods is d′0 = γ(d1) > d1 > d0. Following this
argument we obtain an increasing sequence, {d0, γ(d0), γ(γ(d0)), . . . }, that con-
verges to dmax. In contrast, by relaxing the restriction of “not-too-tight” solvency
constraints we find a continuum of (strict) two-period cycle equilibria. Moreover,
the set of steady-state equilibria is of measure 0 in the set of all 2-period equilib-
ria. Indeed, for any d0 in the interval (0, d
max) there are a continuum of 2-period
cycles where d0 is the debt limit in even periods.
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Figure 3.5: Set of two-period credit cycles
The set of credit equilibria described in Proposition 7 contains equilibria where
credit dries up periodically. In the left panel of Figure 3.5 such equilibria corre-
spond to the case where d0 = 0 < d1 < γ(0) = d
min, i.e., even-period IOUs are
believed to be worthless while odd-period IOUs are repaid. If a seller extends a
loan in an even period, the buyer defaults, in accordance with equilibrium beliefs,
but remains trustworthy in subsequent odd periods. Such outcomes are ruled out
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by backward induction in pure-currency economies. In contrast a credit economy
has IOUs issued at different dates (and by different agents), and hence agents can
form different beliefs regarding the terminal value of these different securities.
The result according to which there are a continuum of equilibria does not
imply that everything goes. Fundamentals, such as preferences and matching
technology, do matter for the outcomes that can emerge. The following corollary
investigates how changes in fundamentals affect the equilibrium set.
Corollary 5. (Comparative statics) As r decreases or α increases the set of
2-period cycles expands.
If agents become more patient, i.e., r decreases, then γ shifts upward, as the
discounted sum of future utility flows associated with a given allocation increases,
and the set of 2-period cycle equilibria expands. The expansion of the equilibrium
set is represented by the dark yellow area in the left panel of Figure 3.5. Similarly,
if the frequency of matches, α, increases, then dmax increases as permanent autarky
entails a larger opportunity cost, and the set of credit cycles expands.
Corollary 6. (Credit tightness over the cycle)
If r ≥ α [u(y∗)− υ(y∗)] /υ(y∗) then `t ≤ dt binds for both t ∈ {0, 1} in any
2-period cycle.
If r < α [u(y∗)− υ(y∗)] /υ(y∗), then there are 2-period cycles such that `t ≤ dt
is slack for all t ∈ {0, 1}, and there are 2-period cycles where `t ≤ dt binds only
periodically.
Corollary 6 shows that if agents are sufficiently impatient, as in the left panel of
Figure 3.5, then the debt limit binds and output is inefficiently low in every period
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for all credit cycles. However, if agents are patient, then there are equilibria where
the debt limit binds periodically. Such equilibria are represented by the blue and
green areas in the right panel of Figure 3.5. There are also equilibria where the
debt limit fluctuates over time but never binds. These fluctuations, however, are
payoff-irrelevant since the allocation is constant and the first best is implemented,
y0 = y1 = y
∗. These equilibria are represented by the red square, [υ(y∗), dmax]2,
in the right panel of Figure 3.5.
One can generalize the above arguments to T -period cycles, {dj}T−1j=0 . The debt
limits must solve the following inequalities:
dt ≤
α
∑T
j=1 β
j
{
u
[
y(t+j)modT
]− υ [y(t+j)modT ]}
1− βT , t = 0, ..., T − 1 (3.16)
The numerator on the right side of (3.16) is the expected discounted sum of utility
flows over the T -period cycle. Following the same reasoning as above:
Proposition 8. (T-Period Credit Cycles) For any T ≥ 2 and for all d0 ∈
[0, dmax), the set of T -period credit cycles with initial debt limit, d0, denoted
ΩT (d0), is a bounded, convex, and closed set in RT−1 with positive Lebesgue mea-
sure.
Our environment can lead to cycles of any periodicity, and for a given length
of the cycle there are a continuum of equilibria. As an illustration, in Figure 3.6
we represent the set of 3-period cycles for a given d2. The outer edge of this set,
which has positive measure in R2, is represented by a thick black curve. One
can also see from the right panel that there is a non-empty set of 3-period cycles
(the pink area) where credit shuts down periodically, once (d2 = 0) or twice (e.g.,
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d1 = d2 = 0) every three periods. Also, for our parametrization the first best is
implementable, i.e., there are equilibria in the purple area with dt ≥ d∗ = 1 for
all t ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Figure 3.6: Set of three-period credit cycles: u(y) = 2
√
y, v(y) = y, β = 0.9, α =
0.25
3.3.3 Monetary vs credit economies
We now consider the same environment as before but we shut down the
record-keeping technology: individual trading histories are private information
in a match. Without public memory credit is no longer incentive-feasible as a
buyer would find it optimal to renege on his debt. Suppose that all buyers are
endowed with M = 1 units of fiat money at time t = 0. Money is a perfectly divis-
ible, storable, and intrinsically useless object, and its supply is constant over time.
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The environment is now identical to the one in Lagos and Wright (2003, 2005).20
We show in the following that any allocation, {(xt, yt)}+∞t=0 , of a pure monetary
economy, where xt is CM output and yt is DM output, is also an allocation of a
pure credit economy.
The CM price of money in terms of the nume´raire good is denoted φt. The
buyer’s choice of money holdings in period t is the solution to the following prob-
lem:
max
m≥0
{−φtm+ βα [u(yt+1)− υ(yt+1)] + βφt+1m} , (3.17)
where, from buyers’ take-it-or-leave-it offers in the DM, sellers are indifferent
between trading and not trading, υ(yt) = φtm. From (3.17) it costs φtm to the
buyer in the CM of period t to accumulate m units of money. In the following
DM the buyer can purchase yt+1 = υ
−1(φt+1m) if he happens to be matched with
probability α. Otherwise the buyer can resell his units of money at the price φt+1
in the CM of period t+ 1. From the first-order condition of (3.17), {φt}+∞t=0 solves
the following first-order difference equation,
φt = βφt+1
[
1 + α
u′(yt+1)− υ′(yt+1)
υ′(yt+1)
]
. (3.18)
According to (3.18) the value of fiat money in period t is equal to the discounted
value of money in period t + 1 augmented with a liquidity term that captures
the expected marginal surplus from holding an additional unit of money in a
20This version of the environment with ex-ante heterogeneity between buyers and sellers is
due to Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
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pairwise meeting in the DM. A monetary equilibrium is a bounded sequence,
{(yt, xt, φt)}+∞t=0 , that solves (3.18), with v(yt) = xt = min{φt, v(y∗)}
Proposition 9. (Monetary vs Credit Equilibria) Let {(yt, xt, φt)}+∞t=0 be a
monetary equilibrium of the economy with no record-keeping. Then, {(yt, xt, `t)}+∞t=0
where `t = min{φt, v(y∗)} is a credit equilibrium of the economy with record-
keeping.
Figure 3.7: Monetary vs credit outcomes
Proposition 9 establishes that the set of (dynamic) equilibrium allocations in
pure credit economies encompasses the set of equilibrium allocations of pure mon-
etary economies taking as given the trading mechanism. This result is related
to those in Kocherlakota (1998), but with a key difference: while Kocherlakota
(1998) shows that the set of all implementable outcomes (allowing for arbitrary
141
Chapter 3. Dynamic Indeterminacy and Welfare in Credit Economies
trading mechanisms) using money is contained in the set of all implementable out-
comes with memory, we compare the equilibrium outcomes for the two economies
under a particular trading mechanism. Later on we discuss the robustness to
other trading mechanisms.
We illustrate this result in Figure 3.7 where the green, backward-bending line
represents the first-order difference equation for a monetary equilibrium, (3.18),
while the red area is the first-order difference inequality for a credit equilibrium,
(3.11). Starting from some initial condition, d0, we represent by a dashed line
a sequence {dt} that satisfies the conditions for a monetary equilibrium. This
sequence also satisfies the conditions for a credit equilibrium, i.e., all pairs (dt, dt+1)
are located in the red area. Therefore, if the equilibrium set of a pure monetary
economy contains cycles and chaotic dynamics, the same must be true for the
equilibrium set of the same economy with no money but record-keeping.
The inclusion result in Proposition 9 breaks down if one imposes the “not-
too-tight” solvency constraints since the phase line for credit economies differs
from the phase line for monetary economies. The reason for this discrepancy is as
follows. Under the “not-too-tight” solvency constraints the payment capacity of
buyers, dt, in the pure credit economy is the discounted sum of all future match
surpluses,
dt = β {α [u(yt+1)− v(yt+1)] + dt+1} .
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In pure monetary economy the payment capacity of buyers, φt, is the discounted
sum of all future marginal surpluses multiplied by the value of money,
φt = β
{
α
∂ [u ◦ υ−1(φt+1)− φt+1]
∂φt+1
φt+1 + φt+1
}
.
From the concavity of the match surplus, if φt = dt, then φt+1 > dt+1.
The reverse of Proposition 9 does not hold; There are equilibria of pure credit
economies that are not equilibria of pure monetary economies. As we saw above
there are credit equilibria where trades shut down periodically, and such equilibria
cannot be captured by Figure 3.7. (Recall that the recursive condition in Corollary
4 is sufficient but not necessary.) As another example, one can construct equilibria
where the debt limit, dt, increases in a monotonic fashion over time as buyers
become more and more trustworthy. Such equilibria would not be sustainable in
monetary economies.
3.3.4 Sunspot equilibria
There is a view that deterministic cycles might not provide a realistic descrip-
tion of actual business cycle fluctuations. Hence we show in the following that one
can also construct sunspot equilibria where the DM allocation, {(yχ, `χ)}, depends
on the realization of a sunspot state, χ ∈ X, at the beginning of the DM. Suppose
that X is finite and the process driving the sunspot state is i.i.d. with distribution
pi. We assume that pi has a full support, i.e., pi(χ) > 0 for all χ ∈ X. The value of
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a buyer along the equilibrium path solves
V bχ = α [u(yχ)− υ(yχ)] + βV¯ b (3.19)
V¯ b =
∫
V bχ′dpi(χ
′), (3.20)
for all χ ∈ X. As before, the lifetime utility of a buyer is the expected discounted
sum of the surpluses coming from DM trades. It follows that a sunspot credit
equilibrium is a vector, 〈dχ;χ ∈ X〉, that satisfies dχ ≤ βV¯ b. Hence, {dχ} satisfies
rdχ ≤ α
∫
{u[z(dχ′)]− υ[z(dχ′)]}dpi(χ′) ∀χ ∈ X (3.21)
Proposition 10. (Sunspot equilibria) Suppose that X has at least two elements
and let pi be a distribution over X with a full support. For a given (χ, dχ) ∈
X × (0, dmax), the set of sunspot credit equilibria with debt limit dχ in state χ,
denoted by ΩX,pi(χ, dχ), has a positive Lebesgue measure in R|X|−1.
3.4 Alternative trading mechanisms
In the following we show that our results regarding the equilibrium set of pure
credit economies are robust to trading mechanisms other than take-it-or-leave-
it offers by buyers. We also extend our model in order to parametrize buyers’
temptation to renege on their debt. This extension adds a new parameter that
plays a key role for the normative results in Section 3.5.
Suppose from now on that a buyer who promises to deliver ` units of goods in
the next CM incurs the linear disutility of producing at the time he is matched
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Figure 3.8: Timing of the extended model with temptation to renege
in the DM. This new timing is illustrated in Figure 3.8.21 The effort exerted
by the buyer in the DM, `, is perfectly observable to the seller. At the time of
delivery, at the beginning of the CM, the disutility of production has been sunk
and the buyer has the option to renege on his promise to deliver the good. The
buyer’s utility from consuming his own output is λ` with λ ≤ 1. A buyer has
no incentive to produce more good than the amount he promises to repay to the
seller since the net utility gain from producing x units of the good for oneself is
(λ − 1)x ≤ 0. Although the physical environment is different, mathematically
speaking, the model of the previous section can be regarded as a special case with
λ = 1. As before we will focus on symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria that
satisfy (A1)-(A3).22
21The description of the buyer’s incentive problem is taken from Gu et al. (2013a) and GMMW.
22GMMW also introduce an imperfect record-keeping technology as follows. At the end of the
CM of period t the repayments are recorded for a subset of buyers, Brt ⊂ B, chosen at random
among all buyers. The set, Brt , of monitored buyers is of measure pi, and the draws from B are
independent across periods. So in every period, while his promise is always recorded, a buyer
has a probability pi of having his repayment decision being recorded. Any equilibrium of our
model with pi < 1 is also an equilibrium with pi = 1. Hence, setting pi = 1 is with no loss in
generality.
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Let {(dt, yt, `t)}∞t=0 be the sequence of equilibrium debt limits and trades. A
necessary condition for the repayment of dt to be incentive feasible is βV
b
t+1 ≥ λdt,
where the left side is a buyer’s continuation value from delivering the promised
output and the right side of the inequality is the utility of a buyer if he keeps
the output for himself, in which case he enjoys a utility flow λdt, and goes to
autarky. Following the same reasoning as before, a credit equilibrium is reduced
to a sequence, {dt}∞t=0, that satisfies
λdt ≤ βV bt+1 = α
+∞∑
s=1
βs [u(yt+s)− `t+s)] , t ∈ N0, (3.22)
where the relationship between yt, `t, and dt will depend on the assumed trading
mechanism.
3.4.1 Bargaining
It is standard in the literature on markets with pairwise meetings to determine
the outcome of a meeting by an axiomatic bargaining solution. In this section we
consider two well-known solutions: (i) the Kalai (1977) proportional bargaining
solution and (ii) the generalized Nash solution. We adopt the representation of
the equilibrium with solvency constraints, `t ≤ dt, in order to obtain a convex
bargaining set.23 For a given sequence of debt limits, {dt}+∞t=0 , the buyer repays
min{`t, dt} if his date-t obligation from his DM trade is `t. Due to the linearity
23Even though the bargaining solution is axiomatic we could consider a simple game where
upon being matched the buyer and the seller receive a proposal that they can either accept
or reject. The focus here, however, is not on strategic foundations for axiomatic bargaining
solutions.
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of the CM value functions, the buyer’s surplus from a DM trade, (yt, `t) with
`t ≤ dt, is u(yt)− `t and the seller’s surplus is −υ(yt) + `t.
Kalai proportional bargaining We amend the take-it-or-leave-it offer game
by restricting the set of buyers’ feasible offers: a buyer can only make offers
such that the fraction of the match surplus he receives is no greater than a given
θ ∈ [0, 1], i.e.,
u(y)− ` ≤ θ[u(y)− υ(y)]. (3.23)
Thus, the buyer’s offer in the DM, assuming he is in state G, solves
(yt, `t) = arg max
y,`
[u(y)− `] s.t. (3.23) and ` ≤ dt. (3.24)
According to (3.24) the buyer maximizes his utility of consumption net of the cost
of repaying his debt subject to the feasibility constraint, (3.23), and the repayment
constraint, ` ≤ dt. The solution to (3.24) is
yt = z(dt) ≡ min{y∗, η−1(dt)} and `t = η[z(dt)]. (3.25)
where η(y) = (1 − θ)u(y) + θυ(y). In equilibrium, the buyer offers (yt, `t) given
by (3.25) and the seller accepts it. The seller rejects any offer from a buyer with
state A.
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Proposition 11. (Credit equilibrium under proportional bargaining) A
sequence, {dt}, is a credit equilibrium under proportional bargaining if and only if
λdt ≤ αθ
+∞∑
i=1
βi [u(yt+i)− υ(yt+i)] , ∀t ∈ N0, (3.26)
where (yt, `t) is given by (3.25).
Proposition 11 describes the set of all debt limits, {dt}+∞t=0 , and associated
allocations, {(yt, `t)}+∞t=0 , that are generated by credit equilibria under bargaining
weight θ. The right side of (3.26) takes into account that buyers only a receive
a fraction θ of the match surplus. Note that Corollary 3 is a special case of
Proposition 11 by taking θ = λ = 1.
We can generalize Proposition 6 by showing that the set of steady-state equi-
libria is the interval [0, dmax], where dmax is the largest nonnegative root to rλd =
αθ{u[z(d)] − υ[z(d)]}, and dmax > 0 if and only if λr < αθ/(1 − θ). If buyers do
not have all the bargaining power, then an active steady-state credit equilibrium
exists only if buyers are sufficiently patient. The lower the value of θ the lower the
rate of time preference that is required for credit to emerge. Indeed, if θ decreases
buyers receive a lower share in current and future match surpluses and, for a
given d, the amount of DM consumption they can purchase is lower. Both effects
reduce the gains from participating in the DM and hence reduce the maximum
sustainable debt limit. It can also be checked that a higher λ reduces dmax. As a
result any (equilibrium) allocation under λ = 1 is also an (equilibrium) allocation
under λ < 1. We now move to equilibria with endogenous fluctuations.
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Proposition 12. (2-Period Credit Cycles under proportional bargain-
ing) If λr < αθ/(1 − θ), then there exists a continuum of strict, 2-period, credit
cycle equilibria. Moreover, if r <
√
1 + αθ/[λ(1− θ)] − 1, then there exist equi-
libria where credit shuts down periodically.
Proposition 12 establishes a condition for the existence of a continuum of
credit-cycle equilibria under proportional bargaining. The set of equilibria can
also be represented by Figure 3.5, and, under proportional bargaining, the outer
envelope shifts outward as θ increases. Moreover, if agents are sufficiently patient
then there are equilibria where credit shuts down periodically, i.e., γ(0) > 0. In
contrast, if we impose the “not-too-tight” solvency constraints, then there are
no periodic equilibrium under proportional bargaining, irrespective of the buyer’s
bargaining share.24
Generalized Nash bargaining Under generalized Nash bargaining the terms
of the loan contract are
(yt, `t) = arg max [u(y)− `]θ [`− υ(y)]1−θ s.t. ` ≤ dt.
The solution is given by (3.25) where
η(y) = Θ(y)v(y) + [1−Θ(y)]u(y) and Θ(y) = θu′(y)/ [θu′(y) + (1− θ)v′(y)] .
(3.27)
24Propositions 8 and 9 regarding the existence of N -period credit cycles and the relationship
between monetary and credit equilibria can be generalized to proportional bargaining in a similar
fashion.
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A sequence, {dt}+∞t=0 , is a credit equilibrium under generalized Nash bargaining if
and only if
λdt ≤ α
+∞∑
i=1
βi [u(yt+i)− η(yt+i)] , ∀t ∈ N0, (3.28)
where yt is the solution to (3.25).
We denote yˆ = arg max {u(y)− η(y)} the output level that maximizes the
buyer’s surplus. Unlike the proportional solution yˆ < y∗ for all θ < 1. As a result
the buyer’s surplus, u(y)− η(y), in the right side of the participation constraint,
(3.28), is non-monotonic with the debt limit provided that θ < 1.25 It follows
that the function γ(d) is hump-shaped, reaching a maximum at d = dˆ ≡ η(yˆ) and
it is constant for d > η(y∗). In Figure 3.9 we represent the function γ and the
set of pairs, (d0, d1), consistent with a 2-period credit cycle equilibrium. One can
see that the results are qualitatively unchanged except for the fact that the credit
limits at a periodic equilibrium can be greater than the highest debt limit at a
stationary equilibrium.26 This result will have important normative implications.
The two red stars in the left panel of Figure 3.9 are the strict two-period
cycles under 11not-too-tight” solvency constraints that GMMW focuses on. Such
cycles are located at the intersection of γ and its mirror image with respect to
the line d1 = d0. It should be clear that the non-monotonicity of the trading
mechanism is necessary to obtain such cycles. It can also be checked that cycles
under “not-too-tight” solvency constraints do not exist when λ = 1 (see GMMW).
25This non-monotonicity property of the Nash bargaining solution and its implications for
monetary equilibria is discussed at length in Aruoba et al. (54).
26In the Appendix we prove that any 2-period cycle under proportional bargaining is also a
2-period cycle under Nash bargaining.
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Figure 3.9: 2-period cycles under Nash bargaining or competitive pricing
In the top panels of Figure 3.10 we plot the numerical examples in Gu and
Wright (2011) under generalized Nash bargaining for the following functional
forms and parameter values: u(y) = [(x + b)1−a − b1−a]/(1 − a) with a = 2
and b = 0.082, v(y) = Ay, β = 0.6, α = 1, θ = 0.01, and λ = 3/40. In the
top left panel, A = 1.1, the two 2-period cycles under “not-too-tight” solvency
constraints are such that borrowing constraints bind periodically. In the top right
panel, A = 1.5, the borrowing constraint binds in all periods. For both examples
there exists a continuum of PBE 2-period cycles, a fraction of which feature bor-
rowing constraints that bind periodically and a fraction of which have borrowing
constraints that bind in all periods.
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3.4.2 Competitive pricing
Here we follow Kehoe and Levine (1993) and AJ and assume that the terms of
the loan contract in the DM are determined by competitive pricing. We reinterpret
matching shocks as preference and productivity shocks, i.e., only α buyers want
to consume and only α sellers can produce. As in the previous sections, buyers’
repayment strategy follows a threshold rule: for a given sequence of debt limits,
{dt}+∞t=0 , the buyer repays min{`t, dt} if his date-t obligation from his DM trade
is `t.
27 Moreover, the overall amount of debt issued by a buyer in the DM of
period t, `t, is known to all agents. Hence, if pt denotes the price of DM output in
terms of the nume´raire, a buyer’s demand is subject to the borrowing constraint,
pty ≤ dt. For a given {dt}+∞t=0 the market-clearing price is given by pt = υ′(yt),
where
yt = z(dt) ≡ min{y∗, η−1(dt)} and `t = η[z(dt)], (3.29)
with η(y) = υ′(y)y.28 The buyer’s surplus is u(y)−py = u(y)−υ′(y)y. For a given
p, the buyer’s surplus is non-decreasing in his borrowing capacity, dt. However,
once one takes into account the fact that p = v′(y) then the buyer’s surplus is
non-monotone in his capacity to borrow, dt. Provided that υ is strictly convex,
the buyer’s surplus reaches a maximum for y = yˆ < y∗. A sequence, {dt}+∞t=0 , is
a credit equilibrium under competitive pricing if and only if (3.28) holds for all
27If a buyer repays xt 6= `t in the CM, then each unit of IOU issued by that buyer has a payoff
equal to xt/`t units of nume´raire to its owner.
28The buyer’s problem is maxy {u(y)− pty} s.t. pty ≤ dt. The solution is yt =
min
{
u′−1(pt), dt/pt
}
. Using that there is the same measure, α, of buyers and sellers partic-
ipating in the market, market clearing implies pt = v
′(yt). As a result yt = y∗ if y∗v′(y∗) ≥ dt
and ytv
′(yt) = dt otherwise. For a detailed description of this problem in the context of a pure
monetary economy, see Rocheteau and Wright (2005, Section 4).
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t ∈ N0, where yt is given by (3.29). A steady state is a d such that
rλd ≤ α {u [z(d)]− υ′ [z(d)] z(d)} . (3.30)
Under some weak assumptions on v (for example, η(y) = υ′(y)y is convex), dmax >
0, i.e., there exists a continuum of steady-state equilibria. This also implies that
there exist a continuum of strict, 2-period, credit cycle equilibria.29 This result
can be contrasted with the ones in GMMW (Corollary 1-3) where conditions
on parameter values are needed to generate a finite number (typically, two) of
cycles. The right panel of Figure 3.9 illustrates these differences. Under “not-
too-tight” solvency constraints credit cycles are determined at the intersection
between γ(d) and its mirror image with respect to the 45o line. These cycles
are marked by a red star. If we allow for slack buyers’ participation constraints,
cycles are at the intersection of the area underneath γ(d) and its mirror image
with respect to the 45o line—the blue area in the figure. Finally, Proposition 9 on
the equivalence result between monetary equilibria and credit equilibria holds for
Walrasian pricing as well. (See the Supplementary Appendix C.0.8 for a formal
proof).
We now review the numerical examples in GMMW in the case where the
DM market is assumed to be competitive. The functional forms are u(y) = y,
v(y) = y1+γ/(1 + γ), and there are no idiosyncratic shocks, α = 1. The first
example in the bottom left panel of Figure 3.10 is obtained with the following
29Under competitive pricing, the function γ (analogous to (3.14)) may not be monotone or
concave, but the logic for Proposition 7 does not depend on those properties. See also the
supplementary appendix S2 for a formal proof of the existence of 2-period cycles.
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Figure 3.10: The blue area is the set of all PBE credit cycles. The red dots are
credit cycles under AJ “not-too-tight” solvency constraints. The top panels are
obtained under generalized Nash bargaining while the bottom panels are obtained
under price taking.
parameter values: γ = 2.1, β = 0.4, λ = 1/6. GMMW identify two (strict) two-
period cycles under “not-too-tight” solvency constraints , (d0, d1) = (0.477, 0.936)
and its converse, marked by red dots in the figure. The second example in the
bottom right panel is obtained with the following parameter values: γ = 0.5,
β = 0.9, λ = 1/10. The credit cycles under “not-too-tight” solvency constraints,
(d0, d1) = (0.933, 1.037) and its converse, are such that period allocations fluctuate
between being debt-constrained and unconstrained. We find a much bigger set of
PBE credit cycles represented by the blue colored region. There are a continuum
of cycles such that the allocations fluctuate between being debt-constrained and
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unconstrained and a continuum of cycles such that agents are debt-constrained
in all periods. In the second example, the credit cycle under “not-too-tight”
solvency constraints is such that (y0, y1) = (0.96, 1.00) while the most volatile
PBE is (y0, y1) = (0.96, 0.00).
3.5 Normative analysis
We now turn to the normative implications of our model. We will characterize
constrained-efficient allocations under two alternative market structures: pairwise
meetings and large-group meetings. We will show that the optimal mechanism for
the economy with pairwise meetings is the one studied in Section 3.3 where buyers
have all the bargaining power, and “not-too-tight” solvency constraints are socially
optimal. Under large-group meetings the optimality of “not-too-tight” solvency
constraints depends on λ that parameterizes buyers’ temptation to renege on their
obligations.
3.5.1 Optimal mechanism with pairwise meetings
We study the problem of a planner who chooses the allocation, {(yt, `t)}+∞t=0 , in
order to maximize the discounted sum of all match surpluses subject to incentive-
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feasibility conditions:30
max
{(yt,`t)}
+∞∑
t=0
βtα [u(yt)− υ(yt)] (3.31)
s.t. λ`t ≤
+∞∑
s=1
βsα [u(yt+s)− `t+s] (3.32)
υ(yt) ≤ `t ≤ u(yt). (3.33)
The inequality, (3.32), is the participation constraint guaranteeing that buyers
prefer to repay their debt rather than going to permanent autarky. The conditions
in (3.33) make sure that both buyers and sellers receive a positive surplus from
their DM trades. Coalition-proofness in pairwise meetings requires that yt ≤
y∗, which is satisfied endogenously (and hence ignored thereafter). We call a
solution to (3.31)-(3.33) a constrained-efficient allocation (c.e.a.). In the following
we use ymax to denote the highest, stationary level of output consistent with both
the seller’s and buyer’s participation constraints. It is the positive solution to
λrυ(ymax) = α [u(ymax)− υ(ymax)].
Proposition 13. (c.e.a. under pairwise meetings)
1. If y∗ ≤ ymax, then any c.e.a. is such that yt = y∗ and `t ∈ [v(y∗), `] for all
t ∈ N0, where ` = α [u(y∗)− υ(y∗)] /λr.
30Kocherlakota (1996) and Gu et al. (2013a, Section 7) study a Pareto problem to determine
a contract curve linking the expected discounted utilities of buyers and sellers. In contrast the
planner’s objective in our model is a social welfare function that aggregates the buyers’ and
sellers’ utilities. One can interpret this social welfare function as the ex ante expected utility
of a representative agent in a version of the model where the role of an agent in the DM is
determined at random in each period.
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2. If y∗ > ymax, then the c.e.a. is such that yt = ymax and `t = v(yt) for all
t ∈ N0.
If agents are sufficiently patient (r low) and if the temptation to renege is not
too large (λ low), then the first-best allocation is implementable.31 In contrast, if
λr > α [u(y∗)/υ(y∗)− 1], then the c.e.a. is yt = ymax < y∗, which corresponds to
the highest steady state. The c.e.a. can be implemented by having buyers set the
terms of the loan contract unilaterally, in which case `t = υ(yt) for all t.
32 By giv-
ing all the bargaining power to buyers the planner relaxes participation constraints
in the CM, which allows for higher levels of output. Moreover, the solvency con-
straint in the buyer’s bargaining problem must be “not-too-tight,” in accordance
with AJ’s Second Welfare Theorem. We summarize this implementation result in
the following Corollary.
Corollary 7. (Second Welfare Theorem for economies with pairwise
meetings) The c.e.a. is implemented with take-it-or-leave-it offers by buyers
under “not-too-tight” solvency constraints.
3.5.2 Optimal mechanism with large-group meetings
Suppose next that agents meet in a centralized location in the DM. If we do
not allow for defections with coalitions, then the planner’s problem is subject to
31Hu et al. (2009) derive the same condition for pure monetary economies in the case where
λ = 1. A difference, however, is that the game where buyers make take-it-or-leave-it offers is
not the optimal mechanism in monetary economies.
32Notice, however, that the c.e.a. is not uniquely implemented by the optimal mechanism.
There are a continuum of equilibria under “not-too-tight” solvency constraints converging to
the autarky steady state. The c.e.a. is the only bounded sequence that does not converge to the
autarky equilibrium. For related results in the context of the AJ model see Bloise et al. (2013).
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the same incentive constraints as before, (3.32) and (3.33), and Proposition 13
holds. However, the restriction according to which no coalition of agents can
defect from the proposed allocation is binding when υ′′ > 0.33 In order to prevent
such defections we impose the core requirement in the DM or, equivalently, the
competitive equilibrium outcome.34 Hence, from (3.29) the terms of the loan
contract are given by ` = η(y) = v′(y)y.
The planner’s problem, which is analogous to (3.31)-(3.33), is easier to solve
when written recursively with the buyer’s “promised utility,” ωt, as a new state
variable.35 Society’s welfare, denoted V (ω), solves the following Bellman equation,
V (ω) = max
y,ω′
{α [u(y)− v(y)] + βV (ω′)} (3.34)
s.t. −η(y) + βω
′
λ
≥ 0 (3.35)
ω′ ≥ (1 + r) {ω − α [u(y)− η(y)]} (3.36)
y ∈ [0, y∗], ω′ ∈ [0, ω¯] , (3.37)
where ω¯ = maxy∈[0,y∗] [u(y)− η(y)] /(1− β) is an upper bound for the lifetime ex-
pected utility of a buyer. Equation (3.35) is the buyer’s participation constraint
in the CM that replaces (3.32) taking into account the competitive pricing mech-
33Indeed, a buyer and two sellers can form a deviating coalition in which each seller produces
yt/2 at a total cost of 2υ(yt/2) < υ(yt) and the buyer compensates the sellers by offering them
a positive surplus, `t/2− υ(yt/2) > 0.
34See Hu et al. (2009) and Wallace (2013) for a related assumption in the context of monetary
economies. The equivalence result between the core and competitive equilibrium allocations for
economies with a continuum of agents was first shown by Aumann (1964). See supplementary
appendix S3 for a proof of this equivalence result in the context of our model.
35Our recursive formulation is similar to the self-generation technique in Abreu et al. (1990),
which characterizes the set of payoffs generated by Perfect Public Equilibria. We go beyond
their characterization by providing the set of allocations and debt limits.
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anism, ` = η(y) = v′(y)y. The novelty is the promise-keeping constraint, (3.36),
according to which the lifetime expected utility promised to the buyer along the
equilibrium path, ω, is implemented by generating an expected surplus in the
current period equal to α [u(y)− η(y)] and by promising βω′ for the future. In
the Supplementary Appendix S4 we show that there is a unique V solution to
(3.34)-(3.37) in the space of continuous, bounded and concave functions, and this
solution is non-increasing. As a result, the maximum value for society’s welfare
is V (0) = maxω∈[0,ω¯] V (ω), as the initial promised utility to the buyer is a choice
variable.
We define two critical values for DM output:
yˆ = arg max
y∈[0,y∗]
[u(y)− η(y)] (3.38)
ymax = max{y > 0 : α[u(y)− η(y)] ≥ rλη(y)}. (3.39)
The quantity yˆ is the output level that maximizes the buyer’s surplus in the DM.
The quantity ymax is the highest, stationary level of output that is consistent with
the buyer’s participation constraint in the CM. We assume that both yˆ and ymax
are well-defined and, for all 0 ≤ y ≤ ymax, α[u(y)− η(y)] ≥ rλη(y).
Proposition 14. (c.e.a. under centralized meetings) Assume η is a convex
function.
1. If y∗ ≤ ymax, then the c.e.a. is such that yt = y∗ for all t ∈ N0.
2. If ymax ≤ yˆ ≤ y∗ , then the c.e.a. is such that yt = ymax for all t ∈ N0.
3. If yˆ < ymax < y∗ then there are two cases:
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(a) If λ ≥ α [1− u′(ymax)/η′(ymax)], then the c.e.a. is such that yt = ymax
for all t ∈ N0.
(b) If λ < α [1− u′(ymax)/η′(ymax)], then the c.e.a. is such that y0 ∈
(ymax, y∗) and yt = y1 ∈ (yˆ, ymax) for all t ≥ 1, where (y0, y1) is the
unique solution to
max
y0,y1
{
u(y0)− v(y0) + u(y1)− v(y1)
r
}
(3.40)
s.t. η(y0) =
α[u(y1)− η(y1)]
λr
. (3.41)
In accordance with “Folk theorems” for repeated games, provided that agents
are sufficiently patient, r ≤ α[u(y∗) − η(y∗)]/λη(y∗), the first-best allocation is
an equilibrium outcome. If ymax < y∗ then the first best violates the buyers’
participation constraint. In this case, the characterization of the c.e.a. depends
on the ordering of ymax and yˆ. As shown in the left panel of Figure 3.11, if
ymax ≤ yˆ then a buyer’s welfare and society’s welfare are both increasing with y
over (0, ymax) and the highest steady state maximizes social welfare.
We now turn to the case where yˆ < ymax < y∗. For all y ∈ (yˆ, y∗) the buyer’s
surplus, u(y)− η(y), and society’s surplus, u(y)− v(y), covary negatively with y,
as shown in the right panel of Figure 3.11. This negative relationship gives rise
to a trade-off between social efficiency and incentives for debt repayment. As a
result of this trade-off the highest steady state, ymax, might no longer be the PBE
outcome that maximizes social welfare.
It is shown in the proof of Proposition 14 that it is always socially optimal
to keep future output constant, yt = y1 for all t ≥ 1. Moreover, if the first best
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Figure 3.11: Left panel: No trade-off between efficiency and incentives over
[0, ymax]; Right panel: A trade-off between efficiency and incentives over [yˆ, y∗].
cannot be achieved, then the buyer’s participation constraint at t = 0 must be
binding since otherwise y0 could be raised without affecting any future incentive
constraints. As a result of these two properties the buyer’s participation constraint
at t = 0 is given by (3.41). If y1 > yˆ, (3.41) gives a trade-off between current and
future output. The magnitude of this trade-off in the neighborhood of the highest
steady state is:
dy1
dy0
∣∣∣∣
ymax
=
λrη′(ymax)
α[u′(ymax)− η′(ymax)] < 0.
When λ ≥ α [1− u′(ymax)/η′(ymax)] exploiting this trade-off is harmful since one
would have to implement a large drop in future output below ymax in order to
raise current output by a small amount above ymax while maintaining the buyer’s
incentive to repay his debt.
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In contrast, when λ is small, it is optimal to exploit the trade-off between
current and future output arising from (3.41). The optimal allocation is such
that y0 is larger than y
max while y1 is lower than y
max. Even though, in future
periods, society would be better-off at the highest steady state, u(y1) − v(y1) <
u(ymax)−v(ymax), buyers enjoy a higher surplus, u(y1)−η(y1) > u(ymax)−η(ymax),
which relaxes their incentive constraint for repayment at t = 0. As a result, output
and society’s welfare in the initial period are higher than the highest steady-state
levels, u(y0)− v(y0) > u(ymax)− v(ymax).36
In Figure 3.12 we illustrate the determination of (y0, y1). The red curve labelled
IR corresponds to (3.41). It slops downward because of the trade-off between
current and future output described above. By definition the IR curve intersects
the 45o-line at ymax. The blue curve labelled FOC corresponds to the first-order
condition of the problem (3.40)-(3.41). Given the strict concavity of the surplus
function it is optimal to smooth consumption by increasing y0 when y1 increases.
When λ is low the FOC curve is located above the IR curve at y1 = y
max. Hence,
the optimal solution, denoted (y∗∗0 , y
∗∗
1 ), is such that y
∗∗
0 > y
max and y∗∗1 < y
max.
The next Corollary reviews the role of ”not-too-tight” solvency constraints to
implement a constrained-efficient allocation.
Corollary 8. (Second Welfare Theorem under large-group meetings)
Assume that η is a convex function.
36Kehoe and Levine (1993) provide an example where partial exclusion leads to a welfare-
improving outcome. See their Example 2 on p. 875. In the Supplementary Appendix S5
we conduct a similar analysis for different trading mechanisms, η. We show that the results
obtained under Nash bargaining are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained in this section
under competitive pricing.
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Figure 3.12: Determination of the constrained-efficient allocation, (y0, y1)
1. If either ymax ≤ yˆ ≤ y∗ or yˆ < ymax < y∗ and λ ≥ α [1− u′(ymax)/η′(ymax)],
then the c.e.a. is implemented with “not-too-tight” solvency constraints.
2. If yˆ < ymax < y∗ and λ < α [1− u′(ymax)/η′(ymax)], then the c.e.a. is im-
plemented with slack repayment constraints (i.e., “too-tight” solvency con-
straints) in all future periods, t ≥ 1.
The failure of the AJ Welfare Theorem in the second part of Corollary 8 is
surprising as one would conjecture that higher debt limits allow society to generate
larger gains from trade. This reasoning is valid in a static sense. If dt increases,
the sum of all surpluses in period t, α [u(yt)− v(yt)], increases. However, there
is a general equilibrium effect according to which more IOUs are competing for
DM goods, which raises the price of DM goods, pt = v
′(yt). If the economy is
close enough to the first best, this pecuniary externality lowers the buyers’ welfare
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(even though society as a whole is better off) and worsens their incentive to repay
their debt in earlier periods.
Figure 3.13: The blue area is set of all 2-period cycles. The red star is the
2-period cycle in GMMW and the green star is the highest steady state. Left
panel: λ = 1/6; Right panel: λ = 1/4.
The results in Proposition 14 are robust if we restrict the equilibrium set
to 2-period cycles. To see this we adopt the numerical example from the left
panel of Figure 3.10, γ = 2.1, β = 0.4, λ = 1/6. For these parameter values
λ < α [1− u′(ymax)/η′(ymax)]. Society’s welfare over a 2-period cycle is measured
by u [y(d0)]−v [y(d0)]+β {u [y(d1)]− v [y(d1)]}. In the left panel of Figure 3.13 we
highlight in red and green the set of 2-period cycles, (d0, d1), that dominate the
equilibria under “not-too-tight” solvency constraints. There exist a continuum
of such cycles that feature slack participation constraints. Hence, the imposition
of “not-too-tight” solvency constraints eliminates good equilibria. Moreover, we
represent society’s welfare at the c.e.a. with a black indifference curve. This
curve lies outside of the set of 2-period cycles (the blue area), which confirms
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Part 3(b) of Proposition 14, i.e., the c.e.a. is not a 2-period cycle. The right
panel of Figure 3.13 reduces λ from λ = 1/6 to λ = 1/4. The condition in Part
3(b) of Proposition 14 holds so that the highest steady state is not constrained
efficient. There is no credit cycle under the “not-too-tight” solvency constraints,
but there are a continuum of cycles under “too-tight” constraints, a fraction of
which dominate the highest steady state.
3.6 Conclusion
We have characterized the set of equilibrium outcomes of a pure credit econ-
omy and their welfare properties. The economy features intertemporal gains from
trade that can be exploited with simple one-period loan contracts. Such contracts
and their execution are publicly recorded. Agents interact either through random,
pairwise meetings under various trading mechanisms, as in the New-Monetarist
literature, or in competitive spot markets, as in AJ. In contrast with the exist-
ing literature we have shown that such economies exhibit a continuum of steady
states and a continuum of endogenous cycles of any periodicity. Moreover, any
equilibrium outcome of the pure monetary economy with no record-keeping but
fiat money is an outcome of the pure credit economy, but the reverse is not true.
Finally, we have characterized the constrained-efficient allocations for economies
with pairwise and large-group meetings. We generalized the AJ Second Wel-
fare Theorem to economies with pairwise meetings by showing that constrained-
efficient allocations are implemented with take-it-or-leave-it offers by buyers and
“not-too-tight” solvency constraints. In contrast, under large group meetings the
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Figure 3.14: Optimality of ”not-too-tight” solvency constraints and credit cycles
under competitive pricing.
AJ Second Welfare Theorem fails when the temptation to renege (λ) is small. As
shown in Figure 3.14, cycles under “not-too-tight” solvency constraints emerge for
low values of λ (see GMMW), but for such values constrained efficiency requires
slack participation constraints or, equivalently, “too-tight” solvency constraints.
Hence, imposing the “not-too-tight” solvency constraint entails a loss in generality
for both positive and normative analysis.
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Consumer Credit,
Unemployment, and Aggregate
Labor Market Dynamics
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Figure A.1: Consumer credit outstanding to disposable personal income and
the civilian unemployment rate. 1978 Q1-2013 Q4. Series are detrended with a
Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter λ = 100, 000. Sources: Fed-
eral Reserve Board Flow of Funds Accounts. Table B.100 and Bureau of Labor
Statistics. NBER recessions are shown in grey.
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Figure A.2: Each time series is logged then de-trended with a Hodrick-Prescott
filter with smoothing parameter λ = 100, 000.
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Table A.2: Unemployment and Consumer Credit, 2007-2009
(1) (2) (3)
2007 2009 Difference (2)-
(1)
Consumer Debt ($) 4,780 5,441 661*
(150) (340)
Credit Card Debt ($) 2,438 2,226 -212
(113) (113)
Auto Debt ($) 2,513 3,086 573*
(97) (283)
Credit Card {0,1} 0.67 0.62 -0.43***
(0.01) (0.01)
CC Monthly Charges ($) 447 393 -54**
(16.5) (14.4)
CC Debt Limit ($1,000) 15.74 14.50 -1.24*
(0.52) (0.48)
Applied 0.63 0.43 -0.20***
(0.01) (0.01)
Denied | Applied 0.21 0.27 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01)
Income ($1000) 44.72 42.82 -1.90*
(0.61) (0.61)
Weekly Hours 29.96 25.64 -4.32***
(0.34) (0.34)
Observations 3,820 3,820
Note: Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Observations
are weighted using SCF 2007-2009 probability weights. The sample consists
of all primary economic units (PEUs) that were single in both 2007 and 2009
and were employed in 2007. Dollar values represent real 2007 dollars adjusted
using the CPI.
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Table A.3: Balancing Test, Pre-Treatment 2007
(1) (2) (3)
EU = 0 EU = 1 Difference
Individual Characteristics
Male 0.34 0.33 -0.01
(0.01) (0.03)
Black 0.20 0.23 0.03
(0.01) (0.03)
Age 48.0 43.1 -4.88***
(0.25) (0.77)
High School 0.41 0.39 -0.02
(0.01) (0.03)
Some College 0.22 0.19 -0.03
(0.01) (0.02)
College Degree 0.37 0.42 0.05*
(0.01) (0.03)
Outcome Variables
Consumer Debt ($) 4,711 5,525 814
(148) (784)
Credit Card Debt ($) 2,457 3,304 946
(102) (756)
Auto Debt ($) 2,540 2,221 -319
(102) (305)
Credit Card {0,1} 0.67 0.65 -0.02
(0.01) (0.03)
CC Monthly Charges {0,1} 0.53 0.58 0.05
(0.01) (0.03)
CC Monthly Charges ($) 441 507 66.4
(16.1) (89.1)
CC Debt Limit ($1,000) 16.20 10.75 -5.45***
(0.56) (1.08)
Applied 0.64 0.56 -0.08**
(0.01) (0.01)
Denied | Applied 0.21 0.20 -0.01
(0.01) (0.03)
Income ($1000) 45.43 37.10 -8.33***
(0.76) (2.36)
Labor Income ($1000) 28.43 27.85 -0.47
(0.66) (2.03)
Weekly Hours 29.42 35.87 6.45***
(0.37) (1.09)
Observations 3,515 305
Note: See note in Table A.2.
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Table A.9: Calibration Summary: Parameters and Stochastic Steady State
Targets
Description Value Source/Target
Labor Market Parameters
matching curvature, ηL 0.710 job filling rate, JOLTS
separation rate, δ 0.032 unemployment rate, BLS
vacancy posting costs, k 0.150 Silva and Toledo (2009)
labor bargaining weight, λ 0.500 normalization
utility from leisure, ` 0.250 Hall and Milgrom (2008)
unemployment income, b 0.700 average decline in credit upon job
loss, estimated in Section 1.2.2,
SCF
Goods/Credit Market Parameters
matching curvature, ηG 1.27 debt to income, FRB Z.1 Flow of
Funds
utility curvature, γ 0.390 MPC out of credit, Gross and
Souleles (2002)
mean of labor productivity, µz 1.000 normalization
persistence of labor productivity, ρz 0.884 output per job, BLS
s.d. of labor productivity shock, σz 0.0075 output per job, BLS
mean of agg. financial conditions, µν 0.512 FRB Z.1 Flow of Funds
persistence of agg. financial conditions,
ρν
0.967 FRB Z.1 Flow of Funds
s.d. of agg. financial conditions, σν 0.0083 FRB Z.1 Flow of Funds
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A.0.2 Derivation of Wage equation
From (1.16), we can write Vt(1) and Vt(0) combining (1.5) and (1.22) as
Vt(1) = α(nt)µ[υ(y
1
t )− y1t ] + wt + β
[
(1− δ)Vt+1(1) + δVt+1(0)
]
(A.1)
Vt(0) = α(nt)µ[υ(y
0
t )− y0t ] + (`+ b) + β[p(θt)Vt+1(1) + (1− p(θt))Vt+1(0)] (A.2)
Solving for Vt(1) in (A.1) and subtracting Vt(0) obtains the surplus of an employed
worker
Vt(1)− Vt(0) = α(nt)µ
{
[υ(y1t )− y1t ]− [υ(y0t )− y0t ]
}
+ wt − (`+ b)
+ β(1− δ − p(θt))[Vt+1(1)− Vt+1(0)] (A.3)
From (1.26) and the free entry condition k = βf(θt)Jt+1, we can write (A.3) as
Vt(1)− Vt(0) = α(nt)µ
{
[υ(y1t )− y1t ]− [υ(y0t )− y0t ]
}
+ wt − (`+ b)
+ (1− δ − p(θt)) λ
1− λ
k
f(θt)
(A.4)
Similarly, from (1.25), (1.26), and the free entry condition we can write the value
of a filled job as
Jt = zt − wt + (1− δ) k
f(θt)
(A.5)
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Combining (A.4) and (A.5) using (1.26) we obtain
(1− λ)[α(nt)µ
{
[υ(y1t )− y1t ]− [υ(y0t )− y0t ]
}
+ wt − (`+ b)] = λ[zt − wt + λθtk]
(A.6)
where we have used the result that p(θt) = θtf(θt). Rearranging (A.6) yields the
wage equation (1.27)
wt = λ[zt(wt) + θtk] + (1− λ)(b+ `− α(nt)µ[S1(wt)− S0]) = Γt(wt) (A.7)
A.0.3 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 2: Part (i): Taking the derivative with respect to θ in (1.31)
we have
∂Sf
∂θ
= −λk + (1− λ)α(n)ν[υ
′(y1)− 1]
(1− µ)υ′(y1) + µ
∂w
∂θ
(A.8)
Taking derivative of (1.29) with respect to θ yields
∂w
∂θ
=
λk
1− (λ− µ)α(n) ν[υ′(y1)−1]
(1−µ)υ′(y1)+µ
(A.9)
Evaluated at the equilibrium wage, the denominator in (A.9) is positive, hence
∂w/∂θ > 0. Let ∂S1/∂w = nu[υ′(y1) − 1]/[(1 − µ)υ′(y1) + µ]. Combining (A.8)
and (A.9) we can write ∂Sf/∂θ as
∂Sf
∂θ
= − λk 1− (1− µ)α(n)∂S
1/∂w
1− (λ− µ)α(n)∂S1/∂w (A.10)
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The sign of (A.10) depends on the magnitude of ∂S1/∂w. Its maximum value is
νµ/(1− µ) when y1 = 0. Since (1− µ)α(n)νµ/(1− µ) ≤ 1, then ∂Sf/∂θ ≤ 0 for
any n.
Part (ii and iii): Taking the derivative with respect to n in (1.31) yields
∂Sf
∂n
= (1− λ)α′(n)[S1 − S0] + (1− λ)(1− µ)ξS0 + (1− λ)α(n)∂S
1
∂w
∂w
∂n
(A.11)
where ξ = α
′(n)n−α(n)
n2
< 0. If S0 = 0 the result in part (ii) immediately follows.
Taking the derivative of (1.29) with respect to n yields.
∂w
∂n
=
(λ− µ)α′(n)S1 + λ(1− µ)ξS0
1− (λ− µ)α(n)∂S1/∂w (A.12)
The sign of the denominator is positive at the equilibrium wage. However, the
sign of the numerator is ambiguous since ξ < 0. Plugging (A.12) into (A.11) yields
∂Sf
∂n
= (1− λ)α′(n)[S1 − S0] + (1− λ)(1− µ)ξS0+
(1− λ)α(n)(λ− µ)α′(n)S1 ∂S1
∂w
+ (1− λ)λ(1− µ)ξα(n)S0 ∂S1
∂w
1− (λ− µ)α(n)∂S1/∂w (A.13)
Proof of Lemma 3: From Lemma 2, we know ∂Sf/∂θ ≤ 0 which implies
∂Sf/∂J ≤ 0. Let S¯t be the solution to Sf (1− u, 0). From (1.31), S¯f > 0 for any
u. Since the right-hand side of (1.34) is strictly increasing and crosses through
the origin, there exists a unique fixed point of the problem. Further since Sf is
bounded below by (1− λ)(z¯ − `)− λθk, J∗ > JDMP .
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A.0.4 Continuous Time Derivation
To come. Available upon request.
A.0.5 Data Appendix
Survey of Consumer Finances, 2007-2009 ‘Denied’ Variable Definitions
Denied because of credit related reasons includes households that were
told they haven’t established a credit history, credit rating service reports, credit
records/history from another institution, bankruptcy, amounts of debt, size of
other payments, or ability to repay loan too high, insufficient credit references, or
other credit characteristics of the borrower.
Denied because of asset related reasons includes lack of assets, collateral,
property to secure the loan or insufficient collateral or equity.
Denied because of income related reason includes lack of assets, collateral
or property to secure the loan, time on current job, the type of job or work (i.e.
steady or secure, a good job), lack of job or not working, amount of income or the
source of income for retired households, and any other financial characteristics of
the household.
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B.0.7 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1 First we derive Equation (2.32) that determines the
debt limit. Let Λe = [−a+ βUe (a)] −
[
−a˜+ βU˜e (a˜)
]
, where a and a˜ are the
optimal choices of liquid assets of households with and without access to credit,
respectively. From (2.14) and (2.16) it can be checked that
U1(a) =α(n)µ [υ (y)− y] + (R− 1)a+ ∆− T + (1− δ) [w + βU1(a)]
+ δ [`+ b+ βU0(a)]
U˜1(a˜) =α(n)µ [υ (y˜)− y˜] + (R− 1)a˜+ ∆− T + (1− δ)
[
w + βU˜1(a˜)
]
+ δ
[
`+ b+ βU˜0(a˜)
]
U0(a) =α(n)µ [υ (y)− y] + (R− 1)a+ ∆− T + p [w + βU1(a)]
+ (1− p) [`+ b+ βU0(a)]
U˜0(a˜) =α(n)µ [υ (y˜)− y˜] + (R− 1)a˜+ ∆− T + p
[
w + βU˜1(a˜)
]
+ (1− p)
[
`+ b+ βU˜0(a˜)
]
.
After some calculation,
Λ1 = −(1− βR)(a− a˜) + βα(n)µ {[υ (y)− y]− [υ (y˜)− y˜]}+ (1− δ)βΛ1 + δβΛ0
Λ0 = −(1− βR)(a− a˜) + βα(n)µ {[υ (y)− y]− [υ (y˜)− y˜]}+ pβΛ1 + (1− p)βΛ0.
It follows that Λ1 = Λ0 = Λ where
Λ =
−(1 + r −R)(a− a˜) + α(n)µ {[υ (y)− y]− [υ (y˜)− y˜]}
r
. (B.1)
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Thus, the cost of losing access to credit is the same for employed and unemployed
households. From (2.29) and (B.1), d¯ is a fixed point to (2.32). Next, we prove
the claims in Proposition 1 by distinguishing the case where households with no
access to credit hold liquid assets (case 1) from the case where they don’t (case
2).
Case 1: a˜ > 0. From (2.25) this requires (1 + r −R) /R < α(n)νµ/(1 − µ),
i.e., R >R.
The left side of (2.32), rd¯, is linear. Let us turn to the right side of (2.32), Γ(d¯).
If d¯ ≤ Rνa˜, then the debt limit is less than the payment capacity of households
with no access to credit. It follows from (2.25) that households with access to
credit will choose the same payment capacity as the one of households with no
access to credit, i.e., d¯+Rνaˆ = Rνa˜ and y = y˜, since they face the same marginal
condition for the choice of liquid assets. Consequently, the right side of (2.32) is
linear, Γ(d¯) ≡ ρ (1 + r −R) d¯/Rν. Since Γ(0) = 0, d¯ = 0 is a solution to (2.32).
If d¯ > Rνa˜, then the debt limit is greater than the payment capacity of
households with no access to credit. Consequently, from (2.25), households with
access to credit choose not to accumulate liquid assets, a = 0, and the derivative
of Γ is
Γ′(d¯) ≡ ρα(n)µ
[
υ′ (y)− 1
(1− µ)υ′(y) + µ
]
≥ 0.
In that case Γ(d¯) is a concave function of d¯. For all d¯ ≥ (1−µ)υ(y∗)+µy∗, y = y∗
and Γ′(d¯) = 0. A necessary and sufficient condition for a unique d¯ > 0 solution
to (2.32) to exist is that the slope of the left side of (2.32) is less than the slope
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of the right side of (2.32) evaluated at d¯ = 0, i.e., r < Γ′(0). This condition can
be rewritten as r < ρ
(
1+r−R
Rν
)
or R < R¯.
If R = R¯, then r = Γ′(0) and Γ(d¯) = rd¯ for all d¯ ≤ Rνa˜. Moreover, for all
d¯ > Rνa˜, Γ(d¯) is located underneath rd¯ so that there is no solution to Γ(d¯) = rd¯.
This proves the claim that if R = R¯, then any d¯ ∈ [0, Rνa˜] is a solution to (2.32).
Case 2: a˜ = 0. This happens if 1+r−R
R
≥ α(n)νµ
1−µ , i.e., R ≤R. In this case (2.32)
can be expressed as
rd¯ = ρα(n)µ [υ (y)− y] .
It follows that d¯ > 0 iff r < ρα(n)µ
1−µ . Finally, notice that R< R¯ iff r <
ρα(n)µ
1−µ .
Putting together cases 1 and 2, d¯ > 0 is unique iff R< R¯ and R < R¯, as
claimed in Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2 We establish first that n, y and y˜ are monotone,
continuous functions of θ. From (2.38), n = 1 − u = m(1, θ)/[m(1, θ) + δ] is a
continuous and increasing function of θ. Therefore, from (2.36), y˜ is a continuous
and non-decreasing function of θ. By virtue of the assumption, r < ρα(n0)µ/(1−
µ), for all θ ≥ θ0 the condition, r < ρα(n)µ/(1 − µ), holds. Therefore, from
Proposition 1, for all θ ≥ θ0 and R < R¯ ≡ ρ(1 + r)/(rν+ ρ), there exists a unique
d¯ > 0 solution to (2.32). Moreover, d¯ is continuous and increasing (Corollary 2)
with θ. From (2.35) for all θ ≥ θ0, y is continuous and increasing with θ. Let us
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turn to the mapping defining equilibrium market tightness:
Ψ(θ) ≡ (r + δ) k
m
(
1
θ
, 1
) + βλθk
− (1− λ)
{
α [n(θ)]
n(θ)
(1− µ) {ω [υ (y(θ))− y(θ)] + (1− ω) [υ (y˜(θ))− y˜(θ)]}+ Φ
}
,
where Φ = +z¯ − ` − b. From (2.39) an equilibrium value for θ solves Ψ(θ) = 0.
From the assumption that (1−λ) (z¯ − `− b) > (r + δ) k, and using the definition
of θ0, it can be checked that
Ψ(θ0) =
− (1− λ)
{
α [n(θ0)]
n(θ0)
(1− µ) {ω [υ (y(θ0))− y(θ0)] + (1− ω) [υ (y˜(θ0))− y˜(θ0)]}
}
< 0.
Since Ψ(∞) = +∞, there exists a θ > θ0 solution to Ψ(θ) = 0. Moreover, since
r < ρα(n0)µ/(1− µ) ≤ ρα(n)µ/(1− µ), the corresponding debt limit is positive,
d¯ > 0.
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C.0.8 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Proposition 5 (⇒) Here we prove necessity. Suppose that {(yt, xt, `t)}∞t=0
is an equilibrium outcome in a credit equilibrium, (sb, ss).
(i) Here we show condition (3.4). Because the worst payoff to buyers at each period
is 0 (autarky) while the equilibrium payoff at period t is u(yt)−xt, condition (3.4)
is necessary for buyers to repay their promises at each period.
(ii) To show condition (3.5), we first show that xt = v(yt) for all t. Note that (A3)
implies that xt = `t for all t. If xt < v(yt), then the seller would not accept the
offer. Suppose, by contradiction, that xt > v(yt). Then, the buyer may deviate
and offer (y′, `t) with v(y′) ∈ (v(yt), `t). Because this deviation does not affect the
buyer’s public record and the buyer has the same incentive to repay his debt, it
204
Appendix C. Dynamic Indeterminacy and Welfare in Credit Economies
is dominant for the seller to accept it. It then is a profitable deviation because
y′ > yt.
Next, to show that yt ≤ y∗ for all t, suppose, by contradiction, that yt > y∗
and hence u(yt) ≥ xt ≥ v(yt) > v(y∗). Then there exists an alternative offer,
(y′, `′) = (y′, x′), such that u(y′)− x′ > u(yt)− xt and −v(y′) + x′ > −v(yt) + xt
and `′ ≤ `t. It is dominant for the seller to accept this alternative offer. The
seller’s payoff at the current period is 0 if he rejects. However, if he accepts, then
by (A3), the threshold rule for repayment, the buyer will repay his promise `′ = x′.
Then, by accepting the offer the seller obtains −v(y′) + x′ > 0. Thus, (y′, `′) is a
profitable deviation for the buyer.
(⇐) Here we show sufficiency. Let {(yt, xt, `t)}∞t=0 be a sequence satisfying (3.4)
and (3.5). Consider (sb, ss) given as follows. Buyers can be in two states, χi,t ∈
{G,A}, and each buyer’s initial state is χi,0 = G. The law of motion of the buyer
i’s state are given by:
χi,t+1 [(`
′, x′, i), χi,t] =

A if x′ < min(xt, `′) or χi,t = A
G otherwise
. (C.1)
The strategies are such that sbt,1(ρ
i
t) = (yt, `t) if the state for ρ
i
t is G and s
b
t,1(ρ
i
t) =
(0, 0) otherwise; sbt,2(ρ
i
t, (y
′, `′), yes) = min{`′, `t} if the state for ρit is G and
sbt,2(ρ
i
t, (y
′, `′), yes) = 0 otherwise; sst(ρ
i
t, (y
′, `′)) = yes if the state for ρit is G
and v(y′) ≤ min{`′, `t}, and sst(ρit, (y′, `′)) = no otherwise. We show that (sb, ss)
is a credit equilibrium.
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Given sb, ss is optimal: the seller expects a buyer in state G to repay up to `t
at period t and hence he accepts an offer, (y′, `′), if v(y′) ≤ min{`′, `t}; with buyers
in state A he expects no repayment at all and hence rejects any offer. Next, we
show that sb is optimal given ss. Consider a buyer with state A at the beginning
of period t. Any offer to the seller is rejected and therefore it is optimal for the
buyer to offer (0, 0). Similarly, for such a buyer at the CM stage at period t with
a promise `′, his state will remain in A, independent of his repayment decision
and hence it is optimal to repay nothing.
Now consider a buyer with state G at the CM stage of period t, with a promise
`′ made to the seller. The buyer has to pay min{`t, `′} to maintain state G. By
(3.4), paying this amount is better than becoming an A person, whose continuation
value is 0. Finally, consider a buyer with state G at the beginning of period t.
Note that under sb, his continuation value from period t+1 onward is independent
of his offer at period t. Moreover, for any offer (y, `), the seller accepts the offer
if and only if v(y) ≤ min{`, `t}. Thus, a buyer’s problem is
max
(y,`)
u(y)−min{`, `t} s.t. v(y) ≤ min{`, `t}.
Because `t = v(yt) ≤ v(y∗), (yt, `t) is a solution to the problem. 
Proof of Corollary 3 (⇐) Here we show sufficiency. Let {dt}∞t=0 be a sequence
satisfying (3.9) and (3.10). Then, we can determine the outcome, {(yt, xt, `t)}∞t=0,
consistent with {dt}∞t=0 by the solution to the bargaining problem, (3.8), that is,
xt = `t = v(yt) = min{v(y∗), dt} for each t. It remains to show that {(yt, xt, `t)}∞t=0
is the outcome of a credit equilibrium, (sb, ss), with buyers’ repayment strategy
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consistent with {dt}∞t=0. As in the proof of Proposition 5, the strategy follows a
simple finite automaton with two states, χi,t ∈ {G,A}, and each buyer’s initial
state is χi,0 = G. The law of motion of the buyer i’s state are given by:
χi,t+1 [(`
′, x′, i), χi,t] =

A if x′ < min(dt, `′) or χi,t = A
G otherwise
. (C.2)
This law of motion is the same as (C.1), where dt replaces xt. The strategies are
analogous to those constructed in the proof of Proposition 5, but with dt as the
maximum amount of debt the buyer repays: at date t, the buyer offers (yt, `t) in
state G, the seller accepts the offer (y′, `′) iff v(y′) ≤ `′ ≤ dt and the buyer’s state
is G, and the buyer repays min(`′, dt) in the CM in state G if `′ is the loan issued
in DM. Following exactly the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 5, (3.9)
and (3.10) ensure that (sb, ss) is a credit equilibrium.
(⇒) Here we show necessity. Let {dt}∞t=0 be a sequence consistent with a credit
equilibrium outcome, {(yt, xt, `t)}∞t=0. By definition, {dt}∞t=0 satisfies (3.10). To
show (3.9), consider a buyer at period-t CM with a loan size `′ = dt (perhaps on
an off-equilibrium path). For repayment of dt to be optimal in state G, (3.9) must
hold, i.e., the buyer prefers repaying dt to permanent autarky.
Proof of Corollary 4 Rewrite the incentive-compatibility constraint (3.11) at
time t+ 1 and multiply it by β to obtain:
βdt+1 ≤ β2 {α [u(yt+2)− v(yt+2)] + dt+2} . (C.3)
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Combining (3.11) and (C.3) we get:
dt ≤ β {α [u(yt+1)− v(yt+1)]}+ β2 {α [u(yt+2)− v(yt+2)]}+ β2dt+2.
By successive iterations we generalize the inequality above as follows:
dt ≤
T∑
s=1
βs {α [u(yt+s)− v(yt+s)]}+ βt+Tdt+T . (C.4)
By assumption, {dt} is bounded, limT→∞ βt+Tdt+T = 0. Hence, by taking T to
infinity, it follows from (C.4) that {dt} satisfies (3.9).
Proof of Proposition 6 Define the right side of (3.12) as a function
Ψ(d) = α {u [z(d)]− υ [z(d)]} . (C.5)
Ψ is continuous in d with Ψ(0) = 0 and Ψ(d) = α [u (y∗)− v (y∗)] for all d ≥ v(y∗).
Moreover, it is differentiable with
Ψ′(d) = α
{
u′[z(d)]− v′[z(d)]
v′[z(d)]
}
if d ∈ (0, v(y∗)], and Ψ′(d) = 0 if d > v(y∗).
This derivative is decreasing in d for all d ∈ (0, v(y∗)). Hence, Ψ is a concave
function of d, and the set of values for d that satisfies (3.12) is an interval [0, dmax],
where dmax ≥ 0 is the largest number that satisfies Ψ(dmax) = rdmax. Moreover,
dmax > 0 if and only if Ψ′(0) > r, which is always satisfied since Ψ′(0) = ∞ by
assumption on preferences.
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Proof of Lemma 4 Define the correspondence Γ : R+ ⊃ R+ as follows:
Γ(d) = {x ∈ R+ : r (1 + β)x ≤ α {u [z(d)]− υ [z(d)]}+ βα {u [z(x)]− υ [z(x)]} .
(C.6)
Then, γ(d) = max Γ(d). First we show that Γ(d) is a closed interval and γ is
well-defined. By definition, x ∈ Γ(d) if and only if
r(1 + β)x ≤ Ψ(d) + βΨ(x),
where Ψ(d) = α {u [z(d)]− υ [z(d)]}. Using a similar argument to that in Propo-
sition 6, Γ(d) is a closed interval with zero as the lower end point. Thus, γ is
well-defined, and γ(d) is the largest x that satisfies
r (1 + β)x = Ψ(d) + βΨ(x). (C.7)
Moreover, if d > d′, then Γ(d′) ⊆ Γ(d), and hence γ is a non-decreasing function:
Because Ψ(d) is constant for all d ≥ v(y∗), γ is constant for all d ≥ v(y∗), but it
is strictly increasing for d < v(y∗). Now we show that
γ(0) > 0, γ(dmax) = dmax,
where dmax is given in Proposition 6. First, as Ψ(0) = 0, and Ψ(x) is a concave
function, γ(0) > 0 if and only if r(1 + β) < Ψ′(0) = ∞, which holds by Inada
conditions. Moreover, as the two curves r (1 + β)x and βΨ(x) intersect at γ(0) ≡
dmin > 0, by concavity of Ψ we have βΨ′(dmin) < r(1+β). Second, by Proposition
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6, dmax > 0 and rdmax = Ψ(dmax). Therefore, r (1 + β) dmax = Ψ(dmax)+βΨ(dmax)
and hence γ(dmax) = dmax.
Finally, we show that γ is a concave function. Applying the implicit function
theorem to (C.7), for all 0 < d < v(y∗),
γ′(d) =
Ψ′(d)
(1 + β) r − βΨ′[γ(d)] .
Note that (1 + β) r−βΨ′[γ(0)] = (1 + β) r−βΨ′(dmin) > 0 and hence (1 + β) r−
βΨ′[γ(d)] > 0 for all d. By concavity of Ψ, γ′(d) is decreasing in d. Hence, γ is a
concave function.
Proof of Proposition 7 Notice that, by definition, any pair (d0, d1) that satis-
fies d0 ≤ γ(d1) and d1 ≤ γ(d0) also satisfies (3.13) with y0 = z(d0) and y1 = z(d1),
and hence (d0, d1) is a 2-period credit cycle. By Lemma 4, γ is a concave function
with γ(0) > 0 and γ(dmax) = dmax, and hence, γ(d) > d for all d ∈ [0, dmax),
where dmax is given in Proposition 6. Thus, for each d0 ∈ [0, dmax), the interval
[d0, γ(d0)] is nondegenerate and γ(d0) < d
max. Hence, for each d1 ∈ [d0, γ(d0)],
d0 ≤ d1 < γ(d1), where we used that γ(d) > d for all d ≤ γ(d0) < dmax, so
(d0, d1) is a 2-period credit cycle. This gives a full characterization of the set of
2-period cycles with d0 ≤ d1, and the set of cycles with d1 ≤ d0 is its mirror
image with respect to the 45◦ line. Thus, for each d0 ∈ [0, dmax), the set Ω(d0) is
a nondegenerate interval.
Proof of Corollary 5 As shown earlier, a pair (d0, d1) is a 2-period cycle if
and only if d0 ≤ γ(d1;α, r) and d1 ≤ γ(d0;α, r), where γ is given by Lemma 1.
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Note that here we make the parameters (α, r) explicit. By Proposition 7, for all
d0 ∈ [0, dmax), there exists a continuum of d1 such that (d0, d1) is a 2-period cycle.
Now, d1 ≤ γ(d0;α, r) if and only if
r(2 + r)
1 + r
d1 ≤ Ψ(d0;α) + 1
1 + r
Ψ(d1;α), (C.8)
where Ψ(d;α) = α {u [z(d)]− υ [z(d)]}. By the proof of Proposition 7, for each
d0 ∈ [0, dmax), (d0, d1) is a 2-period cycle with d0 ≤ d1 if and only if d1 satisfies
(C.8). Let Ω(d0;α, r) be the set of such d1. Because of symmetry between d0 and
d1 in a 2-period cycle, it suffices to show that Ω(d0;α, r) expands as α increases
and as r decreases. Because Ψ(d;α) is strictly increasing in α, it follows that for
any α′ > α′′, d1 ∈ Ω(d0;α′′, r) implies that d1 ∈ Ω(d0;α′, r), but there exists d1 ∈
Ω(d0;α
′, r) that is not in Ω(d0;α′′, r), that is, Ω(d0;α′′, r) $ Ω(d0;α′, r). Similarly,
because the left-side of (C.8) is increasing in r but the right-side is decreasing in
r, for any r′ > r′′, d1 ∈ Ω(d0;α, r′) implies that d1 ∈ Ω(d0;α, r′′), but there exists
d1 ∈ Ω(d0;α, r′′) that is not in Ω(d0;α, r′), that is, Ω(d0;α, r′) $ Ω(d0;α, r′′).
Proof of Corollary 6 Note that dmax ≤ υ(y∗) if and only if r ≥ α [u(y∗)− υ(y∗)] /υ(y∗).
We prove the two cases separately.
Case 1: dmax ≤ υ(y∗). Consider a 2-period cycle, (d0, d1), with d0 ≤ d1. By
Proposition 7, d0 ≤ d1 ≤ γ(d0) ≤ dmax ≤ υ(y∗). Thus, by (3.8), the loan contract
is given by `t = dt for t = 0, 1. The case d0 > d1 is completely symmetric.
Case 2: dmax > υ(y∗). Consider a 2-period cycle, (d0, d1), with d0 ≤ d1. If
d0 ≤ d1 ≤ v(y∗), then using identical arguments as case (1) above, we can show
that the borrowing constraints always bind. Because, as shown in Lemma 4,
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γ[v(y∗)] = dmax > υ(y∗), there exists a unique d̂0 < υ(y∗) such that γ(d̂0) = υ(y∗).
Then, for any d0 ∈ (d̂0, dmax] and for any d1 ∈ [d0, γ(d0)], d1 > v(y∗), and hence, by
(3.8), `1 = v(y
∗) < d1. Thus, for any 2-period cycle, (d0, d1), with d̂0 < d0 ≤ v(y∗)
and d1 ∈ [d0, γ(d0)], the borrowing constraint is slack in odd periods but binds in
even periods. For any 2-period cycle, (d0, d1), with v(y
∗) < d0 and d1 ∈ [d0, γ(d0)],
the borrowing constraints are slack in all periods. The case d0 > d1 is symmetric.
Proof of Proposition 8 By a similar argument to Proposition 7, a T -tuple,
(d0, ..., dT−1) ∈ RT+, is a T -period credit cycle if and only if dt ≤ γT (dt+1, .., dt+T−1),
where γT (d0, ..., dT−2) is the largest x that satisfies
r
β
1− βT x =
T−2∑
t=0
βtΨ(dt) + β
T−1Ψ(x), (C.9)
and Ψ(x) = α {u [z(x)]− υ [z(x)]}. The function γT (d0, ..., dT−2) is a non-decreasing
function in all its arguments. By similar arguments to Lemma 4, we can also show
that γT (d
max, ..., dmax) = dmax and γT (d, ..., d) > d for all d ∈ [0, dmax). Moreover,
γT is a concave function. For each d0 ∈ [0, dmax), define
ΩT (d0) =
{
(d1, ..., dT−1) ∈ RT−1+ : dt ≤ γT (dt+1, .., dt+T−1) for all t = 0, ..., T
}
.
The set ΩT (d0) is closed and bounded. Moreover, (d0, ..., d0) ∈ ΩT (d0) where
all inequalities in the definition above are strict inequalities. Hence, there exists
an open ball with a positive radius centered at (d0, ..., d0) that is contained in
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ΩT (d0). Thus, ΩT (d0) has positive Lebesgue measure in RT−1. Finally, because
γT is concave, ΩT (d0) is a convex set.
Proof of Proposition 9 Replace dt = φt into the buyer’s optimality condition
in a monetary economy, (3.18), to get
dt = βdt+1
[
1 + α
u′(yt+1)− υ′(yt+1)
υ′(yt+1)
]
. (C.10)
The right side of (C.10), [u′(yt+1)− υ′(yt+1)] /υ′(yt+1), is the derivative of the
function, u[v−1(dt+1)] − dt+1, with respect to dt+1. From the strict concavity of
the function and the fact that it is equal to 0 when evaluated at dt+1 = 0,
u′(yt+1)− υ′(yt+1)
υ′(yt+1)
dt+1 < u(yt+1)− υ(yt+1). (C.11)
From (C.10) and (C.11),
dt < βα [u(yt+1)− υ(yt+1)] + βdt+1. (C.12)
Iterating (C.12),
dt <
J∑
j=1
βjα [u(yt+j)− υ(yt+j)] + βJdt+J . (C.13)
Applying the transversality condition, limJ→∞ βJdt+J = 0 to (C.13), we prove
that the sequence, {dt}, is a solution to (C.10) satisfies (3.9), and hence it is part
of a credit equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 10 Here we show that for any distribution over X with
a full support, denoted by pi, we have a continuum of sunspot equilibria indexed
by d ∈ (0, dmax). For any d ∈ (0, dmax), we have
rd < α{u[z(d)]− υ[z(d)]}. (C.14)
Fix an element χ0 ∈ X and let X−0 = X− {χ0}. Define the set
Ω(X,pi)(dχ0) = {〈dχ;χ ∈ X−0〉 : rdχ ≤ pi(χ0)α{u[z(dχ0)]− υ[z(dχ0)]}
+
∑
χ∈X−0
pi(χ)α{u[z(dχ)]− υ[z(dχ)]} for all χ ∈ X
 .
By (C.14), the sequence 〈dχ;χ ∈ X−0〉 with dχ = dχ0 for all χ ∈ X−0 is in
Ω(X,pi)(dχ0) where all inequalities in the definition above are strict inequalities.
Thus, the set Ω(X,pi)(dχ0) contains an open ball with a positive radius centered at
〈dχ;χ ∈ X−0〉 with dχ = dχ0 for all χ ∈ X−0. Hence, it has a positive Lebesgue
measure in R|X−0| and almost all points in it satisfy dχ 6= dχ′ for all χ 6= χ′. Note
that for any 〈dχ;χ ∈ X−0〉 ∈ Φ(d), 〈dχ;χ ∈ X〉 with dχ0 = d is a sunspot credit
equilibrium by (3.21).
Proof of Proposition 11 In the main text we have shown that (3.22) is nec-
essary for the buyer to deliver their promised output in the DM, and, by (3.25),
for a given sequence of debt limits, {dt}, the equilibrium amount of loan is given
by `t = η[z(dt)] and hence u(yt) − `t = θ[u(yt) − v(yt)]. Thus, (3.22) becomes
(3.26). This proves the necessity. For sufficiency, let {(yt, `t, dt)} be a sequence
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satisfying (3.25) and (3.26). We use the same strategies as in the proof of Corol-
lary 3, but we have to modify sb2 in accordance with the new environment. As the
buyer makes the production decision in the DM, the buyer strategy sb2 becomes a
delivery strategy that specifies the amount of the output that the buyer delivers
to the seller in the CM, the difference being what the buyer consumes. Analogous
to the strategies in Corollary 3, sb2 satisfies the following threshold property. If `
′
is the amount of output that the buyer promises to deliver in the period-t DM,
then his actual delivery is x′ = min{`′, dt}. As in the proof of Corollary 3, (3.26)
ensures that this delivery strategy is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 12 From (3.26), a pair (d0, d1) is a 2-period credit cycle
equilibrium outcome if and only if d0 ≤ γ(d1) and d1 ≤ γ(d0), where γ(d) is the
largest x that satisfies
rλ (1 + β)x = Ψ(d) + βΨ(x), (C.15)
and
Ψ(d) = αθ {u [z(d)]− υ [z(d)]} .
The left side of the equation in (C.15), rλ (1 + β)x, is linear and increasing while
the right side, βαθ {u [z(x)]− υ [z(x)]}, is non-decreasing and concave. Given that
the first term on the right side is non-negative, γ(d) is well-defined. Note that
γ(dmax) = dmax, where dmax is defined as the highest solution to rλd = Ψ(d), and,
by similar arguments to Lemma 4, we can show γ is concave.
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Note that dmax > 0 if and only if Ψ′(0) > rλ. Now,
Ψ′(d) = αθ
[
u′[z(d)]− υ′[z(d)]
(1− θ)u′[z(d)] + θυ′[z(d)]
]
and hence Ψ′(0) = αθ/(1 − θ), which shows that dmax > 0 if and only if rλ <
αθ/(1− θ).
When dmax > 0, i.e., when rλ < αθ/(1−θ), for each 0 < d0 < dmax, d0 < γ(d0),
and, for each d1 ∈ (d0, γ(d0)], d0 < γ(d0) ≤ γ(d1). So any such (d0, d1) is a 2-
period cycle and there are continuum of them.
To show the existence of 2-period cycles with periodic credit shutdowns, we
need to show that γ(0) > 0. From (C.15), γ(0) > 0 if and only if rλ(1 + β) <
βΨ′(0) = βαθ/(1−θ), which corresponds to the condition r <√1 + αθ/[λ(1− θ)]−
1. Given that γ(0) > 0, any (d0, d1) ∈ {0}× (0, γ(0)) is a credit equilibrium where
credit shuts down in even periods.
Proof of Proposition 13 (1) Suppose that y∗ ≤ ymax. Then, the outcome
{(yt, `t)}∞t=0 with yt = y∗ and `t = v(yt) for all t is implementable.
(2) Suppose that y∗ > ymax. We show that the optimal sequence that has yt =
ymax and `t = v(yt) for all t. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is another
sequence {y′t, `′t}∞t=0 satisfying (3.32) and (3.33) with a strictly higher welfare. It
then follows that y∗ ≥ y′t > ymax for some t. Let t0 be the first t such that
u(y′t)− v(y′t) > u(ymax)− v(ymax). Now we show that for some t1 > t0, y′t1 > y′t0 .
Suppose, by contradiction, that y′t ≤ y′t0 for all t > t0. We have the following
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inequality,
v(y′t0) ≤ `′t0 ≤ λ−1
+∞∑
s=1
βsα
[
u(y′t0+s)− `′t0+s
] ≤ λ−1 +∞∑
s=1
βsα
[
u(y′t0)− v(y′t0)
]
,
where the first inequality follows from the seller’s participation constraint, (3.33),
at t = t0, the second follows from the buyer’s participation constraint, (3.32),
and the third follows from u(y′t0+s)− `′t0+s ≤ u(y′t0+s)− v(y′t0+s) ≤ u(y′t0)− v(y′t0)
since u − v is increasing for y < y∗ and `′t0+s ≤ v(y′t0+s) for all s. Because ymax
is the maximal value of y′t0 that equalizes the left side and the right side of this
series of inequalities, it follows that y′t0 ≤ ymax, a contradiction. So y∗ ≥ y′t1 > y′t0
for some t1 (and we choose t1 > t0 to be the first index for this to happen). By
induction, we can then find a subsequence {y′ti} that is strictly increasing and is
bounded from above. So there exists a limit y˜ = limi→∞ y′ti > y
max. Hence, by
monotonicity, we have for all i,
rv(y′ti) ≤ r`ti ≤
α[u(y˜)− v(y˜)]
λ
,
and, by taking i to infinity, we have
rv(y˜) ≤ α[u(y˜)− v(y˜)]
λ
.
However, as explained above, this implies that y˜ ≤ ymax, and this leads to a
contradiction.
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Proof of Proposition 14 The program that selects the best PBE is
max
{yt}∞t=0
+∞∑
t=0
βtα [u(yt)− υ(yt)] (C.16)
s.t. λη(yt) ≤ α
+∞∑
s=1
βs [u(yt+s)− η(yt+s)] (C.17)
yt ≤ y∗ for all t = 0, 1, 2, ... (C.18)
(1) Suppose that y∗ ≤ ymax. In this case, the outcome {yt}∞t=0 with yt = y∗
for all t is implementable and hence is the c.e.a.
(2) Suppose that y∗ > ymax but ymax ≤ yˆ. We show that the outcome
{yt}∞t=0 with yt = ymax for all t is the optimum. Suppose, by contradiction, that
there is another outcome {y′t}∞t=0 satisfying (C.17) and (C.18) with a strictly higher
welfare. First we show that y′t ≤ yˆ for all t. Suppose, by contradiction, that there
is a t such that y′t > yˆ. Then, because yˆ ≥ ymax,
λη(y′t) > λη(yˆ) ≥
∞∑
s=1
βsα[u(yˆ)− η(yˆ)] ≥
∞∑
s=1
βsα[u(y′t+s)− η(y′t+s)],
a contradiction to (C.17). Given that this alternative outcome can only lie in the
range [0, yˆ] and hence the trade surplus is increasing in the output, the rest of the
arguments are exactly the same as those in the proof of Proposition 13.
(3) Suppose that yˆ < ymax < y∗. In the supplementary Appendix S4 we
show that the constrained-efficient allocation, {xt, yt}, can be determined recur-
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sively as follows:
V (ω) = max
y,ω′
{α [u(y)− v(y)] + βV (ω′)} (C.19)
s.t. −η(y) + βω
′
λ
≥ 0 (C.20)
βω′ ≥ {ω − α [u(y)− η(y)]} (C.21)
y ∈ [0, y∗], ω′ ∈ [0, ω¯] , (C.22)
with ω0 = 0, ωt+1 = ω
′(ωt), yt = y(ωt), and xt = η(yt). Moreover, the value
function V is unique, and it is nonincreasing and concave.
The Lagrangian associated with the above Bellman equation is
L = α [u(y)− v(y)] + βV (ω′) + ξ
(
β
ω′
λ
− η(y)
)
+ν {α [u(y)− η(y)] + βω′ − ω} , (C.23)
where the Lagrange multipliers, ξ and ν, are non-negative. In general V may not
be differentiable everywhere. However, because V is concave, the following first-
order conditions are still necessary and sufficient for (y, ω′) to be optimal (Clark
(1976), Theorems 1 and 2):
α [u′(y)− v′(y)]− ξη′(y) + να [u′(y)− η′(y)] = 0 (C.24)
βV ′+(ω
′) + β
ξ
λ
+ βν ≤ 0 ≤ βV ′−(ω′) + β
ξ
λ
+ βν, (C.25)
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where V ′+(ω
′) = limω↓ω′ V ′(ω) and V ′−(ω
′) = limω↑ω′ V ′(ω). Both V ′+(ω
′) and V ′−(ω
′)
exist because of concavity. The envelope condition, provided that V ′(ω) exists, is
V ′(ω) = −ν. (C.26)
We define two critical values for the buyer’s promised utility:
ωmax =
α [u(ymax)− η(ymax)]
1− β and ω¯ =
α[u(yˆ)− η(yˆ)]
1− β .
The first threshold is the buyer’s life-time expected utility at the highest steady
state, while the second is the maximum life-time expected utility achieved by the
buyers across all steady states. Note that by the definition of ymax, η(ymax) =
βωmax/λ.
(a) λ ≥ α [1− u′(ymax)/η′(ymax)] .
The following claim provides conditions under which the constrained-efficient
allocation corresponds to the highest steady state. In order to establish this claim,
we shows that, for ω = 0 and ω = ωmax, the optimal solution to the maximization
problem in (C.19)-(C.22) is (ωmax, ymax).
Claim 1. If yˆ < ymax < y∗ and λ ≥ α [1− u′(ymax)/η′(ymax)], then the unique
solution to (C.19)-(C.22) is
V (ω) =
α [u(ymax)− v(ymax)]
1− β if ω ∈ [0, ω
max], (C.27)
=
α {u[g(ω)]− v[g(ω)]}
1− β if ω ∈ (ω
max, ω¯], (C.28)
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where g(ω) is the unique solution to α[u(y)−η(y)] = (1−β)ω for all ω ∈ (ωmax, ω¯].
The function V given by (C.27)-(C.28) is flat in the interval [0, ωmax] and is
strictly concave for all ω ∈ (ωmax, ω¯), and hence is concave overall. To show the
strict concavity, we compute V ′′(ω) for all ω ∈ (ωmax, ω¯). By the Implicit Function
Theorem, we have
g′(ω) =
1− β
α{u′[g(ω)]− η′[g(ω)]} < 0,
and hence
V ′(ω) =
u′[g(ω)]− v′[g(ω)]
u′[g(ω)]− η′[g(ω)] (C.29)
for all ω ∈ (ωmax, ω¯). Thus,
V ′′(ω) =
{u′′[g(ω)]− v′′[g(ω)]}{u′[g(ω)]− η′[g(ω)]}
{u′[g(ω)]− η′[g(ω)]}2 g
′(ω)
+
−{u′[g(ω)]− v′[g(ω)]}{u′′[g(ω)]− η′′[g(ω)]}
{u′[g(ω)]− η′[g(ω)]}2 g
′(ω) < 0.
Note that, for all ω ∈ (ωmax, ω¯), u′[g(ω)] − η′[g(ω)] < 0 as g(ω) > yˆ and that
u′[g(ω)]− v′[g(ω)] > 0 as g(ω) ≤ ymax < y∗.
To prove that V satisfies (C.27) and (C.28), we consider two cases.
(i) Suppose that ω ∈ [0, ωmax]. The solution to the maximization problem in
(C.19)-(C.22) is given by (ω′, y) = (ωmax, ymax). This solution is feasible because
(ωmax, ymax) satisfies (C.21) for all ω ≤ ωmax and it satisfies (C.20) at equality.
Next, we show that it satisfies (C.24)-(C.25) with ν = 0 and
ξ =
α[u′(ymax)− v′(ymax)]
η′(ymax)
> 0.
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The condition (C.24) holds by the definition of ξ. To establish (C.25), first note
that V ′−(ω
max) = 0 and
V ′+(ω
max) ≡ lim
ω↓ωmax
V ′(ω) =
u′(ymax)− v′(ymax)
u′(ymax)− η′(ymax) .
Thus, V ′−(ω
max) + ξ/λ > 0 and the first inequality in (C.25) holds if and only if
V ′+(ω
max) +
ξ
λ
=
1
λ
[u′(ymax)− v′(ymax)]
η′(ymax)
{
α + λ
η′(ymax)
u′(ymax)− η′(ymax)
}
≤ 0,
and, because yˆ < ymax < y∗ and hence u′(ymax) − v′(ymax) > 0 and u′(ymax) −
η′(ymax) < 0, the last inequality holds if and only if
α
[
u′(ymax)
η′(ymax)
− 1
]
≥ −λ,
that is, λ ≥ α [1− u′(ymax)/η′(ymax)]. This implies V satisfies (C.27).
(ii) Suppose that ω ∈ (ωmax, ω¯). Here we show that (ω′, y) = (ω, g(ω)) is the
solution to the maximization problem in (C.19)-(C.22). This solution is feasible:
(C.21) holds by construction; because ω′ = ω = α[u(y)−η(y)]/(1−β) and because
y = g(ω) ≤ ymax,
λη(y) ≤ βα[u(y)− η(y)]/(1− β),
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(C.20) holds. Next, we show that the FOC’s (C.24) and (C.25) are satisfied by
(ω′, y) = (ω, g(ω)) with ξ = 0 and
ν = −u
′[g(ω)]− v′[g(ω)]
u′[g(ω)]− η′[g(ω)] > 0.
The FOC for y, (C.24), holds by the definition of ν. The FOC for ω′, (C.25),
holds if and only if
ν + V ′(ω) = 0,
which holds by (C.29). Thus, if ω0 = ω ∈ (ωmax, ω¯), then the optimal sequence is
(ωt, yt) = (ω, g(ω)) for all t. Hence, V (ω) is satisfies (C.28) for all ω ∈ (ωmax, ω¯).
Finally, V satisfies (C.28) at ω = ω¯ by continuity.
(b) λ < α [1− u′(ymax)/η′(ymax)] .
We will show that V (ω) has the same closed-form solution as derived in claim
1 when ω > ωmax. Given this observation, we will establish that if ω = 0 then
ω′ > ωmax and y can be solved in closed form.
Claim 2. Suppose that yˆ < ymax < y∗ and λ < α [1− u′(ymax)/η′(ymax)]. Then,
there exists a unique (y0, y1) with yˆ < y1 < y
max < y0 < y
∗ that solves (3.40)-
(3.41), and the unique V that solves (C.19)-(C.22) satisfies
V (ω) = α[u(y0)− v(y0)] + β
1− βα[u(y1)− v(y1)] if ω = 0, (C.30)
=
α
1− β {u[g(ω)]− v[g(ω)]} if ω ∈ [ω
max, ω¯], (C.31)
where g(ω) is given in Part 1.
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The fact that V satisfies (C.31) follows the proof of the second case in the
claim in the proof of Part 1 and the Contraction Mapping Theorem. Note that by
(C.31), V ′(ω) is given by (C.29) for ω > ωmax and hence the proof there applies
exactly.
Here we show (C.30). First we rewrite the problem in (C.19)-(C.22) at ω = 0
as follows:
max
y,ω′
{α [u(y)− v(y)] + βV (ω′)} (C.32)
s.t. − η(y) + βω
′
λ
≥ 0 (C.33)
y ∈ [0, y∗], ω′ ∈ [0, ω¯] . (C.34)
Note that (C.21) is trivially satisfied when ω = 0. Now, conjecturing that ω′ ≥
ωmax, we can replace V (ω′) by the expression given by (C.31), y by y0 and g(ω′)
by y1, and transform the above problem to
max
(y0,y1)∈[0,y∗]×[yˆ,ymax]
{
α [u(y0)− v(y0)] + αu(y1)− v(y1)
r
}
(C.35)
s.t. −η(y0) + αu(y1)− η(y1)
λr
≥ 0, (C.36)
which is exactly the same as (3.40)-(3.41). By the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, a pair
(y0, y1) solves the above problem if it satisfies the following FOC and feasibility
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condition:
u′(y0)− v′(y0)
η′(y0)
= −λ
α
[
u′(y1)− v′(y1)
u′(y1)− η′(y1)
]
(C.37)
α[u(y1)− η(y1)] = rλη(y0). (C.38)
In order to show that the solution (y0, y1) is also a solution to the problem in
(C.19)-(C.22) at ω = 0 we only need to verify our conjecture,
ω1 =
1
1− βα[u(y1)− η(y1)] > ω
max,
because the necessary conditions, (C.37)-(C.38), are also sufficient by the concav-
ity of V over its entire domain.
Now we show that there exists a unique pair (y0, y1) with yˆ < y1 < y
max <
y0 < y
∗ that satisfies (??)-(??). For each y1 ∈ (yˆ, ymax], define
h(y1) = η
−1
[ α
rλ
[u(y1)− η(y1)]
]
.
as the unique solution of y0 to (??) for a given y1. Note that h(y
max) = ymax. For
any y1 ∈ (yˆ, ymax],
h′(y1) =
α
rλ
[u′(y1)− η′(y1)]
η′[h(y1)]
< 0.
Substituting y0 by its expression given by h(y1) in the left side of (C.37), we
rewrite (C.37) as H(y1) = 0 where
H(y1) =
u′[h(y1)]− v′[h(y1)]
η′[h(y1)]
+
λ
α
[
u′(y1)− v′(y1)
u′(y1)− η′(y1)
]
.
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The function H(y1) is continuous and strictly increasing in (yˆ, y
max] with
lim
y1↓yˆ
H(y1) = −∞,
and, at y1 = y
max, we have
H(ymax) =
u′(ymax)− v′(ymax)
η′(ymax)
+
λ
α
[
u′(ymax)− v′(ymax)
u′(ymax)− η′(ymax)
]
= [u′(ymax)− v′(ymax)]
{
1
η′(ymax)
+
λ
α
[
1
u′(ymax)− η′(ymax)
]}
> 0
because λ < α [1− u′(ymax)/η′(ymax)]. Thus, by Intermediate Value Theorem,
there exists a unique y1 ∈ (yˆ, ymax) such that H(y1) = 0 and hence (C.37) holds
for (h(y1), y1), and h(y1) > y
max as h is strictly decreasing with h(ymax) = ymax.
This proves that there exists a unique pair (y0, y1) with yˆ < y1 < y
max < y0 < y
∗
that satisfies (C.37) and (C.38).
Finally, because yˆ < y1 < y
max < y0 < y
∗ and because (ω′, y) = (ω1, y0) with
ω1 = α[u(y1) − η(y1)]/(1 − β) is the solution to the maximization problem in
(C.19)-(C.22) for ω = 0, V satisfies (C.30). 
SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDICES
S1. Equivalence between monetary and credit equilibria
Here we extend the equivalence result, Proposition 9, to other trading mech-
anisms. We first consider bargaining in the pairwise meetings and then consider
Walrasian pricing for large group meetings. We adopt the environment introduced
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in Section 4 without record-keeping. The monetary trades follow a similar pattern
to that in Section 3.3: buyers who cannot commit to deliver goods in the CM use
money to buy DM goods from sellers in the DM. They produce CM goods in
the first stage of each period in order to sell them for money in the CM. Notice
that the timing of producing CM goods (whether it takes place in the first or
second stage of each period) is irrelevant for buyers’ behavior because it is only
incentive-feasible to sell these goods in the CM for money. Sellers use money
obtained from DM sales to buy CM goods. Because λ ≤ 1, buyers never produce
CM goods for self-consumption. As a result, the parameter λ plays no role in
monetary equilibria. So with no loss of generality we set λ = 1.
Bargaining Under a general bargaining solution represented by the function
η(y), the sequence for the values of money, {φt}, solves
max
m≥0
{φtm+ βα [u(yt+1)− η(yt+1)]}
where φt+1m = η(yt+1) for all t. Replace dt = φt for all t in the above problem
and take the FOC, we obtain
dt = βdt+1
{
α
[
u′(yt+1)
η′(yt+1)
− 1
]
+ 1
}
, (C.39)
where η(yt) = dt for all t. In the credit economy, the debt limits, {dt}, solves
dt ≤ β {α [u(yt+1)− η(yt+1)] + dt+1} . (C.40)
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Because η is concave, u◦η−1(dt)−dt is concave in terms of the value of money. The
right side of (C.39), [u′(yt+1)− η′(yt+1)] /η′(yt+1), is the derivative of the function,
u[η−1(dt+1)]−dt+1, with respect to dt+1. From the strict concavity of the function
and the fact that it is equal to 0 when evaluated at dt+1 = 0,
u′(yt+1)− η′(yt+1)
η′(yt+1)
dt+1 < u(yt+1)− η(yt+1). (C.41)
From (C.39) and (C.41),
dt < βα [u(yt+1)− η(yt+1)] + βdt+1. (C.42)
Iterating (C.42),
dt <
J∑
j=1
βjα [u(yt+j)− η(yt+j)] + βJdt+J . (C.43)
Applying the transversality condition, limJ→∞ βJdt+J = 0 to (C.43), we prove
that the sequence, {dt}, solution to (C.39) satisfies (C.40), and hence it is part of
a credit equilibrium.
This concavity of η is satisfied for the proportional bargaining solution and for
the general Nash bargaining solution under the functional forms for u and υ that
guarantee the concavity of the buyer’s surplus.
Walrasian pricing Suppose the DM is competitive and pt denotes the price
of DM goods in terms of CM goods. In a monetary economy the buyer chooses
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money holdings as the solution to:
max
m,yt+1≥0
{−φtm+ βα [u(yt+1)− pt+1yt+1] + βφt+1m} , (C.44)
where, φt+1m ≥ pt+1yt+1. The first-order condition for (C.44) is
φt = βφt+1
{
α
[
u′(yt+1)
pt+1
− 1
]
+ 1
}
.
From the seller’s maximization problem, pt+1 = υ
′(yt+1) so that {φt} solves
φt = βφt+1
{
α
[
u′(yt+1)
υ′(yt+1)
− 1
]
+ 1
}
. (C.45)
It should be noticed that it is the same first-order difference equation as the one
obtained under buyers’ take-it-or-leave-it offers. Notice, using φt+1 = υ
′(yt+1)yt+1
by market-clearing (i.e., m = 1), that
φt+1
[
u′(yt+1)
υ′(yt+1)
− 1
]
= u′(yt+1)yt+1 − υ′(yt+1)yt+1 < u(yt+1)− v′(yt+1)yt+1,
from the concavity of u. Recall that a sufficient condition for the sequence of debt
limits to be a credit equilibrium is
dt ≤ β {α [u(yt+1)− v′(yt+1)yt+1] + dt+1} .
This proves that the phase of the monetary equilibrium is located to the left of
the phase line of the credit equilibrium. Hence, by the same reasoning as before,
any outcome of the monetary economy is an outcome of the credit economy.
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S2. Existence of 2-period cycles under alternative mecha-
nisms
Walrasian pricing Under Walrasian pricing, η(y) = v′(y)y. Here we show
existence of a continuum of 2-period cycles when η(y) is convex. Recall that
z(d) = min{η−1(d), y∗}. Let dmax be the unique positive solution to
rλd = α {u [z(d)]− η [z(d)]} . (C.46)
Lemma 5. Suppose that η(y) is convex. For each d0 ∈ [0, dmax), there is a
nondegenerate interval, Ω(d0), such that for any d1 ∈ Ω(d0), (d0, d1) is a (strict)
2-period cycle.
Proof. Because η(y) is convex, there is a unique positive number, denoted ymax,
such that
rλη(ymax) = α[u(ymax)− η(ymax)].
It can be verified that that dmax is given by
dmax = {.η(ymax) if y∗ ≥ ymaxα {u(y
∗)− η(y∗)}
rλ
otherwise.
Note that any d ∈ [0, dmax] corresponds to a steady-state equilibrium. Let us turn
to 2-period cycles. A pair, (d0, d1), is a 2-period cycle if for t = 0, 1,
rλdt ≤ α {u [z(dt+1)]− η [z(dt+1)]}+ βα {u [z(dt)]− η [z(dt)]}
1 + β
. (C.47)
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Hence,
Ω(d0) = {d1 ≥ 0 : (d0, d1) satisfies (C.47)}.
For all d ∈ [0, dmax), because rλd < α {u [z(d)]− η [z(d)]}, (d0, d1) = (d, d) satisfies
(C.47) with a strict inequality. Hence, by continuity, there is a nonempty open
set contained in Ω(d). Moreover, because η is concave, the set Ω(d) is convex and
hence is a nondegenerate interval.
Nash bargaining For all y ≤ y∗, u (y) − η(y) ≥ θ[u(y) − υ(y)] and hence
η(y) ≤ (1−θ)u (y)+θυ(y). Under proportional bargaining a 2-period cycle solves
rλ [(1− θ)u (yt) + θυ(yt)] ≤ {αθ [u (yt+1)− υ(yt+1)] + βαθ [u (yt)− υ(yt)]}
1 + β
.
It implies
rλη (yt) ≤ {α [u (yt+1)− η(yt+1)] + βα [u (yt)− η(yt)]}
1 + β
.
Hence (yt, yt+1), and the associated (dt, dt+1) = (η(yt), η(yt+1)), is a credit cycle
under generalized Nash bargaining.
S3. Core and competitive equilibrium
Recall that an allocation, L= {(y(i), x(i)), (y(j), x(j)) : i ∈ B, j ∈ S}, where
(y(i), x(i)) denotes buyer i’s DM and CM consumptions and (y(j), x(j)) denotes
seller j’s DM and CM consumptions, is in the core if there is no blocking (finite)
coalition, I⊂B ∪ S, such that each agent in I enjoys at least the same utility
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as his allocation in L, but at least one of them is strictly better off. Now we
show that the only core allocation is the competitive outcome, with debt limit,
d, is given by the symmetric allocation, (y, `), such that ` = η(y) ≡ v′(y)y and
y = min{y∗, η−1(d)}.
First notice that, by standard arguments, the competitive outcome is in the
core. For necessity, we restrict ourselves to symmetric allocations. For a justifi-
cation of such assumption, see Mas-Colell et al. (1995). Note that to be in the
core, u(y) ≥ ` ≥ v(y). First we show that ` = v′(y)y. Suppose, by contradiction,
` 6= v′(y)y. Assume that ` < v′(y)y. The other direction has a similar proof. Let
ε be so small that
[v′(y)− ε]y > `. (C.48)
Consider a coalition with m buyers and n sellers such that with δ = m/n < 1, we
have
v(y)− v(δy)
(1− δ)y > v
′(y)− ε. (C.49)
Consider the following allocation: each buyer consumes y and issues an IOU with
face value `, and each seller produces δy and receives an IOU with face value δ`.
Note that such allocation is feasible:
my = nδy and m` = nδ`.
Now, each buyer enjoys the same utility as before, but each seller has a higher
utility: combining (C.48) and (C.49),
v(y)− v(δy) > [v′(y)− ε](1− δ)y > (1− δ)`,
232
Appendix C. Dynamic Indeterminacy and Welfare in Credit Economies
and hence
δ`− v(δy) > `− v(y).
This proves ` = v′(y)y = η(y). Finally, if y < min{y∗, η−1(d)}, then a buyer and
a seller can form a coalition to increase surplus.
S4. Recursive formulation of the mechanism design prob-
lem
Here we show that we can solve the problem (C.16)-(C.18) recursively. First
we show that recursive formulation with promised utility as a state variable is
equivalent to the original sequence problem.
Lemma 6. A sequence {yt}∞t=0 satisfies (C.17) and (C.18) if and only if there is
a sequence {ωt}∞t=0 such that, for all t = 0, 1, 2, ...,
ωt ≤ α [u(yt)− η(yt)] + βωt+1, (C.50)
η(yt) ≤ βωt+1/λ, (C.51)
yt ∈ [0, y∗], (C.52)
ωt ∈ [0, ω¯]. (C.53)
Proof. Suppose that {yt}∞t=0 satisfies (C.17) and (C.18). Then, define, for each
t = 0, 1, 2, ...,
ωt =
∞∑
s=0
βsα[u(yt+s)− η(yt+s)]. (C.54)
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The right side of (C.17) is equal to βωt+1/λ for each t. Hence, {ωt, yt}∞t=0 satisfies
(C.51). By definition of yˆ,
u(yt)− η(yt) ≤ u(yˆ)− η(yˆ) for all t ∈ N0.
It follows from (C.18) that {ωt}∞t=0 satisfies (C.53). Finally, by (C.54),
ωt = α[u(yt)− η(yt)] + β
∞∑
s=0
βsα[u(yt+s+1)− η(yt+s+1)] = α[u(yt)− η(yt)] + βωt+1
for all t ∈ N0. Hence, {ωt, yt}∞t=0 satisfies (C.50).
Conversely, suppose that {ωt, yt}∞t=0 satisfies (C.50)-(C.53). Then, {yt}∞t=0 sat-
isfies (C.18) by (C.52). To show (C.17), define, for each t ∈ N0,
ω′t =
∞∑
s=0
βsα[u(yt+s)− η(yt+s)]. (C.55)
By (C.51), it suffices to show that ωt ≤ ω′t for all t ≥ 0. Let t be given. We show
by induction on T that
ωt ≤
T∑
s=0
βsα[u(yt+s)− η(yt+s)] + βT+1ωT+1. (C.56)
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When T = 0, this follows from (C.50). Suppose that it holds for T . Then,
ωt ≤
T∑
s=0
βsα[u(yt+s)− η(yt+s)] + βT+1ωT+1
=
T∑
s=0
βsα[u(yt+s)− η(yt+s)] + βT+1 {α [u(yT+1)− η(yT+1)] + βωT+2}
=
T+1∑
s=0
βsα[u(yt+s)− η(yt+s)] + βT+2ωT+2.
This proves (C.56). Now, because, by (C.53), ωT+1 ≤ ω¯ for all T , it follows from
the limit by taking T to infinity in (C.56) that ωt ≤ ω′t.
Because of Lemma 6, we may replace the constraints (C.17) and (C.18) by
(C.50)-(C.53). Note that the initial condition for the promised utility, ω0, is also
a choice variable.
Define the planner’s value function, V (ω), as follows:
V (ω) = max
{yt}∞t=0
+∞∑
t=0
βtα [u(yt)− υ(yt)]
subject to (C.50)-(C.53) with ω0 = ω. From the Principle of Optimality V satisfies
the following Bellman equations,
V (ω) = max
y,ω′
{α [u(y)− v(y)] + βV (ω′)} (C.57)
s.t. −η(y) + βω
′
λ
≥ 0 (C.58)
βω′ ≥ {ω − α [u(y)− η(y)]} (C.59)
y ∈ [0, y∗], ω′ ∈ [0, ω¯] . (C.60)
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The proposition below shows that the above Bellman equation is well-defined and
that V is uniquely determined. As a result, the maximization problem (C.16)-
(C.18) is reduced to
max
ω0∈[0,ω¯]
V (ω0).
Proposition 15. Suppose that y∗ > ymax > yˆ.
(1) The value function V is the unique solution to (C.57)-(C.60), and is contin-
uous and weakly decreasing in ω.
(2) The function V is concave in ω if η is convex.
Proof. (1) First we show that, for any ω ∈ [0, ω¯], the set of elements (y, ω′) ∈
[0, y∗] × [0, ω] satisfying (C.58)-(C.60) is nonempty and hence the maximization
problem is well-defined. For all ω ∈ [0, ω¯], define yω ≤ yˆ ≤ y∗ as the unique
solution to
ω =
α
1− β [u(yω)− η(yω)]. (C.61)
As u(0) − η(0) = 0 and α
1−β [u(yˆ) − η(yˆ)] = ω, such yω ∈ [0, yˆ] exists by the
Intermediate Value Theorem. We claim that (yω, ω
′) satisfies (C.58)-(C.60) for
any ω′ ∈ [ω, ω¯]. First (C.60) holds by construction. Moreover, rearranging (C.61),
we have
βω = ω − α[u(yω)− η(yω)]
which implies (C.59) for any ω′ ≥ ω. Finally, by (C.61) and the fact that y ≤ yˆ ≤
ymax,
η(yω) ≤ βω
λ
≤ βω
′
λ
for any ω′ ≥ ω.
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We now show that the Bellman equation (C.58)-(C.60) has a unique solu-
tion. Let C[0, ω¯] be the complete metric space of continuous functions over [0, ω¯]
equipped with the sup norm. Define T : C[0, ω¯]→ C[0, ω¯] by
T (W )(ω) = max
y,ω′
{α [u(y)− v(y)] + βW (ω′)} ,
subject to (C.58)-(C.60). Note that T (W ) ∈ C[0, ω¯] by the Theorem of Maximum.
The mapping T satisfies the Blackwell sufficient condition (Lucas et al., 1989,
Theorem 3.3), and hence T is a contraction mapping, which admits a unique
fixed point by the Banach Fixed-Point Theorem. Hence, V is the unique solution
to the Bellman equation and is continuous.
Notice that by decreasing ω we increase the set of (y, ω′) that satisfies (C.58)-
(C.60), but without affecting the objective function. Hence, V is weakly decreas-
ing.
(2) Assume now that η is convex. To show that V is concave, we show that T
preserves concavity. Let ω0, ω1 ∈ [0, ω¯] be given. Let (y0, ω0) and (y1, ω1) solves
(C.58)-(C.60) for ω0 and ω1, respectively. let  ∈ (0, 1) be given. Then,
T (W )(ω0 + (1− )ω1)
≥ α [u(y0 + (1− )y1)− v(y0 + (1− )y1)] + βW (ω′0 + (1− )ω′1)
≥ α[u(y0)− v(y0)] + α(1− )[u(y0)− v(y0)] + β[W (ω′0) + (1− )W (ω′0)]
= T (W )(ω0) + (1− )T (W )(ω1).
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The first inequality follows from the fact that (y0 + (1 − )y1, ω′0 + (1 − )ω′1)
also satisfies (C.58)-(C.60) for ω = ω0 + (1 − )ω1 because η is convex. The
second inequality follows from the concavity of u− v and the assumed concavity
of W .
S5. Optima under arbitrary trading mechanism
We characterize the optimal credit equilibrium allocation taking the mecha-
nism to set the terms of the loan contract, η, as given. Although Propositions
14 are obtained under competitive pricing, they hold for any arbitrary trading
mechanism, η. For example, if η is determined by proportional bargaining, then
yˆ = y∗, and Parts 1-2 of Proposition 14 imply that the best PBE corresponds to
the highest steady state, yt = y
max for all t. Proposition 14 also applies to gener-
alized Nash bargaining: if ymax ≤ yˆ ≤ y∗ or y∗ ≤ ymax, then the best PBE is the
highest steady state (in the proof of the proposition we only use the fact that yˆ is
the unique maximizer). However, under Nash bargaining, the loan contract η may
not be convex in general, and hence Proposition 14 may not apply. Nevertheless,
we showed that (3.34)-(3.37) defines a contraction mapping so that we can easily
solve for the best PBE allocation numerically.
In Figure C.1 we adopt the same functional forms and parameter values as
the ones in the bottom left panel of Figure 3.10. The top left panel plots yt while
the right panel plots V bt . It can be seen that the allocation that maximizes social
welfare is non-stationary: y0 > y1 = yt for all t ≥ 1, in accordance with Part 3(b)
of Proposition 14. The logic for why the solution is non-stationary is similar to the
one described in the case of price taking. Given that the buyer’s surplus is hump-
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Figure C.1: Top panels: Best PBE under Nash bargaining; Bottom panels:
2-period cycles and their welfare properties under Nash bargaining.
shaped, one can implement a high level of output in the initial period by promising
a high utility to buyers in the future, which is achieved by lowering future output.
In the bottom panels of Figure C.1 we represent the set of 2-period cycles under
the same parametrization. There are a continuum of cycles that dominate the
periodic equilibria obtained under “not-too-tight” solvency constraints (the red
area) and the highest steady state (the green area).
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